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SUMMARY 
 
This thesis examines the shifting nature of accountability and clientelism in dominant 
party politics in Tanzania through the analysis of the introduction of a Constituency 
Development Fund (CDF) in 2009. A CDF is a distinctive mechanism that channels a 
specific portion of the government budget to the constituencies of Members of 
Parliament (MPs) to finance local small-scale development projects which are primarily 
selected by MPs. While existing studies argue that the control of resources is essential 
for dominant parties to maintain their power in politics, the adoption of a type of CDF 
in Tanzania poses a puzzle; why did the dominant ruling party of Tanzania accept a 
CDF that would give the legislature financial autonomy and might weaken the party’s 
power over MPs? 
Through a combination of qualitative and quantitative analyses, the thesis 
demonstrates that a CDF proposal was moved forward as part of the reform to 
strengthen the legislature, and the ruling party accepted it to re-establish party 
coherence and gain public support in preparation for the general elections in 2010, after 
it was plagued by the revelation of corruption scandals involving party leaders and 
intraparty competition. The thesis has also found that a CDF was adopted when 
clientelistic voters were increasingly dissatisfied with the performance of MPs and some 
MPs had begun providing financial assistance to voters systematically. With a formal 
project-selection and monitoring mechanism in place, the Tanzanian CDF has more 
potential to restrict the prevalence of clientelistic accountability than the provision of 
private or club goods by MPs based on private resources. The Tanzanian case 
demonstrates that CDFs can potentially mitigate the influence of clientelism in the 
accountability relationship between MPs and voters in developing countries. 
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Preface 
 
Between 2005 and 2008, I worked at the Embassy of Japan in Tanzania as an economic 
cooperation advisor and attended the Governance Working Group (GWG), an aid 
coordination group of over 18 bilateral and multilateral development agencies providing 
assistance to Tanzania. With the new aid modalities, namely general budget support and 
basket funds, donors were increasingly influential in the decision-making and 
implementation of development policies in Tanzania. Various governance reforms were 
financially and technically supported by donors, and the GWG was established to foster 
good governance by ‘strengthen[ing] the effectiveness and efficiency of development 
assistance through joint policy dialogue, analysis and support to the Government of 
Tanzania’ (Development Partners Group in Tanzania).  
The GWG monthly meetings were held in the Umoja House, a landmark 
complex building situated in the centre of Dar es Salaam, where four major European 
donors – the United Kingdom, Germany, Netherlands and European Commission – 
have their country officers together. As the Japanese Embassy was not far from the 
Umoja House, I sometimes walked from my office to attend the GWG meetings there. It 
was only about a fifteen-minute walk, but was enough for me to remember that I was in 
Dar es Salaam, with a dazzling sunshine, my heels sinking into the unpaved streets and 
receiving friendly greetings by a man who occasionally washed my car. Every time I 
entered the Umoja House, the building of modern western design with a vaulted ceiling 
and fully air-conditioned rooms and corridors first gave me relief and then made me 
almost forget that I was in Tanzania. 
 In 2007, one agenda came to the fore at the GWG. It was a proposal to introduce 
a Constituency Development Fund (CDF) by the Tanzanian government. The members 
of the GWG were against the proposal as it would adversely affect governance of the 
country, and they expressed their concerns to the Tanzanian government on various 
occasions. Tanzanian civil society organisations joined forces and took various 
advocacy actions to stop the adoption of the fund. Yet, Tanzanian policymakers did not 
give in to the pressure. Donors’ frustration in their efforts to thwart the introduction of a 
CDF reminded me of the phrase ‘veranda’ politics in Africa (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 
136; Kelsall 2002), a metaphor suggesting that the formal policy space in 
‘air-conditioned rooms’ is only superficial and the actual decision-making takes place in 
the informal political domain of ‘verandas’. It seemed to me that a CDF was discussed 
- 2 - 
within a circle of Tanzanian politicians on a ‘veranda’, which neither donors nor civil 
society organisations were part of. I became interested in how and why Tanzanian 
politicians were pursuing the CDF agenda against the strong pressure and how it would 
affect the political process in the country. After completing my assignment at the 
embassy in 2008, I started to investigate the policymaking process of a CDF and its 
relationship with politics in Tanzania, not as a donor representative but as an academic 
researcher. In the midst of my enquiry, the CDF Act was passed into law in August 
2009 and the fund was launched several months before the general elections in 2010. 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
 
1.1. Aim and Scope 
 
A Constituency Development Fund (CDF) is a government budget allocation 
mechanism that channels a specific portion of the national budget to the constituencies 
of MPs to finance local small-scale development projects such as the construction of 
school facilities, health clinics and water supply systems (International Budget 
Partnership 2010; Keefer and Khemani 2009a; Policy Forum 2009). There are currently 
some 15 developing countries worldwide where CDFs are implemented. A CDF is a 
distinctive mechanism in that MPs are vested with a degree of authority in the selection 
of projects, a function that can be considered as a new form of constituency service by 
MPs. As such, a CDF is not merely a means of transferring public funds from central to 
local governments, but a strategic tool for a redistributive game by politicians in 
electoral politics; MPs use the funds to respond to the development needs of their 
constituencies, cultivate their personal votes and enhance their chances of re-election 
(Baskin 2010b; Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1987; Cox and McCubbins 1986). 
 CDFs have been implemented in different parts of the developing world for 
years. For example, a CDF-like mechanism existed in Uganda as early as 1969 
(Chambers 1974: 97). In the Philippines, the use of national funds by politicians for the 
projects in their constituencies dates back to 1930 by imitating ‘pork barrel’ politics1 in 
the United States of America, which became the basis for the design of a CDF launched 
in the country in 1989 (Nograles and Lagman 2008). Papua New Guinea introduced a 
CDF in 1984,
2
 and eventually, CDFs became a common government budget allocation 
mechanism mainly in Asia and Africa (Table 1.1). Over three-quarters of the countries 
where CDFs are implemented are commonwealth countries and all the countries listed 
in Table 1.1 use the First Past The Post (FPTP) electoral system which exhibits the 
importance of CDFs for candidate-centred electoral politics.
3
 
                                                   
1
 See, for example, Baskin (2010a) and Keefer and Khemani (2009b) on pork barrel politics. CDFs 
resemble ‘earmarks’ or ‘member items’, congressional budget allocations to the projects requested by 
legislators, in the United States of America. Yet, CDFs and American earmarks are different in that the 
former allocates set amounts of public funds to all the constituencies of MPs, while the latter is employed 
on a case-by-case basis. 
2
 The fund was abolished in Papua New Guinea in 1995 due to mounted criticism by local students and 
the World Bank on the lack of an accountability mechanism (Connell 1997: 278). 
3
 See, for example, Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis (2005) for electoral systems. Papua New Guinea changed 
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Table 1.1  Countries Where CDFs Are Implemented 
 
Year starting  
the operation 
Country Name of CDF 
1969/70 Uganda  Rural Development Programme 
FY2005/06  Constituency Development Fund 
1984–1995 Papua New Guinea  Electoral Development Fund 
1985 Pakistan  Five-point programme 
2003  Tameer-e-Pakistan Programme, later 
Khushal Pakistan Programme-I 
1989 Philippines  Mindanao Development Fund and Visayas 
Development Fund 
1990  Countrywide Development Fund, later 
Priority Development Assistance Fund 
1989 Solomon Islands  Rural Constituency Development Fund 
1992  Special Discretionary Fund 
2007  Millennium Constituency Development 
Fund and Constituency Micro Fund 
1993 India  Member of Parliament Local Area 
Development Scheme 
1994 Ghana  MPs’ share in the District Assembly 
Common Fund (DACF), HIPC Funds and 
GEducation Funds 
2011  Constituency Development Fund (to 
replace MPs’ share in the DACF) 
1995 Zambia  Constituency Development Fund 
1995 Nepal  Electoral Constituency Development 
Programme 
2000 Nigeria  Constituency Development Fund 
2003 Kenya  Constituencies Development Fund 
FY2006/07 Malawi  Constituency Development Fund 
FY2008/09 Jamaica  Constituency Development Fund 
2008 South Sudan  Constituency Development Fund 
2009–2012 Bhutan  Constituency Development Grant 
2009 Tanzania  Constituencies Development Catalyst 
Fund 
2010 Zimbabwe  Constituency Development Fund 
 
Sources: Baskin (2010b: 8–11), International Budget Partnership (2010), State University of 
New York (2009), Chambers (1974: 97), Connell (1997: 278), Khan (2006: 126), Nograles 
and Lagman (2008: 4–5), Solomon Star (28 June 2010), Solomon Islands (2008), Ghana 
Broadcasting Corporation (13 January 2011), Republic of India (2002), Mukwena (2004: 
14), European Union (2008), Daily Independent (1 April 2009), Uganda Debt Network 
(2007), Polity (16 June 2007), Jamaica (2008), Sudan Vision (24 September 2009), Bhutan 
(2009), The Bhutanese (17 March 2012), The Zimbabwean (27 April 2011) 
                                                                                                                                                     
the electoral system from FPTP to Alternative Vote after their CDF was abolished (Reynolds, Reilly and 
Ellis 2005: 50). Pakistan and the Philippines use a combination of FPTP and List Proportional 
Representation, but 80% of MPs are elected in the FPTP system in both countries. 
- 5 - 
 CDFs are a controversial mechanism as they directly involve MPs in the 
utilisation of public resources. A major concern has been raised by scholars, civil 
society organisations (CSOs) and Western donors that CDFs erode the separation of 
powers between the legislative and executive branches of the government, an 
arrangement that secures checks and balances in democracies (Murray 2011; van Zyl 
2010). In democratic systems, legislatures are mandated to make policies through the 
formulation of legislations and to oversee executives, while executives implement such 
policies to deliver public services to citizens. The critics of CDFs argue that the CDF 
approach blurs the boundaries of these distinct functions of the government branches by 
involving MPs in the execution of development projects. 
 On the other hand, CDFs have potentially positive effects on electoral 
democracy in developing countries. Given that many MPs in developing countries 
provide financial assistance to poor voters in their constituencies, which is conducive to 
the prevalence of clientelism, CDFs, if designed and implemented in transparent and 
accountable ways, have the potential to mitigate the influence of political finance on 
electoral competition and level the electoral playing field. In addition, in view of public 
finance management, CDFs may have a ring-fencing effect; by setting aside a small 
portion of public funds for MPs, the remaining development budgets of local 
governments may be protected from being abused by politicians or political parties for 
electoral purposes. 
 In sub-Saharan Africa, CDFs have proliferated over the last two decades 
particularly after gaining prominence following Kenya’s introduction of a CDF in 2003 
(Oxford Analytica 2009). When a CDF was adopted in Kenya, it was cautiously but 
widely welcomed by policymakers, civil society and international donors as a 
breakthrough in advancing the decentralisation of public funds and enhancing local 
ownership of development (Kimenyi 2005: 1; Sasaoka 2008: 84–95). However, a 
number of mismanagement of CDF funds by MPs were reported by the media, and 
CDFs became controversial not only in Kenya but also in the international discussion on 
transparency and accountability of public finance in developing countries. 
 Tanzania is one of the African countries that recently launched a CDF by 
emulating that of Kenya. The adoption of a CDF in Tanzania poses a puzzle. Similar to 
the Kenyan CDF, the Tanzanian CDF was designed in the way that the funds would 
automatically be allocated to all the constituencies of MPs without any requirement of 
obtaining approval of the executive. This type of CDF is considered to strengthen the 
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financial autonomy of the legislature from the executive through the allocation of public 
funds to constituency service by MPs (Bagaka 2010; Barkan and Matiangi 2009: 59; 
O'Donnell 2003). Why did Tanzania’s dominant ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi 
(CCM: ‘Party of Revolution’) adopt a CDF in 2009 that would strengthen the financial 
autonomy of the legislature and might weaken its power over its MPs, despite the fact 
that it had not been faced with serious competition from opposition in Mainland of the 
country?
4
 This is the main puzzle that initially motivated the study. The primary 
research question of the thesis is: were there any changes in dominant party politics in 
Tanzania that explain the adoption of a CDF in 2009? Through the examination of the 
politics behind the introduction of a CDF in Tanzania, the study also seeks to address 
another question which is more fundamental to the debates on CDFs: how does the 
introduction of a CDF affect the nature of electoral politics and accountability in 
Tanzania, in particular the accountability relationship between MPs and voters? Does it 
promote clientelistic accountability between them? While the Tanzanian CDF is still at 
an early stage of the implementation and its impacts cannot be assessed empirically, this 
thesis discusses the potential impacts of the CDF on electoral politics and accountability 
based on the analysis of the policy process and the current trend of the MP-voter 
relationship in the country.  
 
1.2. Contribution of the Study 
 
This thesis contributes mainly to the academic discussion on accountability and 
clientelism in developing countries. Among the various dimensions of accountability, 
this study focuses primarily on the vertical accountability relationship between MPs and 
voters which is the core foundation of democratic systems, and to a lesser extent on 
horizontal accountability between legislatures and executives. The two dimensions of 
accountability are of particular interest because CDFs are unique mechanisms to 
empower legislatures and MPs, and they are located at the juncture of the two 
dimensions of accountability. 
Vertical accountability between MPs and voters in developing countries is 
characterised by the influence of clientelism. Clientelism has been one of the central 
                                                   
4
 The United Republic of Tanzania consists of Mainland and Zanzibar, and this question applies only to 
Mainland. In Zanzibar, the Civic United Front (CUF), opposition party, has been challenging CCM’s rule 
since the reintroduction of multiparty politics in 1992. 
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characteristics of politics in developing countries where a majority of citizens are poor 
and tend to be dependent on protection and financial assistance from those who are in 
higher positions in the society including MPs. In democratic countries where elections 
are held regularly, politicians are motivated by electoral incentives and often choose to 
establish their electoral support through clientelistic relationships. 
As CDFs are a mechanism for MPs to distribute tangible goods to voters, some 
scholars view them as an instrument of clientelism. For example, van de Walle (2009) 
argues that the recent proliferation of CDFs in sub-Saharan Africa illustrates a shift of 
the locus of political clientelism from the presidency to the legislature in the region 
(9–10). On the other hand, there are scholars who distinguish CDFs from political 
clientelism (Lindberg 2010: 120). Indeed, CDFs are closely associated with clientelism, 
as the funds may serve as a tool for politicians (patrons) to gain support from voters 
(clients). Yet, in principle, CDFs do not seem to be a typical example of clientelism 
because they are used mainly for development projects and, unlike conventional 
clientelistic exchanges, MPs and voters do not have much personal interaction in CDFs. 
Thus, this thesis does not assume that CDFs are an instrument of clientelism. 
Rather, it takes an inductive approach, first looking at various types of CDFs in Asia 
and Africa and then examines the Tanzanian CDF in depth before discussing what the 
Tanzanian CDF means in view of accountability and clientelism. Through this analysis, 
the thesis seeks to add a new empirical case to the discussions on accountability and 
clientelism in political science. 
 While accountability and clientelism are the core area with which this thesis is 
concerned, it also adds a case to the literature on dominant party politics in developing 
countries. Tanzania is one of the African countries where one party has maintained its 
dominant power since independence. There is a volume of studies examining how 
dominant parties have established and maintained power in Tanzania and other 
democratic countries.
5
 Building on these studies, this thesis presents an example of how 
a dominant party responds to the weakening of party cohesion. The adoption of a CDF 
signifies that the party needed to readjust their election strategies to cope with the 
unexpected influence of factional politics and the risk of losing public support prior to 
the elections in 2010. The thesis therefore contributes to the discussions on the 
adaptation and resilience of dominant party systems in democracies. 
                                                   
5
 See Chapter 5 for the literature on dominant party politics in general and in Tanzania. 
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This thesis also contributes to the growing significance of legislatures and MPs 
in African politics (Barkan 2008; 2009; Lindberg 2010). With the unique objectives and 
arrangements of CDFs, this study also provides insights into the discussion on political 
finance in electoral politics (Casas-Zamora 2008). From policy perspectives, the study 
is also highly relevant to the good governance agenda promoted by the international 
community. Major western donors and researchers on aid have recognised the 
importance of legislatures, accountability mechanisms and political dynamics in 
promoting good governance in the aid recipient countries (Africa Power and Politics 
Programme; Barkan 2009; Hudson 2007; Hyden 2010; Hyden and Mmuya 2008; 
Tsekpo and Hudson 2009). This study draws the attention of donors and researchers on 
aid to the roles and incentives of MPs in economic and social development of their 
constituencies and the significance of the management of voter expectations of MPs. 
Donors and researchers on aid tend to consider constituency service by MPs as trivial to 
the national policy process in which they are mainly interested. Yet, they constitute a 
basic fabric of the accountability mechanisms that affects the overall performance of 
legislatures and the nature of governance in developing countries. 
 
1.3. Research Design 
 
There are various research streams and methods developed in political science that can 
be applied to the examination of specific political phenomena. Among them, this study 
is mainly guided by rational choice theory and new institutionalism (Hay 2002; Marsh 
2002: 3–7; Mayhew 1974; Norris 1997: 30). Rational choice theorists analyse political 
phenomena by focusing on actors with the assumption that actors are ‘instrumental, 
self-serving utility-maximisers’ (Hay 2002: 8). This study shares this assumption and 
highlights key individuals who are involved in the policy process of a CDF as rational 
actors. In particular, MPs are viewed as critical players in the process, who are 
essentially motivated by electoral and career incentives and behave in order to 
maximise their probability of winning elections and advance their political careers.
6
 
                                                   
6
 There is an ontological question as to whether collective entities such as legislatures, political parties 
and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are merely the aggregation of individual actors or they have 
their own ‘organic qualities’ (Hay 2006: 88–89). This thesis assumes that collective entities have organic 
qualities and treats them as the units of analysis, except for Chapter 6 in which individuals are the units of 
analysis. Yet, the thesis also highlights individual actors of collective entities who have had distinctive 
influence on CDF politics or generated meaningful variation within the entities. 
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 This study is also guided by new institutionalism which challenges the 
simplifying assumption of rational choice theory that actors play decisive roles in 
politics, and instead emphasises the importance of ‘the mediating role of the 
institutional contexts in which events occur’ (Hay 2002: 711, italics in original). New 
institutionalism not only refers to formal institutional settings as was the case in 
conventional institutionalism, but also encompasses ‘the rules, norms and values’ 
(Marsh 2002: 6) and highlights ‘history, timing and sequence in explaining political 
dynamics’ (Hay 2002: 11). Based on this view, this study assumes that the introduction 
of a CDF is not simply a result of the collective decisions made by rational actors, but 
the institutional factors, both formal and informal rules and political and social norms, 
affected the policy process and outcomes. By exploring the interactions between actors 
and institutions, the study presents a comprehensive picture of the political changes that 
affected the adoption of a CDF and its potential impact on the nature of electoral 
politics and accountability in Tanzania. 
 While there are various case studies on CDFs to illustrate particular aspects of 
politics in developing countries, there is no single dominant theoretical framework for 
the analysis of ‘CDF politics’, or the interaction between CDFs and politics. Thus, the 
study employed inductive and deductive approaches to examine the Tanzanian case by 
combining different theories and concepts (Hay 2002: 30–31). 
 The study employed a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. It 
relied on qualitative methods to understand the process in which a CDF was adopted 
and formulated, and applied quantitative methods to the analysis of the MP-voter 
relationship. For the qualitative analysis, it employed process-tracing methods to look 
into the policy process of the Tanzanian CDF from several perspectives by connecting 
key events (George and Bennett 2005). Two rounds of fieldwork were undertaken in 
Tanzania (from October 2010 to April 2011 and from October 2011 to March 2012) to 
collect primary data from various sources based on the principle of triangulation to 
enhance validity and reliability of data (Burnham 2008: 206). 
 During the fieldwork, open- and semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
key informants including MPs, their personal assistants, members of political parties 
and officials of Parliament, ministries and district councils, academia, CSOs and donor 
agencies. I visited the Parliament of Tanzania, commonly known as Bunge in Swahili, 
in Dodoma five times in November 2010, February, April and November in 2011 and 
February 2012. Most of the interviews with MPs were held within and outside the 
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Parliament in Dodoma. Thirty-four MPs were interviewed in total, including two 
cabinet ministers and four deputy ministers. Of these 34 MPs, 22 were from CCM and 
12 from opposition parties; 29 MPs were from Tanzania Mainland and 5 from Zanzibar; 
31 male and 3 female. The interviewed MPs were selected by snowball and chain 
referral sampling methods (Tansey 2007: 770), while long-serving MPs were 
particularly targeted to hear their views on the changes over time (see Appendix A for 
the list of interviewees and the selection criteria of MPs). 
 The analysis was also underpinned by the observation of the interactions 
between MPs and other actors. I accompanied the visit of Said Mohamed Mtanda, MP 
for Mchinga (CCM), to his constituency in Lindi Region, which is located in the 
south-east of the country, in March 2011, and observed his activities and interactions 
with people including voters, teachers and students in secondary schools, party 
members, his personal assistant, family members and friends. I interviewed his personal 
assistant who resides in the constituency and the officials of the Lindi District Council 
to understand their roles and relationships with MPs. In April 2011 and February 2012, 
I visited the Singida town in Singida Region, which is located in the central part of the 
country, and interviewed personal assistants of three MPs who were elected from the 
region, the officials of the Singida District Council and Municipal Offices and District 
Councillors, and visited several CDF-funded projects and the projects funded by the MP 
in the Singida Urban constituency. For archival research, government documents such 
as legislations, parliamentary hansards, court cases and election reports, local 
newspapers and the reports published by civil society organisations were collected. 
 Quantitative analysis is employed in an effort to understand the public 
perception of the role of MPs by using the Afrobarometer surveys (Chapter 6). I relied 
on the Afrobarometer surveys because I prioritised collecting information on the CDF 
policy process and changes in national politics during the fieldwork rather than 
conducting surveys of voters. Yet, thanks to the cooperation by the Research on Poverty 
Alleviation (REPOA), local research institute implementing the Afrobarometer surveys, 
I added several questions on the public perception of MPs to the latest survey in June 
2012, which enabled me to conduct regression analyses of the results. This is the first 
study that added vote margins of the elections and the ranking of MPs’ interventions in 
Parliament to the Afrobarometer dataset of Tanzania. 
This thesis also examines CDFs in other countries to understand the Tanzanian 
case from comparative perspectives (Chapter 2). This part of the analysis mainly relied 
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on secondary sources including academic studies and various reports by the media and 
civil society organisations. Only for the case in Kenya, I collected some primary data in 
Nairobi in January 2011. This was because the Tanzanian CDF was initially modelled 
on the Kenyan CDF and thus, the experience in Kenya had an influence on the CDF 
policy process in Tanzania. During the fieldwork in Nairobi, the data were collected 
through semi-structured interviews with selected key individuals including the Assistant 
Minister for State for Planning, National Development and Vision 2030 and a former 
MP who designed the Kenyan CDF (see Appendix A for the list of interviewees in 
Kenya). 
 As mentioned in the preface, I was working at the Embassy of Japan in Tanzania 
when the CDF proposal was discussed in Parliament. Thus, the study is also 
supplemented by my own observation of the events at that time. During the fieldwork 
between 2010 and 2012, my previous work experience in the country and command of 
Swahili facilitated the communication with gatekeepers and interviews with key 
informants. While the study prioritises the objectivity in data collection and 
interpretation, it should be noted that my background, affiliation and personality has a 
certain degree of influence on the findings of the study, particularly on the information 
obtained through elite interviews. 
Elite interviewing was a central method on which this study relied in collecting 
primary data, defined in terms of its unique target groups and characterised by the 
power relations between interviewers and respondents (Burnham 2008: 231; Herts and 
Imber 1995; Leech 2002: 663) As some researchers describe it as ‘studying up’ (Pierce 
1995: 94), the balance of knowledge and expertise in elite interviews is often in favour 
of the respondents and thus, it requires a different approach to the interviews (Burnham, 
2008: 231). Various techniques on elite interviewing were applied during the fieldwork 
with some adjustments to the specific contexts of Tanzania and Kenya.
7
  
 
 
1.4. Structure of the Thesis 
 
The thesis is organised in seven chapters. The remainder of this chapter reviews the 
                                                   
7
 Dexter (1970), Burnham (2008: 231–247) and Harrison (2001: 94–95) provide a good overview of elite 
interviewing in political science. Herts and Imber’s (1995) collection of essays on qualitative methods for 
elite studies are written mainly for sociologists but also useful for political science research. 
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literature on the overarching concepts of the thesis. Chapter 2 compares CDF politics in 
seven countries in Asia and Africa, namely Pakistan, Philippines, India, Zambia, Ghana, 
Kenya and Tanzania, to understand the similarities and differences across the countries 
and to locate the Tanzanian case within the global context. The chapter categorises the 
case countries by the two key dimensions that explain the variation of CDF politics: the 
power balance between executives and legislatures and regime change. The chapter 
demonstrates that the adoption of a CDF by the long-serving ruling party that was 
designed to strengthen the financial autonomy of MPs in Tanzania is a unique case and 
thus worth examining. 
 Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 are the analysis of CDF politics in Tanzania. First, 
Chapter 3 delineates how a CDF was proposed, discussed and introduced in Tanzania 
with a focus on the actors who were involved in the process and their competing 
rationales to support or oppose the fund. Chapter 4 examines the introduction of a CDF 
from the viewpoint of legislative development and discusses how a CDF constituted a 
reform to strengthen the power and autonomy of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive 
and the ruling party. Chapter 5 analyses the introduction of a CDF from the perspective 
of electoral politics and explores how election strategies of the CCM have changed over 
time. It demonstrates that a CDF was one of the strategies of the CCM to regain its 
party coherence and public support in preparation for the elections in 2010. Chapters 4 
and 5 discuss the influence of dominant party politics on the evolution of the legislature 
and electoral politics and thus, these two chapters present one set of analysis of CDF 
politics in a dominant party state from two different angles. 
 Chapter 6 examines the accountability relationship between MPs and voters to 
explain whether and how the fundraising for constituency service became a burden on 
MPs, one of the main reasons for the introduction of a CDF in Tanzania. Based on the 
interviews with MPs and the analysis of the Afrobarometer survey results, the chapter 
shows the trend that clientelistic voters, who have high expectations of MPs to bring 
tangible benefits to their constituencies, are likely to be dissatisfied with the 
performance of MPs and some MPs with fundraising capacity have established 
mechanisms to provide assistance to voters systematically rather than on an ad-hoc 
basis to reduce their transaction costs while maintaining their reputation in constituency 
service. This trend supports that a CDF fitted well with the need of MPs to serve widely 
for their constituents in a systematic manner. 
 As a conclusion of the thesis, Chapter 7 makes an argument that the Tanzanian 
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CDF is a less clientelistic form of constituency service and discusses the implications of 
the introduction of a CDF to the nature of accountability in the country. 
 
1.5. Literature Review 
 
The remainder of this chapter reviews the literature on the themes that are central to the 
examination of CDF politics in general and in Tanzania. First, this section provides an 
overview of the existing studies on CDFs. Second, it reviews the literature on the 
functions and roles of MPs in democratic systems with a focus on constituency service. 
Finally, it provides a critical review of the literature on accountability and clientelism, 
two central concepts for the second research question of this thesis. The studies on 
dominant party politics will be reviewed in Chapter 5 as part of the discussion on 
electoral politics in Tanzania. 
 
1.5.1. Existing Studies on CDFs 
 
While CDFs have been used in various parts of the developing world for many years, 
they started to receive wide attention by scholars and policymakers only recently. There 
are two groups of studies on CDFs. First, there are comparative studies on CDFs across 
different regions. The Center for International Development at the State University of 
New York in Albany (SUNY/CID) and the International Budget Partnership (IBP), an 
international advocacy initiative led by an American NGO, provide a good collection of 
research that explain the generic features, variations and controversies of CDFs. The 
researchers at the SUNY/CID are mainly concerned with transparency and 
accountability in the fund management and they published a guideline for the 
management of CDFs in collaboration with the Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Association, while the IBP focuses more on supporting local CSOs in their engagement 
with the discussion on CDFs (Baskin 2010b; International Budget Partnership 2010; 
State University of New York 2009; 2011). 
The second group of studies on CDFs are political science research. Most of 
them treat CDFs as examples to illustrate particular aspects of patronage politics or 
clientelism in the regions or countries of their focus. For example, as mentioned earlier, 
van de Walle (2009) refers to CDFs to discuss a shifting locus of political clientelism 
from executives to legislatures in sub-Saharan Africa. Barkan and Matiangi (2009) 
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concur with this view and argue that the Kenyan CDF illustrates a strengthening of 
power of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive, as it reduces the need for MPs to ask for 
funds from the executive (59). Cheeseman (2006) compares CDFs in Kenya and 
Zambia to explain the contrasting patterns of patronage politics built by the dominant 
parties in the two countries following the transition to multiparty systems. Kasuya 
(2009) demonstrates how the Philippine CDF has contributed to strengthening the 
presidential control over public resources in the country. Keefer and Khemani (2009b) 
argue that Indian MPs make less effort in utilising CDF funds in the constituencies 
where voter attachment to political parties is strong. What is common across these 
studies is the question as to who holds the power over the release and use of CDF funds. 
Building on these studies, this thesis examines CDF politics in Tanzania with a focus on 
who gains the power over the funds. This is the first academic study that analyses the 
policy process of a CDF and its interaction with politics in Tanzania. 
 
1.5.2. Core Functions and the Benefactor Role of MPs in Democracy 
 
As this thesis is mainly concerned with the role of MPs in democracies in developing 
countries, the basic concepts concerning legislatures and MPs need to be explained. 
While ‘[t]here is no statutory job description for MPs’ (United Kingdom 2013: 2), 
legislatures and MPs in democratic systems have four generic functions: representation, 
lawmaking, oversight and constituency service (Barkan 2009: 6–9; Diamond and 
Plattner 2010: 33–35). First, MPs are mandated to represent the views of their 
constituents mainly in Parliament or more broadly ‘mimic the varied and conflicting 
interests extant in society as a whole’ (Barkan 2009: 7).8 The second fundamental 
function of legislatures and MPs is lawmaking: to make public policies by crafting 
legislations. Third, legislatures and MPs oversee executives to ensure that the policies 
formulated in legislatures are appropriately implemented by governments. Finally, MPs 
provide constituency service: to attend to the needs of their constituents by, for example, 
holding public meetings to hear problems facing communities and individual voters and 
offer them help to solve the problems (Barkan 2009: 6–7). 
                                                   
8
 Representation is also referred to as the overall role of MPs in democracies rather than one of their core 
functions. For example, Pitkin (1967) discusses the concept of representation as the overall role of MPs 
by defining it as ‘the making present in some senses of something which is nevertheless not present 
literally or in fact’ (9). See also Jewell (1983) and Mukandala and Rubagumya (2004) on representation. 
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A number of studies on the constituency roles of MPs were undertaken in 
relation to personal votes and incumbency advantages particularly in American and 
British politics between the 1970s and the 1990s (Butler and Collins 2001; Fenno 1978; 
King 1991). American politics was generally considered to be candidate-centred in 
which MPs and candidates were highly motivated to cultivate personal votes in their 
constituencies, while British politics is centred on political parties that provided fewer 
incentives for politicians to focus on gaining personal votes. Yet, the significance of the 
constituency roles of British MPs was also recognised in the late 1980s and the 1990s, 
and the number of studies on constituency service has increased (Cain, Ferejohn and 
Fiorina 1987; Carey and Shugart 1995; Gaines 1998: 169; Martin 2011: 472; Mezey 
2011: 18; Norris 1997). 
For example, Norris (1997) discusses four instrumental incentives facing British 
MPs in calculating the costs and benefits of constituency service. First, MPs are 
motivated by electoral incentives to use constituency service to maintain their personal 
votes in elections (30). Second, similar to electoral incentives, MPs are also motivated 
by selectoral incentives and serve for the party members to gain votes in the primaries 
and be nominated by the parties for candidacy. Third, MPs have career incentives which 
‘have to be understood in terms of the structure of opportunities facing members, and 
the costs of time invested in constituency service compared with other parliamentary 
activities’ (Norris 1997: 32). This is because successful constituency service helps MPs 
retain their seats, yet it is insufficient to advance their political careers. Thus, MPs who 
have other commitments in the government or political parties and those who are highly 
motivated to advance their political careers need to reduce the transaction costs for 
constituency service to save time for parliamentary or party activities. Finally, apart 
from these incentives, MPs provide constituency service due to psychological rewards 
and their role orientations (Norris 1997: 32). These incentives can be applied to the 
behaviour of MPs in other democratic countries especially where the FPTP system is 
used. 
Norton (1994) identified seven constituency roles of British MPs. For example, 
the role of safety valve allows citizens to express their views on public policies to MPs. 
Local dignitary is the role by which MPs are invited to various local events in their 
constituencies. The one most relevant to this study is a benefactor; an MP serves as ‘the 
provider of benefits to particular individuals, usually those who are needy or greedy’ 
(707). It involves the offer of ‘some help, including sometimes financial help, without 
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reference to any other body or seeking to obtain some preferences … for a constituent 
without any dispute being involved’ (Norton 1994: 707). All constituency roles have 
become increasingly significant to British MPs in the post-war years, except for that of 
a benefactor; the benefactor role was historically important but diminished (Norton 
1994: 707, 713). Applying Norton’s discussion, this study refers to the constituency role 
of MPs to provide financial or material assistance to voters in their constituencies as a 
benefactor. This study expands Norton’s definition to include the assistance by MPs to 
communities in their constituencies as part of their benefactor role. The distinction 
between individuals and communities will be reviewed in the discussion on clientelism 
in the following section. 
 In developing countries where a majority of voters are poor and in need 
assistance to sustain their daily lives, and the governments lack capacity and resources 
to provide sufficient social services, a benefactor tends to be a central role of MPs in 
their constituencies to establish and maintain electoral support (Lindberg 2010). Due to 
this tendency, constituency service sometimes refers only to a benefactor role in the 
studies on MPs in developing countries. For example, Barkan (2009) explains that 
constituency service in sub-Saharan Africa takes the form of either the assistance 
provided by MPs to some of their constituents with their individual needs or to small- to 
medium-scale development projects in their constituencies (7). Yet, MPs in developing 
countries also play other constituency roles such as giving legal advice. This study 
distinguishes a benefactor role from constituency service in the way that the former 
refers to the MP’s role in providing financial or material assistance to individual voters 
or communities while the latter to the overall role of MPs in their constituencies 
including other kinds of assistance. 
 Some scholars argue that the four core functions of MPs discussed above are in 
tension with each other due to the different nature of interests each function entails (i.e. 
general interests and particularistic interests) and the limited time and financial 
resources of MPs (Barkan 2009: 8; Norris 1997). It is true that MPs in any democratic 
countries struggle with balancing their different functions. However, as Lindberg’s 
(2009) study on Ghanaian MPs demonstrates, a benefactor role is probably the most 
important task for MPs in developing countries as it directly affects their political 
survival. 
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1.5.3. Accountability and Clientelism 
 
There is a large volume of studies on the nature of accountability in democratic 
countries. This section focuses on vertical accountability with a question as to how 
CDFs affects the way in which voters hold their MPs accountable in developing 
countries. Horizontal accountability will be reviewed in Chapter 4 as part of the 
discussion on legislative development in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Accountability between MPs and Voters 
 
The relationship between MPs and voters in democratic countries is often described 
with the concept of accountability. Whereas the lexical meaning of accountability is 
being ‘required or expected to justify actions or decisions’ (Oxford Dictionary of 
English 2005: 11), accountability of elected representatives (e.g. presidents, MPs) to 
voters is often discussed with two connotations: answerability and enforcement 
(Schedler 1999: 14). Answerability is ‘the obligation of public officials to inform about 
and to explain what they are doing’ (Schedler 1999: 14), which is close to the above 
lexical meaning of the term. Enforcement is ‘the capacity of accounting agencies to 
impose sanctions on powerholders who have violated their public duties’ (Schedler 
1999: 14) or to reward them for good behaviours. In the relationship between MPs and 
voters, voters are accounting agencies and MPs are powerholders. For citizens to 
effectively perform enforcement, they need to know about the actions taken by their 
representatives. Thus, answerability is a precondition of enforcement. Answerability 
refers to the acts of politicians, while enforcement is an act of voters, and the 
combination of both constitutes the accountability mechanism of the two actors. 
 Alternatively, accountability can be explained by a combination of 
representation and enforcement (Fearon 1999). In this case, accountability between the 
two actors is often described as a principal-agent relationship, and the agent (elected 
representative) is accountable to the principal (electoral constituent) when there is an 
understanding between the two that 1) the agent is obliged to act on behalf of the 
principal (representation) and 2) the principal is empowered to sanction or reward the 
agent for his or her performance in this capacity (enforcement) (Fearon 1999: 55). 
Representation discussed here does not only refer to one of the four core functions of 
MPs discussed above, but it broadly refers to the delegated roles by MPs, including 
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lawmaking and oversight. 
 Another notion occasionally discussed in the conceptualisation of accountability 
is responsiveness, which is ‘the extent to which the agent has acted in a manner that 
meets the expectations of the principal’ (Hyden 2010: 2).9 In contrast to answerability 
and enforcement which highlight particular aspects of linkages between MPs and voters, 
responsiveness encompasses the whole acts of MPs as agents of voters. It also 
encompasses all the four core functions of MPs; for example, responsiveness can be 
assessed on the extent to which constituency service by MPs meets the expectations of 
their constituents. In elections, voters evaluate the past performance and prospects of 
responsiveness of incumbent MPs or challengers and exercise enforcement. Figure 1.2 
below summarises the accountability mechanism showing the sequence of the three 
elements of accountability discussed so far. 
 
Figure 1.2 Accountability Mechanism 
 
answerability         assessment of responsiveness         enforcement 
 
Source: the author 
 
In the situation where voters have high expectations of MPs to provide 
constituency service, answerability is less important for voters than responsiveness. 
This is because answerability is particularly critical for the acts of MPs that take place 
where voters are not present and cannot directly observe them and thus, require the 
information and explanation of the acts. In other words, answerability is particularly 
important for the delegated roles of MPs such as oversight and lawmaking, as they take 
place outside their constituencies. On the other hand, constituency service by MPs takes 
place in the locations where voters are present. Moreover, the acts of a benefactor, or 
the provision of financial or material assistance by MPs to voters, directly involve 
voters themselves. Voters not only observe the acts of MPs but they are a part of the 
acts. Thus, answerability becomes less relevant to voters’ evaluation of the 
responsiveness of MPs. Weak answerability in the benefactor role of MPs is important 
to understand how accountability works in developing countries, which will be 
                                                   
9
 See, also, Carey (2009) and Jewell (1983) on responsiveness in accountability. 
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discussed in relation to the Tanzanian CDF later in the thesis. 
 
Clientelism 
 
Clientelism, or patron-client relationships, in electoral politics explains the features of 
certain political systems, organisations (e.g. political parties) or actors (e.g. MPs). These 
concepts originated in anthropology and sociology to describe the social relationships in 
traditional societies. According to Scott (1972), a patron-client relationship is: 
 
a special case of dyadic (two-person) ties involving a largely instrumental 
friendship in which an individual of higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses 
his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a 
person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general 
support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron (92).  
 
The key elements of clientelism in the above definition by Scott and other scholars 
discussing clientelism are unequal, dyadic (meaning two-person and face-to-face) and 
reciprocal exchanges between patrons and clients (Clapham 1982: 4; Eisenstadt and 
Roniger 1984: 48–49; Kanchan 2007: 86; Lande 1977: xiii; Stokes 2007; 
Taylor-Robinson 2006: 109). 
 In the late 1960s, political scientists in the rational choice school studying 
machine politics
10
 adopted the concept of clientelism to discuss the characteristics of 
political structures in Southeast Asia, Latin America and Africa (Schmidt, Guasti, 
Lande and Scott 1977; Scott 1969; Scott 1972; Taylor-Robinson 2006: 107–108; 
Zolberg 1966). Scott (1972) argues that there are political associations and conflicts in 
these regions which cannot be explained solely by the existing theories based on class 
or primordial sentiments (e.g. ethnicity, language, religion), but can be explained by 
patron-client relationships (91–92). 
 Thereafter, the discussion on clientelism in electoral politics, particularly its 
influence on the relationship between politician and voters in democratic systems, was 
developed by scholars in comparative politics, notably Piattoni (2001), Stokes (2007; 
                                                   
10
 Machine politics is a form of politics in which a political party in power exercises its control by 
securing and holding office for its leaders and distributing income to those who run it and work for it 
(Scott 1969: 1144–1145). The nature of the relationship between political leaders and followers in 
machine politics can be considered as clientelism. 
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2013) and Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007). They highlight the characteristics of the 
goods provided by politicians to voters and the way in which they are distributed in 
clientelism. There is, however, no clear agreement among these scholars on what kinds 
of goods are used by politicians for clientelistic exchanges (van de Walle 2009: 3–4). 
The differences between these studies on the kinds of goods exist mainly in the 
beneficiaries (e.g. individuals, small groups, communities, constituencies). 
 For example, Piattoni (2001) defines clientelism as ‘the trade of votes and other 
types of partisan support in exchange for public decisions with divisible benefits’ (4, 
italics in original).  The public decisions with divisible benefits are based on public 
resources and similar to patronage. Clientelism and patronage are often used 
interchangeably, but patronage tends to denote public resources such as jobs, goods and 
public decisions, whereas clientelism entails all kinds of goods provided by patrons to 
clients (Piattoni 2001: 5, Stokes 2007: 606). Piattoni’s definition of clientelism does not 
include tangible goods based on private funds raised by MPs, perhaps because her study 
is mainly on European countries where clientelism based on private funds is not so 
common as in developing countries. 
Stokes (2007) defines clientelism as ‘the proffering of material goods in return 
for electoral support, where the criterion of distribution that the patron uses is simply: 
did you (will you) support me?’ (605). She specifies ‘material goods’ as what MPs use 
for clientelistic exchanges, which can be sourced with either public or private funds. In 
contrast to Piattoni (2001), Stoke’s (2007) focus on material goods is not surprising as 
her studies are centred on developing countries where material goods are commonly 
used for clientelism. 
Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) focus on the types of goods used for the 
exchanges between politicians and voters and discuss two types of relationships 
between voters and electoral representatives: programmatic and clientelistic 
relationships. A programmatic relationship is based on indirect, non-specific exchange 
of collective goods and votes, and the performance of elected representatives is 
monitored through collective surveillance such as independent media. For example, the 
processes of formulating national policies that affect all the citizens in the country and 
subsequent assessment of the policies by voters represent a programmatic relationship 
(Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 7, 13). In contrast, a clientelistic relationship is founded 
on the provision of goods by politicians exclusively to individuals or small groups of 
people in their constituencies as private rewards to voters ‘who have already delivered 
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or who promise to deliver their electoral support’ (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 10). 
 Programmatic and clientelistic relationships are characterised by the three broad 
types of goods provided by MPs to voters: private, public and club goods. Private goods 
are tangible goods (e.g. money, materials, jobs) provided to individual citizens. Public 
goods, on the other hand, are beneficial to every member in society ‘regardless of 
whether they contribute to the production of the goods or not’ (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 
2007: 11). Examples of public goods include national security, macroeconomic growth 
and national taxation systems. Finally, between public and private goods there are club 
goods which provide benefits to certain groups of citizens. Politicians typically seek to 
distribute club goods to solidify and increase the size of their electoral support.
11
 The 
projects funded by CDFs are generally club goods. While a programmatic relationship 
is based on the provision of either public or club goods, a clientelistic relationship is 
based on either private or club goods (Buchanan 1965; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 
7–12). Figure 1.3 below presents the two types of the relationships between MPs and 
voters, the types of goods and some examples of goods including CDFs. 
 
Figure 1.3 The Nature of Relationships between MPs and Voters 
Nature of
Relationships
Type of Goods
Examples
handouts, food,
public jobs
donations to community
projects, CDFs
national security,
macroeconomic growth
Clientelistic Programmatic
Private Club Public
 
Source: the author, adopted from Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) 
 
While this framework is useful for the analysis of the relationships between MPs and 
voters, it does not give straight answers to the question as to whether club goods, 
including CDFs, contribute to programmatic or clientelistic relationships. 
There are scholars who consider that club goods are not a tool for clientelism or 
they are a better form of clientelism. Lindberg (2010), for example, distinguishes 
                                                   
11
 Lindberg (2010) adds another type of goods, collective goods, between public and club goods, which 
are ‘‘impure’ public goods in that they are directed towards a particular collective (such as legislative 
instruments providing free healthcare for expectant mothers, or general subsidies to sports clubs) but are 
non-divisible within that group’ (119). This thesis treats collective goods as a sub-type of club goods. 
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constituency service, which involves the provision of either club or private goods, from 
political clientelism, which is limited to the provision of private goods, while 
recognising the difficulty in empirically separating the two (120–121). Thus, club goods 
do not contribute to clientelism in his conceptualisation. Similar to Lindberg, Piattoni 
(2001) assumes that constituency service has a collective character and thus, it is one of 
the solutions to clientelism by changing particularistic politics into more acceptable 
forms. She argues that, while still a form of particularism, constituency service is more 
tractable in view of the harmonisation of particularistic interests into general interests of 
society (29). According to their conceptualisation of constituency service, CDFs may be 
an example of constituency service that is not clientelistic. Yet, it needs more 
explanations as to why constituency service or the provision of club goods does not 
contribute to clientelism. Chapter 7 explores this question with the case of the 
Tanzanian CDF. 
The distinction of the types of goods is related to the three core elements of 
clientelism discussed earlier. In electoral politics, clientelistic exchanges are founded on 
inequality between MPs and voters. Private goods, and club goods to a lesser extent, 
strengthen the dyadic dimension of the relationships, as they are meant to benefit 
individuals, cultivate face-to-face personal relationships between MPs and voters. 
Private goods, and club goods to a lesser extent, generate stronger obligations to 
reciprocate among the recipients of the goods than public goods. By combining the 
nature of the MP-voter relationships and the types of goods used for their exchanges, 
what seems to be ultimately important in examining the nature of clientelism in 
electoral politics is the extent to which the provision of particular goods by politicians 
to voters generates a sense of obligation or willingness to reciprocate among voters in 
elections. 
Stokes et al. (2013) provide an alternative conceptualisation of distributive 
politics and clientelism. They distinguish between programmatic and non-programmatic 
distribution of resources based on whether there are public and binding rules. If there 
are formalised and public criteria for distribution (public rules) in place and these 
criteria shape actual distribution of resources (binding rules), the mode of distribution of 
resources is called programmatic distribution. Non-public or nonbinding rules mean that 
one or both of the above rules is missing (Stokes et al. 2013: 7). The distribution of the 
government budget is more likely to have public and binding rules than the distribution 
of private resources. Although CDFs use the government budget, they are a unique 
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mechanism because they have a combination of the both types of distribution; while 
their criteria of distribution of resources to constituencies are usually public and binding, 
the criteria of distribution of resources to projects are non-public as they are determined 
primarily by MPs or project-selection committees established at the constituency level. 
The characteristics of CDFs will be examined further in Chapter 7. 
 
Clientelistic Accountability 
 
The accountability relationship between MPs and voters which is influenced by 
clientelism is sometimes called clientelistic accountability (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 
2007: 2) or patron-client accountability (Lindberg 2009: 12). Clientelistic accountability 
means that the way in which voters hold their elected representatives accountable is 
based on clientelistic norms and exchanges. As discussed on the benefactor role earlier, 
answerability tends to be weak in clientelistic accountability, because the interaction 
between MPs and voters is dyadic, voters are the beneficiaries of the goods provided by 
MPs and thus, there is no need for MPs to explain about their actions to the 
beneficiaries. MPs are under less pressure to be answerable in clientelistic 
accountability as long as they provide tangible goods to voters. Voters evaluate 
responsiveness of MPs and other candidates, and exercise enforcement based on their 
senses of reciprocity. Figure 1.4 below shows the clientelistic accountability mechanism 
by combining the key elements of accountability and clientelism discussed so far. 
 
Figure 1.4 Clientelistic Accountability Mechanism 
 
weak answerability        assessment of responsiveness characterised by unequal 
and dyadic interactions based on private or club goods       enforcement 
characterised by reciprocity 
 
Source: the author 
 
Electoral clientelism is pervasive in developing countries due to ‘widespread 
poverty and … a relatively weak ineffective state apparatus’ (Stokes 2007: 606). 
However, clientelism is not necessarily a sustainable mode of relationship in electoral 
politics. It can be expensive for politicians partly because voters have bargaining power 
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by holding votes as their political resource in electoral clientelism, which is a major 
difference from patron-client relationships in traditional societies in which clients did 
not have such power. In electoral clientelism, the demands of voters tend to be inflated, 
leading to overinvestment (Müller 2007: 263; Scott 1972: 109). CDFs are associated 
with the incremental nature of clientelism, as one of the objectives of the establishment 
of the funds is to relieve the fundraising burden of MPs for constituency service. In 
other words, the introduction of CDFs may be a response to the expansion of 
clientelism. 
Some studies argue that the declining economic gaps between MPs and voters 
reduce the use of clientelism. For example, Wilkinson (2007) argues that clientelism in 
India is likely to decline in the future because the costs of clientelism are increasing due 
to the expansion of the private sector and the growth of a large middle and upper middle 
class (112). Weitz-Shapiro (2012) found in Argentina that some mayors of 
municipalities were opting out of clientelism as it decreases the support from non-poor 
voters. While the economic gaps between MPs and a majority of voters have remained 
large in Tanzania, Chapter 6 of this thesis demonstrates that clientelism does not sustain 
long-term support even from poor voters to MPs in the country and the CDF offers a 
mechanism for MPs to establish a less clientelistic relationship with voters. 
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Chapter 2  Patterns of CDF Politics in Asia and Africa 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
While CDFs in developing countries have a common objective to help MPs serve their 
constituents better, the way in which CDFs interact with politics varies across different 
countries. At first glance, MPs are the primary beneficiaries of CDFs as they are vested 
with authority to decide how to allocate the funds in their constituencies. This means 
that, from an institutional viewpoint, CDFs strengthen the financial autonomy of the 
legislature from the executive. While this seems to be generally true, there are countries 
in which the executive holds power to release CDF funds for constituencies or projects. 
In such cases, MPs may have to negotiate with the executive or even become financially 
dependent on the executive. 
To understand such variation, this chapter compares seven case countries in Asia 
and Africa where CDFs have been implemented and proposes four patterns of the 
interactions between CDFs and politics. This comparative analysis situates the 
Tanzanian case within the global context and provides a first clue to the question as to 
why a CDF was adopted by the dominant ruling party in the country. 
 The comparison of the selected countries suggests that the power dynamics 
between different actors in the introduction and implementation of CDFs varies 
significantly. Based on the inductive analysis, a typology of the potential or actual 
influence of CDFs on politics can be developed by identifying two major dimensions: 1) 
the power balance between the executive and the legislature (whether the introduction 
of a CDF strengthens the power of the executive led by the ruling party or the power of 
MPs) and 2) regime change (whether a CDF is introduced by new leaders following a 
regime change or not). The former dimension responds to the question as to whether 
CDFs empower MPs leading to a shift of power from the executive to the legislature, 
thus leading to enhancing horizontal accountability between the two government 
branches.
12
 The latter dimension highlights whose and what kinds of interests are 
pursued during the introduction of CDFs and suggests why the executive in some 
countries allow the legislature to gain power through the establishment of the funds. 
This dimension is directly related to the overall research question of this thesis as to 
                                                   
12
 See Chapter 6 on horizontal accountability. 
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why a CDF was adopted by the dominant ruling party without a prospect of regime 
change in Tanzania. While the executive and ruling parties are different institutions, this 
chapter does not separate them to illuminate the power balance between the executive 
and the legislature. 
 The first half of the chapter discusses four patterns of the CDF politics based on 
different combinations of the executive-legislature power balance and regime change. 
The second half categorises seven case countries in Asia and Africa, namely, Pakistan 
(a CDF was introduced in 1985), the Philippines (1989), India (1993), Ghana (1994), 
Zambia (1995), Kenya (2003) and Tanzania (2009) into the typology.
13
 The seven 
countries were selected mainly due to the availability of secondary sources and the 
significance of CDFs in these countries. 
 
2.2. Two Dimensions in Explaining the Variation of CDF Politics 
 
There are two key dimensions that explain the variation of CDF politics, or the 
interactions between CDFs and politics. The first is whether and to what extent different 
political actors in the government (i.e. presidents, ministers, MPs, local bureaucrats) 
have power over CDF funds formally and informally. It demonstrates the power 
dynamics around CDFs, which can be translated into whether CDFs have an effect on 
empowering the executive or the legislature.
14
 The assumption of this chapter is that, in 
the countries where MPs are given a high degree of authority over CDF funds, MPs 
gain autonomy from the executive and thus, the power of the legislature is strengthened 
vis-à-vis the executive. This seems particularly evident in the countries where 
presidents used to control patronage and informally distribute funds to MPs for their 
constituency service. In some such cases, CDFs may even be a significant loss of 
presidential power over MPs. 
 In contrast, there are countries where the president or other actors in the 
executive have a high degree of authority to release CDF funds for particular 
                                                   
13
 The research approach by Cheeseman’s (2011) study on the power-sharing in Africa was adopted and 
adapted in developing the typology. 
14
 International Budget Partnership (2010) provides a useful framework to assess the degree of MPs’ 
influence on CDFs by examining 1) whether MPs have authority to appoint the members of the 
committees of CDFs, 2) whether CDF funds are disbursed into MPs’ personal accounts and 3) whether 
MPs have authority to disburse CDF funds. These factors are taken into account in comparing the case 
countries to the extent possible. 
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constituencies. In this case, MPs become dependent on the executive and CDFs have the 
opposite effect; the funds contribute to maintaining or enhancing the power of the 
executive vis-à-vis the legislature. There are also countries where local bureaucrats, 
including presidential appointees at district levels, are given authority to release CDF 
funds. In such cases, CDFs contribute to indirectly strengthening the power of the 
executive vis-à-vis the legislature with a caveat that it depends on the nature of the 
relationships between the actors within the executive (i.e. presidents, cabinet ministers, 
bureaucrats). 
 The second dimension is the timing of the introduction of CDFs in relation to 
election cycles. The question is whether a CDF is introduced before or after the 
elections and in the latter case, whether there was a regime change or not prior to the 
adoption of a CDF.
15
 This dimension is important because, as discussed earlier, CDFs 
function as resources for the redistributive game by MPs in electoral politics. There are 
countries where CDFs are introduced by new leaders immediately after they come to 
power through elections or appointments. In such cases, the introduction of CDFs is 
likely to be driven by the intentions of the new leaders to make changes in politics. In 
contrast, there are countries where CDFs are introduced by long-serving governments. 
In these countries, although CDF funds are allocated to all the constituencies including 
those represented by opposition MPs, the adoption of CDFs tends to be driven by the 
intentions of the leaders of dominant ruling parties to maintain or re-establish their 
power. 
 By combining the above two dimensions, the four patterns of CDF politics are 
identified and shown in Figure 2.1 below. The four patterns are: 1) establishing new 
patronage politics, 2) changing the rule of the game in electoral politics, 3) maintaining 
the status quo and 4) alleviating the risk of losing support from MPs. 
 
                                                   
15
 It should be noted that an election cycle is a continuous process and it is sometimes difficult to 
distinguish between ‘before’ and ‘after’ the elections. 
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Figure 2.1  Patterns of CDF Politics 
 
Source: the author 
 
First, there are countries where CDFs are introduced following a change of government, 
but new leaders restrict the power of individual MPs through the use of CDF funds. In 
such cases, despite sharing the generic objective to enhance MPs’ engagement with the 
development of their constituencies, CDFs are more likely to be aimed at establishing 
new patronage politics controlled by new leaders in power. 
 Second, CDFs that are introduced immediately after a regime change and vest 
MPs with a high degree of control over CDF funds are likely to represent changing the 
rule of the game in electoral politics. As mentioned above, in such cases, CDFs are 
introduced with the intention of new leaders to dissolve the patronage politics 
established by former leaders. This path may be chosen by new leaders particularly if 
they won the elections by advocating for removing old patronage politics. 
 Third, when governments introduce CDFs without a regime change while 
controlling the release of the funds, CDFs demonstrate maintaining the status quo. 
There are no examples that belong to this pattern when the funds were established 
among the seven case countries, but some countries shifted toward this pattern during 
the implementation processes as executives tried to restrict the power of MPs over the 
funds. This occasionally happens as a response to growing public criticism on the 
mismanagement of the funds by MPs. 
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 Finally, CDFs that are introduced by governments without a regime change by 
giving a high degree of authority to MPs in managing CDF funds are likely to be driven 
by the intentions of the government leaders to alleviate the risk of losing support from 
MPs to the governments. The use of patronage politics tends to increase when the 
president is politically vulnerable and in need of parliamentary support (International 
Budget Partnership 2010: 44), and CDFs can be a strategy of presidents or ruling parties 
to consolidate support from MPs in preparation for the forthcoming elections. 
 These patterns are not definite and there are countries that do not neatly fit into 
one category and some countries shift from one category to another as CDFs evolve 
over time. There is also a risk of oversimplifying the political contexts of individual 
cases by pushing them into particular patterns. However, this typology will enable us to 
compare a variety of CDF politics in developing countries systematically. 
 To supplement the above typology, there are two aspects that demonstrate how 
strongly each case falls into one of the patterns identified above. First, the CDF budget 
and its proportion to the government development budget can be considered as a proxy 
of the scale of the power created through the establishment of CDFs. There is, however, 
a caveat that the scale of power cannot simply be compared across countries by using 
the figures, as the scale of CDF budgets is affected by various factors including the 
overall level of fiscal decentralisation in the countries. 
 Second, the extent to which CDFs are consolidated in politics indicates the 
sustainability of particular patterns of the CDF politics. This aspect concerns not only 
the actors in executives and MPs, but also the various stakeholders such as the media, 
civil society organisations and donors, as they often challenge the principle of CDFs by 
arguing that they erode the separation of powers between the executive and the 
legislature as well as criticise the mismanagement of CDF funds. Consequently, there is 
a possibility that CDFs may be abolished. One milestone in the consolidation process of 
CDFs is the ‘constitutionality test’: whether the judiciary endorsed the legality of CDFs 
by confirming that they do not erode the separation of powers between the executive 
and the legislature, if it is stipulated in the constitution. The passing of the 
constitutionality test makes it difficult for the opponents of CDFs to advocate for their 
abolishment, and it contributes to consolidating CDFs in their countries. To the author’s 
knowledge, there is no country where a CDF has been judged unconstitutional. 
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2.3. CDF Politics of Seven Countries in Asia and Africa 
 
By examining the political conditions and key events when CDFs were introduced and 
the subsequent implementation periods, seven countries in Asia and Africa can be 
categorised into the four patterns of CDF politics as compiled in Figure 2.2 below. 
 
Figure 2.2  Patterns of CDF Politics of Selected Countries in Asia and Africa 
 
Source: the author 
 
Ghana and Zambia illustrate the cases that shifted from the pattern of alleviating the 
risk of losing support from MPs to maintaining the status quo, during the 
implementation process of CDFs. The remainder of the paper examines the 
relationships between CDFs and politics of the case countries in turn. 
 
2.3.1. Establishing New Patronage Politics by New Leaders 
 
The first pattern of CDF politics, which is establishing new patronage politics by new 
leaders, can be illustrated by the Philippines. In the Philippines, a CDF was established 
by a new government that came to power following a people’s revolution to end the 
authoritarian rule. The Philippines and Pakistan, which will be discussed in the next 
section, are different from other examples because CDFs were introduced as part of the 
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initial democratisation process from authoritarian rule. 
 
The Philippines: Establishing Presidential Control of Patronage 
 
In the Philippines, the use of pork barrel funds by politicians dates back to the 1930s 
during the American colonial occupation (The Manila Times 28 August 2009). A CDF 
was introduced after the collapse of the Ferdinand Marcos authoritarian rule by the 
People Power Revolution in 1986 and the inauguration of President Corazon Aquino. In 
1989, the Mindanao Development Fund and Visayas Development Fund were launched 
to cover Mindanao and Visayas, two out of the three geographical divisions of the 
country. Under these schemes, each MP was provided authority to identify development 
projects worth 10 million pesos (approximately US$245,000
16
) per district (Kasuya 
2009: 75). 
 In 1990, the funds were expanded to the whole country, and renamed the 
Countrywide Development Fund (CDF). Under the new CDF, 2.3 billion pesos 
(approximately US$56 million) in total were allocated to the constituencies of the 
House of Representatives and the Senate. Between 1993 and 1997, each House member 
received 12.5 million pesos (US$306,000) and a senator 18 million pesos (US$440,000) 
per year (Kasuya 2009: 62, 75). In 2000, the CDF was transformed into the Priority 
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and since then, the amount of funding has risen 
over the years (Nograles and Lagman 2008: 5). Currently, each House member has been 
entitled to receive up to 70 million pesos (US$1.6 million
17
) per year and a senator 200 
million pesos (US$4.5 million) (International Budget Partnership 2010: 44). While the 
size of the CDF budget in the Philippines is the largest in absolute terms among the 
countries examined in this chapter, its ratio to the total government budget remained 
small. For example, the total PDAF budget in 2012 was 24.9 billion pesos and its 
proportion to the total government expenditure was only 1.8%.
18
 This clearly suggests 
that, like other case countries, the Philippine CDF is not a primary funding source of 
local development, but rather a tool for politicians to establish their support base in their 
constituencies. 
                                                   
16
 US$1 = 40.89 Pesos (1998) (Central Bank of the Philippines). 
17
 US$1 = 44.19 Pesos (2000) (Central Bank of the Philippines). 
18
 The projected government expenditure in 2012 was 1,414 billion pesos (International Monetary Fund 
2012c: 32). The data on the government development budget are unavailable. 
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An official reason for the introduction of the CDF in the Philippines was to 
address the unequal allocation of government budgets for local development due to pork 
barrel politics; prior to the adoption of the CDF, legislators needed to reckon with the 
president for the release of pork funds for the projects in their constituencies and the 
allocation of the appropriations were unequal across the country. Through the 
establishment of the CDF, congressional allocations for development became 
institutionalised with equal allocations to all the districts (Nograles and Lagman 2008: 
8). 
 Yet, in practice, the CDF has been used for the election campaigns of MPs 
including constituency service and vote-buying. It is reported that on average, about 
30% of the total project cost goes into MPs’ pockets (Kasuya 2009: 62–63). Moreover, 
the Philippine CDF is characterised by the president’s power over the release of the 
funds, which has made presidents ‘the most important regulator of legislators’ pork in 
the Philippines’ (Kasuya 2009: 80). The presidential control over CDF funds apparently 
continued until the Arroyo administration between 2001 and 2010 (Philippine Daily 
Inquirer 26 November 2006; The Philippine Star 19 May 2010). One Philippine senator 
claimed that ‘“legislators … must make their periodic pilgrimage to Malacanang 
[presidential palace] to obtain the approval of the release for their Countryside 
Development Funds” (PG, October, 1992)’ (Kasuya 2009: 82). Thus, the Philippine 
CDF is widely perceived as a tool of patronage politics controlled by presidents. 
 The CDF has been consolidated in politics through years of the operation in the 
Philippines. There were two failed attempts to change the CDF structure in the 1990s, 
which strengthened the legitimacy of the funds and the presidential control over the 
release of the funds. In 1994, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) petitioned the 
Supreme Court to declare the CDF as unconstitutional and void it, as provided for in the 
General Appropriations Act of 1994 (Nograles and Lagman 2008: 7). In response, the 
Court judged that the CDF is valid and constitutional by asserting that the Congress’s 
spending power, or ‘the power of the purse’ as called by James Madison, includes the 
power to specify projects to be funded under the appropriation law and it is subject only 
to the president’s veto power under the constitution (Nograles and Lagman 2008: 7). In 
1997, the Congress attempted to take away the power from the presidency to release 
CDF funds by revising the general appropriations bill, yet President Ramos used his 
veto power to block it. MPs were silent about the president’s veto and no override 
attempts followed (Kasuya 2009: 92). As such, the CDF has remained as part of 
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patronage politics controlled by presidents in the Philippines. 
 
2.3.2. Changing the Rule of the Game in Electoral Politics by New Leaders 
 
The second pattern of CDF politics represents the empowerment of the legislature 
through the introduction of a CDF following a regime change and thus, it changes the 
rule of the game in electoral politics by new leaders. This pattern is in accordance with 
van de Walle’s (2009) argument on the shifting locus of clientelism from the executive 
to the legislature. Good examples of this pattern are Pakistan and Kenya, though the 
nature of regime changes differs between them. In Pakistan, a CDF was adopted by the 
prime minister who was appointed by the president as part of the regime change from 
military to democratic rule in the 1980s. In Kenya, a CDF was introduced in 2003, one 
year after the end of the 40-year rule of the dominant ruling party in general elections. 
 
Pakistan: Prime Minister’s Attempt to Strengthen His Power during the 
Democratisation Process 
 
In Pakistan, a CDF is claimed to have originated in the President Mohammad 
Zia-ul-Haq’s military regime when he allocated public funds to his chosen members of 
the legislature he constituted in 1981 (Islamic Republic of Pakistan n.d.; The Express 
Tribune 8 March 2012; Wasti 2009: 145). Following the elections for national and 
provincial assemblies in 1985, a CDF was formally initiated as part of the 
civilianisation of military rule under the five-point programme launched by Prime 
Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo. The programme was aimed at establishing a 
democratic system with a strong national defence and foreign policies, and solving 
socioeconomic problems in the country (Associated Press 31 December 1985; Rizvi 
1986). 
 Under the five-point programme, each minister, senator and Member of the 
National Assembly (MNA) was allocated 5 million rupees (Rs) (approximately 
US$314,000
19
) and each Member of the Provincial Assemblies (MPA) Rs2.5 million 
(US$157,000) to implement small-scale development projects in their constituencies. It 
amounted to a total budget of around Rs1.3 billion (US$82 million) (Khan 2006: 
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 US$1 = Rs15.94 (1985) (State Bank of Pakistan). 
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125–126; The Express Tribune 10 June 2013). The funds for MPs were aimed at 
strengthening the connections between elected representatives and voters in their 
constituencies. It was particularly important because the 1985 elections were held on a 
non-party basis and boycotted by a coalition of major opposition parties and thus, 
politicians had low credibility in the country (International Budget Partnership 2010: 
45; Rizvi 1986: 1077). Without an accountability mechanism or public involvement in 
the fund management, politicians exercised discretionary power over the use of the 
funds. They could approach ‘line departments directly or even involve whoever they 
wanted, including private contractors, their factotums or members of their own family’ 
(Khan 2006: 126). 
 The existing studies of Pakistani politics during this period suggest that the 
funds for MPs under the five-point programme functioned as Prime Minister Junejo’s 
instrument to establish his power independent of President Zia in two ways (Waseem 
1992). First, the funds helped Junejo gain support from MPs for his party. Political 
parties were resumed in 1985, having been banned during the martial law period 
between 1977 and 1985. In 1986, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), Pakistan’s 
founding party, was reconstituted under Junejo’s leadership. Subsequently, he 
succeeded in gaining support from a majority of senators, MNAs and MPAs, who were 
elected on a non-party basis in 1985, for his party (van Hollen 1987: 144). The funds for 
MPs contributed to his success in gaining their support. 
 Second, Junejo’s five-point programme sought to attract wide public support to 
the PML by emphasising economic and social programmes for the rural and urban poor. 
This was important as the PML was historically elite-oriented, while its rival party, the 
Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), was based on rural support. Under the five-point 
programme, the allocation of public expenditures on electricity, water, education, health 
and other social sectors to rural areas increased from 10% to 50% (Norman 1989: 
40–41; van Hollen 1987: 145). As such, the Junejo period can be characterised by 
democratisation with the “formation of an ‘official’ political party from the top and the 
subsequent development of a populist programme for cultivating mass support” 
(Norman 1989: 40), and the funds for MPs played an important part in this process. 
 However, President Zia, who appointed him as Prime Minister in 1985, feared 
Junejo’s increasing power. While Junejo was seeking to establish his leadership within 
the PML and the legislature, Zia intended to maintain his presidential and military 
power (Norman 1989: 38). Junejo’s move to strengthen independence from the 
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president and the army created a tension between them. It was particularly evident in the 
public resource allocation, as Junejo sought to allocate limited public resources to his 
five-point programme, including the CDF, by restraining the budget for defence. As a 
consequence, President Zia dismissed him as the premier and dissolved Parliament in 
1988 (Norman 1989: 41–42). 
 Since then, CDFs have existed in the country under different names. The funds 
were renamed every time new parties came to power: the People’s Works Programme 
under Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s PPP government in 1988–1990 and 1994–1996; 
the Taameer-e-Watan Programme under Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 1991–1993 
and 1997–1999; the Khushal Pakistan Program I under President Pervez Musharraf in 
2000–2007; and the People’s Works Programme-I (PWP-I) under the PPP government 
in 2008–2013 (Malik 2010: 183; Qureshi 2001: 9). In June 2013, the PWP-I was 
renamed the Tameer Pakistan Programme by the new government led by the Pakistan 
Muslim League-Nawaz (The Express Tribune 11 June 2013). 
 The fund allocation to each MNA and MPA increased over the years, yet the 
scale of the CDF budget remained relatively small. For example, every MNA was 
allocated Rs20 million (approximately US$239,000
20
) and every MPA received Rs5 
million (US$60,000) under the PWP-I in FY2009/10 and the total expenditure was 
Rs8.4 billion (US$100 million), which was only 2% of the government development 
expenditure (International Budget Partnership 2010: 45; Islamic Republic of Pakistan 
2012).
21
 
 As is the case in the Philippines, whereas some civil society organisations 
complained of a lack of transparency and accountability in the fund management, more 
than twenty-five years of operation of a series of CDFs have made them business as 
usual in Pakistan (International Budget Partnership 2010: 46). Thus, there may no 
longer be a characteristic of changing the rule of the game in electoral politics in the 
operation of the fund. Yet, the Pakistani CDF was initially driven by the Prime 
Minister’s intention to establish his power independent of the President. 
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 US$1 = Rs83.80 (2009/10) (State Bank of Pakistan). 
21
 The government development expenditure in FY2009/10 was Rs558 billion (International Monetary 
Fund 2012b: 36). 
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Kenya: Increasing Degree of Autonomy of MPs from the President in Accessing 
Public Resources 
 
In Kenya, the introduction of the Constituencies Development Fund (CDF) is 
characterised by an increasing degree of autonomy of MPs from the president in 
accessing public resources following the regime change in 2002 (Bagaka 2010).
22
  A 
CDF was first proposed by Muriuki Karue, an opposition MP from the Democratic 
Party (DP), in 1999. His idea was to devolve power and resources to the local level to 
secure basic infrastructure across the country. He tabled a private member’s motion 
requesting the government to set aside 5% of its revenue to fund grassroots projects in 
electoral constituencies. After the Minister for Finance had halved its budget from 5% 
to 2.5% of the national revenue, Karue’s motion was passed in Parliament as a 
resolution in October 2000. He then turned the motion into a bill in July 2002, and 
gained a permission to introduce the CDF Bill in October in the same year, a few days 
before Parliament was dissolved before the elections (Karue 2011: 51).
23
 
In the elections in December 2002, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), an 
alliance of several opposition parties including Karue’s DP, took over power from the 
Kenya African National Union (KANU). After successful re-election, Karue redrafted 
the CDF Bill in liaison with the Attorney General’s Office (Karue 2011: 51). 
Subsequently, the CDF Act was passed in Parliament and ratified by the newly elected 
President Mwai Kibaki in December 2003 (Republic of Kenya 2004b). 
 Although the Kenyan government embarked on local government reforms in the 
mid-1990s and a grant system for local councils called the Local Authority Transfer 
Fund (LATF) was established in FY1999/2000, the overall implementation of 
decentralisation was delayed due to the enduring centralised policy of the government. 
Thus, the proposal to set up a CDF was cautiously welcomed by civil society and 
international donors as a breakthrough in moving decentralisation forward and 
enhancing local ownership of development (Kimenyi 2005: 1; Sasaoka 2008: 84–95; 
Tordoff 1994; United Kingdom 2002). Muriuki Karue was even awarded a United 
Nations Habitat award in recognition of his work in developing the mechanism (Oxford 
Analytica 2009). 
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 Interview, Bagaka (2011). 
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 Interview, Karue (2011). 
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 The CDF targets all types of development projects, but particularly encourages 
those that address poverty alleviation at grassroots level. As stipulated in the CDF Act, 
up to 2.5% of the government’s ordinary revenue is allocated to the mechanism 
annually; 75% of the CDF budget is distributed equally amongst all 210 constituencies, 
and the remaining 25% is allocated according to the poverty level of each constituency 
(Republic of Kenya 2007). Figure 2.3 below shows the CDF budgets from FY2003/04 
to FY2011/12, which increased from 1.3 billion Kenyan Shillings (Ksh) (approximately 
US$15 million
24
) to Ksh17 billion (US$200 million
25), mainly due to the country’s 
economic growth (Gutiérrez-Romero 2009: 2; Republic of Kenya). 
 
Figure 2.3  CDF Allocations in Kenya 
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On average, each constituency received Ksh81 million (approximately US$952,000) in 
FY2011/12. As a large proportion of the government budget is allocated, the Kenyan 
CDF has received a wide attention by the media and scholars, and some African 
countries introduced CDFs by emulating the Kenyan model (Oxford Analytica 2009). 
 The projects funded by the CDF are selected by Constituency Development 
Committees chaired by the MP of each constituency. Consisting of a maximum of 15 
members, including councillors, a district officer, and representatives from the 
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 US$1 = Ksh84.15 (2003) (Central Bank of Kenya). 
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constituencies, each committee is responsible for the co-ordination and supervision of 
all CDF projects within the constituency. Each MP is empowered to select all the 
members of the committee. The committee deliberates on proposals prepared by the 
constituents and produces a list of priority projects, which is submitted to the 
national-level Constituencies Development Fund Board for scrutiny and approval. If 
approved, CDF funds are disbursed to dedicated constituency-level bank accounts. MPs 
are not signatories for the withdrawal of the funds (Institute of Economic Affairs and 
Kenya National Commission of Human Rights 2006; Republic of Kenya 2004a; 
Republic of Kenya 2007). With the authority to appoint the committee members, MPs 
have effectively been controlling the distribution of CDF funds (Cheeseman 2006: 333). 
 The Kenyan CDF is characterised by changes in patronage politics previously 
underpinned by the political use of harambee. Harambee (meaning ‘let us pull together’ 
in Swahili) originally referred to a principle of cooperation among members of 
communities which existed in Kenya during the late-colonial era. Following 
independence, the harambee spirit was promoted by the first President Jomo Kenyatta 
as a national motto for development, and it evolved into a self-help voluntary 
fundraising mechanism in local communities. In the 1980s, however, the harambee 
system gradually came to be used by politicians as a vehicle to gain support from their 
constituents; politicians donated large amounts of money at local harambee meetings to 
exhibit their wealth, fund-raising abilities and commitment to the communities (Barkan 
1994: 19–20; Chieni 1997; Transparency International Kenya 2003a: 1).26  
 Harambee was used by politicians as a campaign strategy, particularly by the 
ruling party, KANU, in the 1990s. For example, the number of harambee meetings 
doubled from 97 in 1991 to 203 in 1992, the year of the first multiparty elections, and 
the total amount raised by politicians for the implementation of community 
development projects increased seven-fold, from Ksh21 million (approximately 
US$250,000
27
) to Ksh142 million (US$1.7 million). The number of harambee meetings 
                                                                                                                                                     
25
 US$1 = Ksh85.07 (2011) (Central Bank of Kenya). 
26
 As a broader political background, whereas the first President Kenyatta maintained stability in the 
country as the national leader through the 1960s and 1970s, political volatility increased under the rule of 
President Daniel arap Moi in the 1980s. He stressed the existence of ethnic divisions in the country to 
prove the superiority of one-party system led by the KANU, claiming that multiparty system would 
exacerbate tribal factionalism (Barkan 1984b: 10–12; Brown and Kaiser 2007: 1137; Carey 2002: 58–59; 
Steeves 2006). Consequently, under Moi’s rule, the flow of public resources from central to local levels 
was tightly controlled by presidentially led patronage politics (Barkan 1984b; Cheeseman 2006; 
Cheeseman 2009). 
27
 US$1 = Ksh84.15 (2003) (Central Bank of Kenya). 
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declined after the 1992 elections, but increased again ahead of the 1997 elections. It is 
noteworthy that President Moi himself was a principal harambee patron, presiding over 
448 meetings throughout the 1990s. His donations increased over time and amounted to 
an estimated over Ksh130 million (US$1.5 million). He also encouraged cabinet 
ministers and other members of KANU to follow suit (Barkan 1992: 186; Transparency 
International Kenya 2001: 3–4). 
 The expansion of politicians’ engagement with harambee led citizens to assess 
the performance of MPs by the frequency and size of the contributions they made to 
harambee (Transparency International Kenya 2001: 1). There was also a growing 
understanding among Kenyans that MPs were the ones responsible for financing 
harambee, resulting in a decrease in contributions from other members of the 
community (Transparency International Kenya 2003b: 2). 
 Reliance on the harambee system for social development also generated 
inequality across the country (Ochanda 2007). In the 1960s and 1970s, wealthy 
communities that succeeded in constructing necessary infrastructure through their own 
funding were entitled to extra support from the government, while their poor 
counterparts were left behind. After the harambee system was captured by the political 
elite in the 1980s and 1990s, regional imbalances persisted, as local development 
depended on the wealth and fundraising skills of individual politicians (Cooksey, Court 
and Makau 1994: 212–213; Sasaoka 2008: 90–91). 
 While the CDF Bill was supported by ruling and opposition parties, its 
introduction of the fund coincided with a change of the ruling party. In the 2002 
elections, the victory for NARC ended the forty-year rule of KANU. The CDF became 
a landmark policy of NARC to replace the political use of harambee which had been 
promoted by KANU. The excessive political use of harambee was addressed early on 
by the newly elected President Kibaki. A taskforce to review harambee was established 
by the Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs in April 2002. Based on its 
recommendations, the Public Officer Ethics Act 2003 was passed into law in April 2003, 
which prohibited MPs from using their official positions to solicit or collect funds for 
harambee activities (Republic of Kenya 2003: 12; Transparency International Kenya 
2003b: 6). In parallel with the review of harambee, the CDF bill was passed into law in 
December 2003 with an aim at ending the political use of harambee and addressing 
imbalances in regional development (Daily Nation 14 December 2002; The Standard 24 
October 2002). As such, the introduction of the CDF demonstrates an increasing degree 
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of autonomy of MPs from the president in accessing public funds for constituency 
service.
28
 
 Yet, the establishment of the CDF does not mean a decline in the overall 
presidential power. President Kibaki also intervened at the last stage of the CDF 
policymaking process in November 2003 by pressurising Muriuki Karue to relinquish 
his tabling of the CDF Bill as his private member’s bill. This was based on the 
constitutional requirement that Bills affecting government budget allocation required 
permission from the president before the debate in Parliament. In the end, the CDF Bill 
was tabled as a government Bill and passed into law with no changes to its contents 
(Barkan 2009: 58; Karue 2011: 51–57). This demonstrates the wielding of power and 
intention of the president to take the ownership of the CDF as a government policy. 
Apart from increased autonomy of MPs through the establishment of the CDF, 
President Kibaki maintained other presidential prerogatives (e.g. the power to appoint 
cabinet ministers). In a broader political context, public dissatisfaction with the 
centralisation of power by the president was one of the reasons for the post-election 
violence in 2007, and led to a referendum over a change to the Constitution in 2010 
(Branch and Cheeseman 2008). 
 In the 2007 Kenyan elections, the return rate of incumbent MPs, regardless of 
whether they sought re-election or not, was approximately 30%, which represented a 
decline of about 10 percentage points from 2002 (Gutiérrez-Romero 2009: 1; Kihoro 
2007; Republic of Kenya). The higher turnover rate in 2007 was partly due to the fact 
that the 2007 elections were the most competitive in Kenyan history, with the total 
number of candidates having increased from 965 in 2002 to 2,547 in 2007 
(Gutiérrez-Romero 2009: 10). 
 According to Gutiérrez-Romero’s (2009) study of the Kenyan CDF and election 
results based on interviews with 1,207 people in 76 of the 210 constituencies 
immediately before and after the 2007 elections, 42% of the respondents who claimed 
to have voted for an incumbent MP agreed that the competent management of CDF 
funds was the reason for choosing to vote for the incumbents (9–10). It is also important 
to note that the mismanagement of CDF funds does not automatically lead to the 
dissatisfaction of the electorate (Institute of Economic Affairs and Kenya National 
Commission of Human Rights 2006: 20–35). Gutiérrez-Romero (2009) found no 
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statistically significant evidence that voters’ decisions were based on their perceptions 
of the mismanagement of the CDF by incumbent MPs (9–10). This indicates that voters 
may appreciate the performance of MPs as long as they receive some benefits from the 
CDF regardless of whether the funds are properly managed. All things considered, the 
CDF does not seem to have contributed to enhancing the overall probability of 
re-election of incumbent MPs in 2007. 
Although the findings of the above study provide only a partial picture of the 
causal relationship between the CDF and the election results, one potential explanation 
is that the CDF can be a ‘double-edged sword’ in electoral politics in Kenya; if MPs use 
its funds particularly well, it helps them get re-elected, but if they handle them 
improperly, it will be a reason for being voted out.
29
 Otherwise, the effects of the CDF 
are buried within various factors affecting voting behaviour. 
 The impact of the CDF on local development has been mixed to date. While the 
mechanism has greatly aided community development and stimulated local ownership 
of development, allegations of mismanagement of CDF funds have frequently been 
reported by the media (Bagaka 2010: 13; Kimenyi 2005; Transparency International 
Kenya 2005). For example, a special investigation conducted by Parliament in 2009 
revealed that some Ksh3.2 billion, or 16% of the fund’s total budget, could not be 
accounted for in the CDF allocations in FY2007/08 and FY2008/09 (The Standard 1 
July 2009). Furthermore, the National Taxpayers Association, an NGO monitoring the 
use of CDF funds, recently reported that 16 per cent of the CDF budget for FY2009/10 
allocated to 34 sampled constituencies had been either uneconomically utilised, wasted, 
or remained unaccounted for (Daily Nation 7 May 2012; National Taxpayers 
Association 2012). 
 Similar to the case in the Philippines, despite the lawsuits filed by civil society 
organisations to challenge the constitutionality of the CDF in 2004 and 2009, the 
legality of the fund was sustained (Business Daily 25 February 2013). On the other hand, 
with efforts by the media and civil society organisations in advocating for greater 
transparency and accountability in the fund management, the Kenyan CDF had an effect 
on enhancing public awareness of the government’s public spending and opened a 
policy space to discuss it (International Budget Partnership 2009). The increased public 
awareness also supports the idea that the CDF became a ‘double-edged sword’ for 
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elections. 
In 2010, the new Constitution was enacted through a referendum and the CDF 
structure was reviewed. The new Constitution, which took effect after the general 
elections in March 2013, fundamentally changed the legislature and local government 
structure of the country. A new tier of government, the county government, was created 
in between central and district governments, and 15% of the national budget is allocated 
to the counties. There was speculation that the CDF might be integrated into this 15% 
allocation to county governments and the role of MPs in the operation of the CDF might 
be altered in the new arrangement (Daily Nation 17 April 2012; Daily Nation 18 April 
2012; Daily Nation 26 June 2011).
30
 On the contrary, the CDF Act was amended to 
make the fund consistent with the new Constitution in January 2013. It redefined the 
roles of MPs in managing the funds; MPs are no longer chairpersons of the committee 
but ex-officio members; nor can they freely appoint the members of the CDF committee 
but have to choose them from the candidates nominated from wards (Republic of Kenya 
2013). This implies that the Kenyan case might shift away from this pattern of CDF 
politics in the future. 
 
2.3.3. Maintaining the Status Quo by the Executive 
 
The third pattern of CDF politics is maintaining the status quo by the executive. While 
no cases are found to indicate that the introduction of CDFs originally fits into this 
pattern, Ghana and Zambia show a shift towards this pattern during the implementation 
process of CDFs. In both cases, the tensions between MPs and local bureaucrats who 
are appointed by presidents have become significant, as some bureaucrats exercise their 
power to release CDF funds for political purposes. 
 
Ghana: Tensions between MPs and District Chief Executives 
 
In Ghana, the first CDF was initiated as part of the District Assemblies Common Fund 
(DACF), a formula-based system of financial transfers from the central government to 
the District Assemblies which was established in 1994 (Banful 2009: 2). A share for 
MPs was created within the DACF in 1996 after MPs from both ruling and opposition 
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parties insisted in Parliament that they would not approve the allocation formula of the 
DACF until they were given part of the fund. In other words, the executive was 
blackmailed into agreeing that a portion of the DACF would be allocated to MPs (The 
Chronicle 19 December 2005). Since then, 5% of the national revenue was set aside to 
the DACF, of which 5% was allocated to 230 MPs who can decide on the projects to be 
funded in their constituencies (Public Agenda 12 December 2007; Republic of Ghana). 
In 2006, 52.3 million Ghana Cedis (GHC) (approximately US$57 million
31
) was 
allocated to the MPs’ share of the DACF, meaning that each MP was allocated 
GHC227,000 (approximately US$247,000) (International Monetary Fund 2009: 160). 
The percentage of the allocation to the DACF increased to 7.5% of the national revenue 
in 2008, and Parliament requested a further increase to 10% in 2013 (Graphic Online 4 
May 2013; Modern Ghana 31 July 2007). 
 The allocation formulas of the DACF, including the MPs’ share, are proposed 
and submitted by the presidentially-appointed DACF Administrator to the President’s 
office every year before they are tabled in Parliament, and Parliament had been 
approving them without any changes (Banful 2009: 9). However, there is a report that 
the DACF allocation formulas had been manipulated by ruling parties. Between 1999 
and 2000, the government allocated a 1.1% higher proportion of the DACF funds to the 
districts where the ruling party had a stronghold, while the newly elected government in 
2001 provided a 16.8% higher allocation to the districts where opposition had a 
stronghold to attract their votes between 2001 and 2005. It was also found that the 
DACF disbursement increased progressively towards the election year in 2000 (Banful 
2009). 
 In the operation of the MPs’ share of the DACF, District Chief Executives 
(DCEs), chief representatives of the central government at district levels who are 
appointed by the president, need to approve the requests by MPs for their access to their 
share (The Chronicle 24 March 2006). The power of DCEs over the MPs’ share of the 
DACF funds created tensions between MPs and DCEs, especially in the districts where 
they belong to different political parties (The Chronicle 9 May 2007; The Chronicle 19 
December 2005). The tensions were particularly evident when a number of DCEs 
aspired for parliamentary seats in the elections in 2004 and 2008 (The Chronicle 31 July 
2003). It is reported that nearly 36% of MPs had experienced conflicts with DCEs over 
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the appropriation of their share of the DACF funds, and the percentage increased to as 
high as 80% prior to the elections (Public Agenda 30 April 2007; SEND Ghana 2010: 
10). 
 In 2009, following the change of government in the 2008 elections, newly 
elected President John Atta Mills announced the establishment of a new CDF to replace 
the MPs’ share of the DACF to reduce the tensions between MPs and DCEs (Ghana 
Broadcasting Corporation 13 January 2011; Ghana 2009; The Ghanaian Times 24 
August 2010). This may have been due to a concern about tensions delaying the 
implementation of projects and might cause public dissatisfaction to the government. 
Mills reaffirmed his intention to establish a CDF in his address to Parliament in 
February 2012, five months before his unexpected death (Republic of Ghana 2012: 20). 
Subsequently, his party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC), maintained the CDF 
proposal in its election manifesto in 2012 and thus, it is still on the government agenda 
(National Democratic Congress 2012: 92–93). There is, however, a view that the 
authorisation to release the new CDF funds will again be under the district officials, 
according to the Financial Administration Act 2003; thus, the tensions between MPs 
and DCEs might remain (Public Agenda 23 February 2009). 
 
Zambia: Tensions between MPs and District Administrators 
 
In Zambia, the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) was introduced as part of a 
wider decentralisation policy in 1995 (Chileshe 2011). There is no background 
information publicly available on the Zambian CDF. Since its introduction, the funds 
have often been used for the election campaigns of MPs and its budget has been on the 
increase (Mukwena 2004: 14). The latest increase was from 600 million Kwacha 
(ZMK) (approximately US$123,000
32
) per constituency to ZMK750 million 
(US$154,000) in 2011 (Times of Zambia 18 August 2011), and the proportion of the 
CDF budget to the total government expenditure was 0.6%.
33
 
 As in Ghana, the Zambian CDF is characterised by the power struggle between 
MPs and District Administrators, local bureaucrats who are directly responsible to the 
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 US$1 = ZMK4,861 (International Monetary Fund 2012d: 25). 
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 The number of MPs in Zambia was 150 and the total CDF budget was ZMK112.5 billion in 2011. The 
projected central government expense was ZMK18,680 billion (International Monetary Fund 2012d: 26). 
The data on the government development budget are unavailable. 
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President. As District Administrators are signatories to the CDF accounts and have the 
authority to release the CDF funds, MPs and District Administrators are often forced to 
compete over the control of the funds (Cheeseman 2006: 334–335; The Post 16 October 
2002; Times of Zambia 1 March 2000). There are media reports on the charges of the 
mismanagement of CDF funds against not only MPs but also District Administrators, 
which suggests the levels of involvement of District Administrators with the CDF (The 
Post 15 November 2003; The Post 25 September 2003). 
 A slight difference in the roles of local bureaucrats in the CDF operation 
between Ghana and Zambia is that, whereas District Chief Executives in Ghana were 
initially provided authority over the release of the DACF including the MPs’ share, the 
office of District Administrators was created in Zambia in 1999, four years after the 
establishment of the CDF, to represent the central government and to coordinate 
activities as the most senior civil servants at district levels. 
 During the first few years after the establishment, the positions of District 
Administrators were filled with the ranks of the party cadres of the ruling party, 
Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD), and they were considered the ruling 
party’s watchdogs to increase its chances of winning the 2001 elections. Many District 
Administrators were involved in campaigns in the parliamentary and local government 
by-elections in the following years. They are also considered to have propagated 
President Chiluba’s attempts to change the Constitution to allow him to run for a third 
term (Chella and Kabanda 2008; Mukwena 2004: 14–15; Times of Zambia 28 March 
2003). Such strong connections between the President and the District Administrators 
demonstrate that the control over the CDF funds by District Administrators indirectly 
increased presidential power vis-à-vis MPs. 
 
2.3.4. Alleviating the Risk of Losing Support from MPs to the Executive 
 
The last pattern of CDF politics represents the intention of ruling leaders to alleviate the 
risk of losing MPs’ support to the executive and the ruling parties. The introduction of 
CDFs in India and Tanzania exemplifies this pattern. 
 
India: The Ruling Party’s Attempt to Regain Public Support at State Levels 
 
The Indian CDF, the Member of Parliament Local Area Development Scheme 
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(MPLADS), was established in 1993 in response to the MPs’ proposal for allocating 
government funds for them to recommend development projects in their constituencies 
because they had frequently been requested by their constituents to assist small-scale 
projects in their constituencies (Republic of India 2002).  
When the MPLADS was introduced, the Prime Minister Narasimha Rao was 
heading a minority government and his party, the Indian National Congress (commonly 
known as the Congress), was losing control of several state governments through which 
the party had been delivering goods to voters to maintain their support. In the 
parliamentary election in 1989, no party won a majority of seats for the first time in the 
country’s history, due to the rise of new caste-, religious- and regionally-based parties. 
As a result, Indian politics had been marked by coalition governments until 2004 
(Rudolph and Rudolph 2008: 32–33). Apparently, the MPLADS was a vehicle of the 
Congress to provide direct funds to its MPs who feared losing access to patronage due 
to the growing number of states controlled by opposition parties (Keefer and Khemani 
2009a: 10; Wilkinson 2007: 121). Yet, given the lack of majority seats in Parliament, 
the MPLADS should have been aimed at gaining support from opposition MPs as well, 
which was important for Rao and the Congress to implement government policies 
effectively.  
 The allocation of MPLADS funds to each MP was initially 10 million rupees 
(Rs) (approximately US$318,800
34
) per year, which increased several times to reach the 
current level of allocation of Rs50 million (US$977,000
35
) in FY2011/12 (Republic of 
India). Yet, the total funds released for the MPLADS, Rs15.3 billion (US$343 
million
36
), in FY2010/11 was only about 0.1% of the central government budget 
(Republic of India 2012: 3, 15).
37
 
 The use of the MPLADS is closely related to electoral politics at local levels. As 
the unspent MPLADS funds in any one year can be carried forward, MPs use the funds 
extensively to ‘pay off supporters just after elections and then to reward potential voters 
in the run up to elections’ (Wilkinson 2007: 121). Indeed, there is a tendency among 
MPs, particularly right-wing MPs, to accumulate funds by not spending during the first 
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years of their term and spend that accumulated amount during the second half of their 
term to ensure their re-election (Pal and Das 2010).  
 When the MPLADS was established in 1993, there was no major debate on it 
inside or outside Parliament, and the funds remained a low profile for several years. 
There was no major media coverage of it either. The turning point came when the 
Comptroller and Auditor General published a pilot audit report of the MPLADS-funded 
projects in several states in 1999. It shed light on the serious mismanagement of the 
funds and the MPLADS received wide public attention (Keefer and Khemani 2009a: 
10–11). This corresponded with the change of government in the elections in 1999. The 
government led by the Bharatiya Janata Party introduced ‘more stringent program 
implementation guidelines, including provisions for review and scrutiny by ministry 
authorities if funds are severely under-utilized’ (Keefer and Khemani 2009a: 10–11). 
 With these guidelines, MPs need to get approval from district authorities that 
can withhold the disbursement of the funds on the grounds of non-conformity with the 
project guidelines. As, only 40% of the projects proposed by MPs were sanctioned by 
the District Commissioners, top public officials at district level, between 1997 and 2000, 
the MPLADS is characterised by the substantial power held by local bureaucrats 
(Keefer and Khemani 2009a: 8). Yet, there is no evidence to support that the decision 
made by local bureaucrats on each disbursement has been influenced by the central 
government. Thus, the Indian MPLADS remains an example of the strengthening of the 
power of the legislature. 
 Similar to the Philippines and Kenya, the constitutionality of MPLADS was 
challenged by legal experts in India (Sivaramakrishnan 2010). In May 2010, the 
Supreme Court concluded that: 
 
there was no violation of the concept of separation of powers because the role of 
an MP in this case is recommendatory and the actual work is carried out by the 
Panchayats [local councils] and Municipalities which belong to the executive 
organ. There are checks and balances in place through the guidelines which have 
to be adhered to and the fact that each MP is ultimately responsible to the 
Parliament (PRS Legislative Research 9 March 2011). 
 
The judgement is likely to contribute to consolidating the MPLADS in politics in India. 
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Tanzania: Why Did the Ruling Party Adopt a CDF? 
 
In Tanzania, a CDF was adopted by the initiative taken by the Speaker of Parliament to 
strengthen the power and functions of Parliament in 2009.
38
 The fund was named the 
Constituencies Development Catalyst Fund (CDCF) as it was envisioned as a catalyst 
for accelerating self-help development efforts at grassroots level. Since then, 10 billion 
Tanzanian Shillings (Tsh) (approximately US$7 million
39
) has been allocated to the 
CDCF annually, which amounted to approximately 0.2% of the national budget in 
FY2010/11 (United Republic of Tanzania 2009b: 69). 
 The design of the CDCF is similar to that of the Kenyan CDF; the funds are 
automatically allocated to all the constituencies of MPs without any requirement to 
obtain the approval of the central or local governments. The projects funded by the 
CDCF are selected by a committee established in each constituency, chaired by the 
respective MPs. This model is generally considered to strengthen the autonomy of 
individual MPs from the executive by decentralising the allocation of public funds for 
their constituency service.  
Tanzania is characterised by stable dominant party politics led by the CCM 
since the country’s independence in 1961. When a CDF was adopted in 2009, a large 
majority of parliamentary seats (89%) was represented by CCM MPs (United Republic 
of Tanzania). Thus, it is less clear than the Indian case why the CCM adopted such a 
mechanism to give financial autonomy to their MPs while the party had not faced any 
challenges from the opposition in Mainland. There might have been another kind of risk 
for the CCM to lose support of their MPs which made the party introduce a CDF to 
reconsolidate their support. While keeping this proposition as a clue to understand CDF 
politics in Tanzania, the subsequent chapters explore the factors in dominant party 
politics in the country that led to the adoption of the fund. 
 
2.4. Conclusion 
 
The seven cases examined in this chapter demonstrate that CDFs create new space for 
power struggles and affect patronage politics, rather than automatically strengthen the 
financial power of MPs and the legislature. Because CDFs are closely associated with 
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electoral politics which intrinsically entails competition, the manifestation of power 
struggles seems to be more evident in the introduction and operation of CDFs than in 
other government social spending mechanisms. 
 The nature of CDF politics, or the interactions between CDFs and politics, is 
diverse. This chapter has demonstrated that the impact of CDFs on politics is subject to 
considerable political manoeuvring and thus produces different results in different 
countries. In the Philippines, the CDF contributed to establishing the power base of the 
president following the democratic transition in the country. Similarly, the CDF was 
adopted in Pakistan as part of the transition to democratic rule, yet it was rather an 
attempt by the Prime Minister to establish his support base in Parliament by giving 
financial power to MPs. In Kenya, the adoption of CDF signifies a change in the rule of 
the game in electoral politics by the newly elected president after the long-serving 
president and his party were removed from power. 
Ghana and Zambia are characterised by the power held by the heads of local 
governments over the release of CDF funds to individual projects, which resulted in 
conflicts between MPs and bureaucrats. Since the heads of local governments are 
appointed by presidents, these two cases demonstrate an indirect enhancement of 
presidential power through the adoption of CDFs. 
In India and Tanzania, CDFs were introduced by dominant ruling parties 
without major regime changes. In India, the fund was established when the ruling party 
was leading a minority government and the CDF was aimed at supporting its MPs who 
feared losing access to patronage due to the growing number of states controlled by 
opposition parties. In Tanzania, the ruling party had held an overwhelming majority in 
Parliament when a CDF was introduced; thus, the reason for the adoption of a fund is 
less evident. The subsequent chapters analyse the political background of the adoption 
of a CDF in Tanzania to explore the reasons. 
 Apart from the case in Tanzania, the general patterns of the interactions between 
CDFs and politics can be summarised as follows. Whereas some CDFs were aimed at 
maintaining or establishing patronage politics centrally controlled by the executive, 
other CDFs functioned to empower MPs. In the latter cases, why did the executive in 
some countries allow the legislature to gain power through the establishment of CDFs? 
The comparison of the case countries suggests two explanations. First, in the countries 
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where CDFs were introduced following regime changes, CDFs were likely to be a 
strategic tool for the executive (e.g. the prime minister in Pakistan and the president in 
Kenya) to dissolve patronage politics controlled by former leaders and to gain support 
from MPs to run the new governments effectively. Second, in the countries where CDFs 
are introduced without regime changes, CDFs seem to be a compromise of the 
executive to the legislature to regain the support from MPs of the ruling parties and the 
wider public. 
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Chapter 3  Policy Process of Introducing a CDF in Tanzania 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The introduction of a CDF in Tanzania was not a straightforward process. The 
discussion regarding a CDF began among MPs in the 1990s, but other African countries 
moved fast and initiated CDFs before Tanzania. After a proposal to establish a CDF was 
made in Parliament in 2006, it faced strong objections, first by donors and later by local 
civil society organisations (CSOs). It took three more years for the law to establish the 
Tanzanian CDF, called the Constituencies Development Catalyst Fund (CDCF), to be 
enacted in Parliament. 
 The existing studies on the policy process in Tanzania highlight the donors’ 
profound influence on the formulation and implementation of the country’s national 
development policies that undermine accountability between the state and citizens. For 
example, according to Hyden and Mmuya’s (2008) study, well-informed Tanzanians 
from different sectors consider that ‘the accountability relationship to donors is … much 
stronger than that to domestic, non-state actors’ (77) and that ‘donors really correct the 
government if it strays away from the agenda that they regard as necessary for the 
country’s development’ (77). Donor influence is evident at the local level as well. Tripp 
(2012) points out that ‘donor influence crowds out the ability of citizens to participate 
meaningfully in local government and makes local governments more attentive to 
donors than their own constituents’ (19). 
 This view is also shared by Tanzanian politicians. For example, Samuel John 
Sitta, Speaker of the Ninth Parliament (2005–2010), notes that donors have created 
‘parallel accountability’ (Sitta, Slaa and Cheyo 2008: 18) in Tanzania; government 
ministries need to be accountable to donors on policy formulation and implementation, 
while they are also obliged to be accountable to Parliament. The scrutiny of the 
government performance is sometimes duplicated and contradicted between donors and 
Parliament (Sitta, Slaa and Cheyo 2008: 36). 
 This chapter delineates the policy process of the introduction of a CDF in 
Tanzania by highlighting the interaction and competition between various actors, 
including donors. It first explains the legislative process of establishing the fund, its 
budget and operational arrangement, and its initial phase of implementation. The 
chapter then discusses four rationales for introducing a CDF based on the interviews 
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with MPs, and analyses the position of various actors involved in the policy process. 
Through this analysis, the chapter argues that the CDF policy process exemplifies a case 
in which the formulation of public policies was not dominated by donors but largely 
shaped by domestic actors. 
 
3.2. How was the CDCF Introduced in Tanzania? 
 
The idea to establish a CDF had been discussed among Tanzanian MPs since the 
mid-1990s (United Republic of Tanzania 2009c: 51, 60). It gained momentum after the 
new government led by President Jakaya Mwisho Kikwete began in 2005. In May 2006, 
a Special Committee was established by Speaker Sitta to review the Standing Orders, a 
set of written rules by which Parliament was governed (United Republic of Tanzania 
2006b: 24; United Republic of Tanzania 2007c: 39).
40
 The committee consisted of 
seven MPs: five from CCM, one from the Civic United Front (CUF) and one from 
Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA: ‘Party of Democracy and 
Development’) (see Table 3.1 below for the list of the committee members). 
 
Table 3.1  Members of the Special Committee to Review the Standing Orders 
 
1.  Job Yustino Ndugai, MP for Kongwa (CCM) – Chairperson 
2.  Athumani Saidi Janguo, former MP for Kisarawe (CCM) 
3.  Willibrod Peter Slaa, former MP for Karatu (CHADEMA) 
4.  Harrison George Mwakyembe, MP for Kyela (CCM) 
5.  Beatrice Matumbo Shellukindo, MP for Kilindi (CCM) 
6.  Rashid Mohamed Hamad, MP for Wawi (CUF) 
7.  Nimrod Elireheemah Mkono, MP for Musoma Rural (CCM) 
 
Note: All the members were re-elected in the elections in 2010, except Janguo, who did 
not contest, and Slaa, who ran for the presidential elections. 
Source: United Republic of Tanzania (2006b: 24) 
 
The committee reviewed not only the rules and operation of Parliament, but also the 
performance of MPs in Parliament, parliamentary committees, party caucuses and their 
constituencies. The deliberation of a CDF was one of the tasks in their terms of 
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reference as a means to strengthen the role of MPs in their constituencies. The members 
travelled to Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, Mauritius and India to learn about the operations 
of legislatures and CDFs. They highly evaluated the contributions made by MPs to local 
development in these countries through CDFs and decided to propose its establishment 
in Tanzania.
41
 
 The committee submitted three documents to the Speaker as their final outputs: 
1) a redrafting of the Standing Orders, 2) recommendations for a review of the 
Constitution and 3) a CDF draft bill. The first document was developed into the new 
Standing Orders, which was enacted in Parliament in November 2007. The second 
document on the Constitution was not originally requested by the Speaker but was 
submitted because some of the challenges facing Parliament were bound by the 
Constitution and could not be addressed without changing it. The CDF draft bill was a 
preliminary document which served as the basis for the further discussion of the fund 
(Shivji 2006: 4).
42
  
 In August 2006, Parliament formally began discussions with the government on 
the CDF proposal with an aim at launching it in FY2007/08 (United Republic of 
Tanzania 2006b: 25).
43
 Two years later, President Kikwete announced to Parliament 
that his government agreed to establish a CDF by stating that: 
 
…it should be publicly announced that the Government has agreed to initiate a 
Constituency Development Fund (CDF). I believe that this Fund will give 
opportunities to Honourable MPs to manage some amounts of funds to reduce 
small problems facing voters in constituencies. Because it is not good that you, 
Honourable MP, visit your constituency, people ask you for five roofing sheets 
and you do not have the capacity for that. This fund will help you with such 
problems (United Republic of Tanzania 2008b: 7).
44
 
 
Subsequently, a small team was formed by the Parliamentary House Business 
Committee, comprising all the chairpersons of parliamentary standing committees, to 
redraft and finalise the CDF bill by collecting views from various stakeholders (see 
Table 3.2 below for the list of the team members).
45
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Table 3.2  Members of the Parliamentary Team to Redraft the CDF Bill 
 
1.  George Malima Lubeleje, former MP for Mpwapwa (CCM) – Chairperson 
2.  John Momose Cheyo, MP for Bariadi East (United Democratic Party: UDP) 
3.  Zitto Zuberi Kabwe, MP for Kigoma North (CHADEMA) 
4.  Estherina Julio Kilasi, former MP for Mbarali (CCM) 
5.  William Hezekia Shellukindo, former MP for Bumbuli (CCM) 
6.  Hamza Abdallah Mwenegoha, former MP for Morogoro South (CCM) 
 
Note: All four CCM members lost in the primary election in 2010 (Matukio-Michuzi 2 
August 2010; MwanaHalisi 18 August 2010) 
Source: Interview, Wankanga (2010) 
 
When the bill was redrafted by the parliamentary team, the CDF was renamed the 
Constituencies Development Catalyst Fund (CDCF), or Mfuko wa Kuchochea 
Maendeleo ya Jimbo in Swahili. The word kuchochea, meaning ‘catalyse’,46 was added 
to emphasise that it would be a catalyst for accelerating self-help development efforts at 
the grassroots level, instead of serving as a core funding for large-scale projects.
47
 
 Once the government bill for the Constituencies Development Catalyst Fund Act 
2009 was finalised, it was expeditiously tabled and passed in Parliament. The 
parliamentary standing committee on the Constitution, Legal Affairs and Governance 
reviewed the draft and proposed several revisions which were reflected in the bill. The 
bill was submitted to Parliament on 29 June 2009, published on the following day for 
the government gazette dated 3 July and presented in Parliament for first reading on 23 
July (United Republic of Tanzania 2009d). The above committee organised a public 
hearing on 26 July to collect the views of stakeholders including CSOs and academics. 
Then, the bill was tabled in Parliament for second and third readings and passed on 31 
July 2009 (United Republic of Tanzania 2009a).
48
 President Kikwete assented to it on 
21 August 2009. 
 Although CSOs complained that there was not enough time for the public to 
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discuss the bill, the passing of the Act followed the required legislative procedure.
49
 
According to the parliamentary standing orders, a first bill ‘must be published at least 
twenty-one days before it is introduced in the National Assembly for first reading’ 
(United Republic of Tanzania 2007a: 54; United Republic of Tanzania n.d.: 1). The 
CDCF bill was published 23 days before first reading. 
When the CDCF Bill was discussed in Parliament, both CCM and opposition 
MPs enthusiastically supported it. This is characterised by the statement of a veteran 
CCM politician, Gertude Mongella, then MP for Ukerewe (CCM), in Parliament. She 
endorsed the CDCF and pronounced that: 
 
today it became clear that we are Tanzanians and when we discuss fundamental 
issues, there are no CHADEMA, CCM, CUF, there are no parties, which is what is 
happening today. I hope it will be written in history books (United Republic of 
Tanzania 2009d: 71).
50
 
 
As such, all MPs became one interest group and agreed on the introduction of the 
CDCF. 
The CDCF Regulation was formulated and passed in Parliament in February 
2010, and the operation of the fund started several months before the general elections 
in October 2010 (United Republic of Tanzania 2009c; United Republic of Tanzania 
2010c). 
 
3.3. CDCF Budget and Operational Arrangement 
 
The CDF budget kept changing during the preparatory process. As mentioned above, 
there was initially a plan to start a CDF in FY2007/08. First, Tsh50 billion 
(approximately US$40 million
51
) was proposed to be allocated to a CDF in the 
government budget guideline passed in Parliament in April 2007, which was about 
0.8% of the national budget (Mulisa 2007). In August 2007, Prime Minister Edward 
Ngoyai Lowassa announced in Parliament that Tsh7.5 billion (approximately US$6 
million) would be allocated to the CDF in FY2007/08 (United Republic of Tanzania 
2007b: 41; United Republic of Tanzania 2007d: 29). In March 2008, the newly 
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appointed Prime Minister Mizengo Kayanza Peter Pinda mentioned to a Swahili 
newspaper that Tsh1 billion was allocated to a CDF in FY2007/08 (Tanzania Daima 18 
March 2008). Despite the intentions by the prime ministers to start a CDF in FY2007/08, 
it took two more years for the CDF funds to be disbursed. 
 In July 2008, a draft CDF bill was circulated among donors, which states that 
the CDF budget would be no less than 2.5% of the national recurrent budget excluding 
national debt, which is the same ratio adopted by the Kenyan CDF (United Republic of 
Tanzania 2008a). The high ratio of the CDF budget to the government budget raised 
concerns among donors. It is unknown whether Tanzanian policymakers had an 
intention to actually allocate 2.5% of the national budget to the CDCF, yet taking into 
account the smaller scale of the budgets proposed in the government budget guideline 
and announced by the prime ministers for FY2007/08, it was probably the case that the 
ratio was tentatively adopted from the Kenyan CDF and remained as it was in the 
circulated draft bill. 
 Once the CDCF was launched in 2010, Tsh10 billion (approximately US$7 
million
52
) was provisionally allocated to the budget for FY2009/10 and FY2010/11, 
amounting to approximately 0.2% of the national budget in the latter year (United 
Republic of Tanzania 2009b: 69). There is no fixed percentage or amount stipulated in 
the CDCF Act or Regulations, and it is not clear how the government determined the 
budgets.
53
 According to the CDCF Act, the funds are disbursed twice per year; 50% of 
the total budget is disbursed within the first half of the financial year, and the remaining 
50% in the second half of the year (United Republic of Tanzania 2009a: 15). In 
FY2009/10, only half of the annual budget, Tsh5 billion, was disbursed in April 2010, 
three months before the end of the financial year and six months before the general 
elections, and there was no second disbursement for this financial year. In the second 
year of the operation, FY2010/11, approximately Tsh10 billion was allocated in May 
2011 (United Republic of Tanzania 2011). 
 Similar to the Kenyan CDF, the CDCF budget is allocated to electoral 
constituencies based on a formula. The parliamentary special committee that proposed 
the establishment of a CDF in 2006 suggested that 75% of the budget be equally 
allocated to all the constituencies, which is the formula used in Kenya (Shivji 2006: 6). 
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However, the parliamentary team that redrafted the CDCF bill proposed a more 
progressive approach in addressing regional inequality and decided that 25% would be 
equally distributed to all the constituencies and the allocation of the remaining 75% 
would be based on a combination of population (45%), poverty level (20%) and size of 
the geographical area (10%) (United Republic of Tanzania 2009a). 
 In FY2010/11, the CDCF budget for each constituency ranged from Tsh75.3 
million (approximately US$53,000) in the Bariadi West constituency to Tsh21.3 million 
(US$15,000) in the Lindi Town constituency (United Republic of Tanzania 2011b). On 
average, each constituency received Tsh41.8 million (US$29,000). The scale of the 
CDCF budget is significantly smaller than the budget of the Kenyan CDF and what 
donors had anticipated. A simple comparison of the budgets shows that a constituency 
in Kenya receives 33 times more CDF funds than a constituency in Tanzania.
54
 
The CDCF is administered by the Prime Minister’s Office–Regional 
Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG) and the Ministry of Finance. The 
PMO-RALG calculates the CDCF budget of each constituency based on the above 
formula, and the funds are disbursed from the Ministry of Finance to the dedicated bank 
accounts opened and managed by district councils. The budgets allocated to 
constituencies for FY2009/10 and FY2010/11 were published on the website of the 
Ministry of Finance (United Republic of Tanzania 2010b; 2011b). This arrangement is 
different from the Kenyan CDF. In Kenya, after four years of the operation of the CDF, 
the CDF Board Secretariat, a parastatal agency, was established under the Ministry of 
Planning, National Development and Vision 2030, in 2007 to manage the CDF.
55
 
 Since the CDCF was launched in the middle of FY2009/10, there was no budget 
allocated to the CDCF in the government budget that was approved at the beginning of 
the financial year. Thus, the budget originally earmarked for other activities of the 
PMO-RALG was modified as the CDCF budget. The CDCF was intended to be part of 
the district councils’ budgets in the following year, FY2010/11, yet it was again 
included in the budget of the PMO-RALG.
56
 
 The CDCF is managed in similar ways to the regular local development budgets. 
The only difference between the two budgets is that the former is reviewed and 
approved at the committees chaired by an MP at district councils, while the latter is 
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approved at the full district council meetings.
57
 There are three levels of local 
government authorities in Tanzania: 30 regions, 169 districts and 3,643 wards.
58
 The 
budget planning and execution are mainly carried out by district councils (United 
Republic of Tanzania 2013a).
59
 In terms of the geographical areas, some districts 
consist of only one electoral constituency (e.g. the Arumeru West constituency in the 
Arusha district), while others contain several constituencies (e.g. the Kawe, Kinondoni 
and Ubungo constituencies in the Kinondoni district). 
 The projects funded by the CDCF should be community-based development 
projects that benefit a wide section of the people in constituencies. It is prohibited to use 
the funds for political or religious activities (United Republic of Tanzania 2009a: 
12–13). Based on the lists of priority projects submitted by wards, the CDCF projects 
are selected by the Constituencies Development Catalyst (CDC) Committees 
established at district levels. Each CDC Committee has a maximum of seven members 
consisting of the elected MP as the Chairperson, the District Planning Officer as the 
Secretary, two District Councillors, two Ward Executive Officers
60
 and one 
representative of an NGO in the area. The Committee is responsible for the selection, 
co-ordination and supervision of all the CDCF projects within the respective 
constituencies (United Republic of Tanzania 2009a). 
 While the CDCF was modelled on the Kenyan CDF, it was carefully designed to 
restrict the power of MPs in the management of the funds
61
; MPs are not allowed to 
select the members of the CDC Committees directly by law. Instead, the two District 
Councillors on the Committees are nominated by district councils, the Ward Executive 
Officers by the Council Director and an NGO representative by the CDC Committees. 
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This arrangement indicates that MPs cannot easily dominate the project selection 
process through the appointment of the committee members (United Republic of 
Tanzania 2010c: 4–5). 
The CDCF funds are disbursed for the selected projects upon the authorisation 
of the designated officials of district councils. The signatories of the CDCF bank 
accounts are a combination of 1) either the Council Director or the Council Planning 
Officer and 2) either the Council Treasurer or the Council Accountant. Therefore, MPs 
cannot directly withdraw the funds from the CDCF bank accounts. The disbursement, 
procurement and auditing of the CDCF are carried out in accordance with the 
government laws and regulations (United Republic of Tanzania 2010b: 13–14; United 
Republic of Tanzania 2011b; United Republic of Tanzania 2010c: 2–3). 
 
3.4. Initial Phase of the Implementation of the CDCF 
 
After the CDCF was formally launched, the first disbursement of the funds reached 
district councils, and the CDC Committee meetings were held several months before the 
general elections in October 2010. For example, the first CDC Committee meeting of 
the Mchinga constituency was held in June 2010, one month before Parliament was 
dissolved in July before the elections in October, and the first meeting of the Singida 
Urban constituency was held in September 2010, only one month before the elections. 
Therefore, the impact of the CDCF on the 2010 elections was limited. 
 There is variation in the way in which CDC Committees select projects across 
constituencies. The differences exist in terms of sectors (e.g. education, health) and 
geographical areas. For example, the CDCF budget for the Mchinga constituency in 
FY2009/10 was Tsh17.5 million (approximately US$12,000) which was allocated 
mainly to the projects in education (i.e. secondary school fees, the construction of 
laboratories in schools and the rehabilitation of teachers’ houses) and infrastructure (i.e. 
the construction of the culverts bridging rivers).
62
 Other MPs allocate the funds equally 
across their constituencies. For example, the Singida Urban constituency received 
Tsh38 million (US$27,000) in FY2009/10 and FY2010/11, which was divided by 13 
wards and each ward received Tsh2.8 million.
63
 Yet, due to the limited budget, it is not 
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always possible to allocate the funds equally to all the wards. Sometimes, District 
Councillors who are members of the CDC Committees complain in the committee 
meetings that their wards are not allocated any funds. In response, MPs as chairs of the 
committees convince them, for example, by promising to allocate the following year’s 
budget to their wards. Several MPs decided to allocate the CDCF to priority sectors, 
rather than equally distributing them across the constituencies. 
MPs seem to have significant influence on the decision-making of the CDC 
Committees regardless of their party affiliations. There was an example in which the 
CDCF funds were used to purchase products of a company owned by an MP, which 
indicates the influence of MPs in the selection process of the projects.
64
 It is important 
for opposition MPs to have good relationships with the district councils so that the 
selection of the CDC Committee members would not be biased towards the CCM. 
Opposition MPs sometimes request the Council Directors to balance the party 
composition in selecting the CDC Committee members.
65
 
There is also variation in the way in which the implementation of CDCF projects 
are monitored and publicised by MPs. For example, Halima James Mdee, MP for Kawe 
in Dar es Salaam (CHADEMA), encourages people in her constituency to monitor the 
implementation of the CDCF projects. There was a CDCF-funded project of the 
rehabilitation of teachers’ houses in a primary school in her constituency, and the 
teachers’ committee reported to her that the funds were not properly used. She inspected 
the project with other CDC Committee members and found a gap between the funds 
disbursed for the project and the actual amount used by the local contractor. They 
ordered the contractor to return the fund to the district council (Mwananchi 3 November 
2011).
66
 This exemplifies how an MP can work closely with local government officials 
and communities in managing the CDCF. 
Zitto Zuberi Kabwe, MP for Kigoma North (CHADEMA) and a member of the 
parliamentary team that redrafted the CDCF bill, has been publishing the lists of the 
CDCF projects in his constituency on his personal blog to ensure transparency in the 
utilisation of the funds. In his constituency, the funds were allocated to the projects on 
schools, clinics and dispensaries and water. Kabwe also reported on the embezzlement 
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of the CDCF funds by a district council officer. When a water project was implemented 
in his constituency, the officer purchased old water pipes from a warehouse and 
submitted a fake receipt issued by another shop. Kabwe ordered the council to punish 
the officer and the shop that issued a fake receipt. He also asked senior village leaders to 
closely monitor the implementation of the CDCF projects (Kabwe 23 May 2011; 28 
December 2011; 29 September 2011). Mdee’s and Kabwe’s cases show that MPs can 
play an active supervising role in the implementation of the CDCF. They also suggest 
that the CDCF is prone to the mismanagement not only by MPs but also by various 
other actors who are involved in the implementation of the fund. 
 The first audit on the CDCF was undertaken by the Controller and Auditor 
General (CAG) for FY2010/11, which revealed that approximately Tsh2.7 billion 
(approximately US$1.9 million), or 80%, of the total budget was unspent in the 51 
sampled district councils (United Republic of Tanzania 2012a). This can largely be 
explained by the delayed disbursement of the funds to district councils. Yet, the CAG 
report for FY2011/12 reported again that more than Tsh2.6 billion (approximately 
US$1.6 million
67
) of the total budget were unspent in the 69 sampled district councils.
68
 
This report also revealed that CDC Committees in 15 out of 69 sampled districts did not 
prepare the reports for the PMO-RALG on the CDCF budgets they received and spent. 
Some of the CDCF projects did not have evidence that the CDC Committees approved 
the spending or they were initiated by resident community members. Thus, the report 
concludes that the objectives of the CDCF were not fully achieved (United Republic of 
Tanzania 2013b: xxxiv, 113–117). Probably in response to these reports, the CDCF Act 
was amended in October 2013 to strengthen the CDCF audits by articulating that the 
CDCF funds will be audited and reported upon by the CAG in terms of the provisions 
of the Public Audit Act (United Republic of Tanzania 2013c: 11). 
The CDCF projects have occasionally been reported by newspapers. The most 
common reports are the pictures of the projects funded by the CDCF or minor problems 
about managing the funds in particular constituencies (Habari Leo 13 May 2013; The 
Citizen 22 May 2013). Despite the heated debate on the CDCF in the media when it was 
discussed in Parliament in July 2009, many Tanzanians do not know about the fund. 
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According to the Views of the People 2012, a perception survey conducted by the 
Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA),
69
 only 21% of the respondents had heard of 
the CDCF, and very few knew that the funds were managed by MPs (Research on 
Poverty Alleviation 2012: 32). The CDCF is still at an early stage of the implementation 
which is not widely known to the public. 
 
3.5. Four Rationales for the Adoption of a CDF in Tanzania 
 
There are various reasons why Tanzanian policymakers supported the establishment of 
a CDF. While undoubtedly influenced by their electoral incentives, their rationales for 
adopting a fund are underpinned by the need to address various problems existing in the 
country. Based on the interviews with MPs, the rationales can be summarised into four 
groups: the first group is concerned with electoral politics, the second with the role of 
MPs, and the third and fourth with the development challenges facing the country. 
These four rationales are actors’ explanations for the introduction of the CDCF. 
Building on these rationales, a possible explanation for the introduction of the fund is 
discussed in Chapter 5 by analysing the changing nature of electoral and party politics 
of the country following the transition to a multiparty system in 1992. The chapter 
presents an argument that the introduction of the CDCF was an election strategy of 
Tanzania’s ruling party, the CCM, to re-establish party unity in preparation for the 
elections in 2010. In contrast to the actors’ rationales discussed in this section, the 
argument in Chapter 5 is the explanation of external observers based on the political 
analysis of the country. 
During the interviews with MPs, some of the four rationales were mentioned by 
specific MPs, while others were repeatedly mentioned by a wider group of MPs. Thus, 
it is important to distinguish two groups of MPs in the policy process: one comprises 
‘policymakers’ who set the agenda and directly engaged with the formulation of the 
CDCF, and the other comprises ‘supporters’ who favoured and supported the 
establishment of the CDCF in Parliament but were not directly involved in the 
designing of the fund. The main actors in the former category are the President, the 
Prime Minister, the Speaker of Parliament and the members of the three parliamentary 
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committees (i.e. the parliamentary special committee that initially proposed a CDF, the 
parliamentary team which redrafted the CDCF bill and the parliamentary standing 
committee of the Constitution, Legal Affairs and Governance) as described in the 
previous section. All MPs who were elected from constituencies including the 
‘policymakers’ are the beneficiaries of the CDCF. 
 
3.5.1 To Prevent Collusion between MPs and the Private Sector and Level the 
Electoral Playing Field 
 
The first rationale is that a CDF would reduce the financial dependency of MPs on 
businessmen, thereby curbing collusion between MPs and the private sector and 
creating a more level playing field for elections. This rationale was articulated by the 
Speaker Sitta, a principal ‘policymaker’.70 One MP described the problem of MPs 
using private funds for their constituency service by referring to a Swahili saying: 
‘Aliyemlipa mpiga zumari ndiye anayechagua wimbo (A person who pays the guitarist 
is the one who chooses songs)’, and another MP also made a similar point that the 
CDCF was aimed at mitigating the influence of money on electoral politics.
71
 In 
addition, while it was not explicitly mentioned by any MPs in interviews, as discussed 
in Chapter 2, a CDF can be a means to enhance financial autonomy of MPs from the 
executive and mitigate the prevalence of patronage politics centrally controlled by the 
executive. 
This rationale was also pointed out by a Kenyan politician on the Kenyan CDF 
(Cheeseman 2006: 49) and more broadly, it is a general feature of public funds for 
political finance. For example, Casas-Zamora (2008) discusses direct state funding 
(DSF) to political parties or individual politicians for their political activities. He argues 
that there are three areas of dispute on DSF: 1) autonomy of political actors and 
prevention of corruption, 2) political equality and electoral competition and 3) 
organisation and institutionalisation of political parties (Casas-Zamora 2008: 4–5, 29). 
Among them, the first and second areas of debate are relevant to this rationale.  
First, the proponents of DSF argue that DSF contributes to strengthening the  
autonomy of political actors and the prevention of corruption, as ‘subsidies protect 
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parties and elected officials from economic dependence on large private donors’ 
(Casas-Zamora 2008: 4). The opponents assert that DSF is additional to the existing 
political finance and does not substitute existing private contributions (Casas-Zamora 
2008: 5). The second area of debate on DSF is on political equality and electoral 
competition. The proponents of DSF argue that it enhances equality in electoral 
competition, as it prevents political dominance of the groups that have access to 
resources and allows candidates to compete fairly in elections regardless of their 
economic conditions. The critics argue that DSF generates incumbency advantage and 
makes it difficult for newcomers to enter politics (Casas-Zamora 2008: 4–5). 
 These debates can be applied to Sitta’s rationale for a CDF based on financial 
autonomy of MPs or to CDFs in general, apart from the last point on incumbency 
advantage because, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, CDFs do not automatically 
enhance incumbency advantage. Although there are potentially positive effects of CDFs 
on electoral democracy, CDFs may have only marginal effects on mitigating the 
collusion between MPs and the private sector or the executive discussed by the 
opponents of DSF. 
 
3.5.2. To Relieve the Fundraising Burden on MPs 
 
The second rationale is the benefactor role of MPs in their constituencies. The 
‘supporters’ welcomed the introduction of a CDF, because it would relieve their 
responsibilities of raising funds for their constituency service. This rationale seems to be 
a common rationale across the countries where CDFs were adopted. As mentioned 
earlier, President Kikwete made this point in his speech to Parliament as well. All the 
interviewed MPs agree that the financial requests made by voters exceed what they can 
offer them.
72
 One MP questioned why MPs had to use their own salaries for the 
problems of citizens that ought to be addressed by local governments.
73
 There are MPs 
who think that voters are misguided about the role of MPs in Tanzania.
74
 Yet, the 
popularity of this rationale confirms that there is a social norm in Tanzania and other 
developing countries that MPs should play a benefactor role in their constituencies. 
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 This rationale is also associated with the power balance between MPs and 
presidential appointees at local levels in Tanzania. The Tanzanian government has been 
allocating discretionary budgets to Regional Commissioners (RCs), heads of local 
governments appointed by the President at the regional level, so that they can support 
community projects in their jurisdiction. Around Tsh10 million (approximately 
US$8,000
75
) was allocated to each RC in 2006, which was increased to Tsh20 million 
by 2009.
76
 Similar to RCs, District Commissioners (DCs), presidential appointees at the 
district level, started to receive around Tsh45–50 million in 2009 before the CDCF Act 
was passed into law (United Republic of Tanzania 2009c: 61). The latter amount is 
about the same scale as the CDCF budget allocated to each constituency (i.e. Tsh47.7 
million). 
 MPs found it unfair that only RCs and DCs had been receiving public funds to 
contribute to community projects. For example, when MPs, RCs and DCs travelled to 
villages together, RCs and DCs were able to contribute money to community projects 
using their discretionary funds without necessarily mentioning that they are public 
funds; there is no requirement for establishing committees to decide how to use these 
funds. MPs were similarly expected to contribute to the projects by villagers, and they 
had to spend their own money to match the contributions by RCs and DCs. MPs claim 
that although the CDCF is not a discretionary fund they can use immediately, they can 
refer to it as a means to help community projects when they visit the communities 
(United Republic of Tanzania 2006c: 1–3; United Republic of Tanzania 2009c: 70).77 
Although no evidence was found to make a strong argument here, given the fact that the 
discretionary funds for DCs and the CDCF were introduced in the same year, the 
executive might have sought to reinforce its support basis at local levels by allocating 
part of the government budget to both presidential appointees (i.e. RCs and DCs) and 
elected representatives (i.e. MPs) so that neither of them would feel left out in the 
provision of the financial power by the executive. 
 The financial power of MPs and the presidential appointees at the local level has 
already been discussed in the cases of Ghana and Zambia in Chapter 2. In the two 
countries, the heads of local governments who are appointed by presidents have power 
to release CDF funds, and thus the introduction of CDFs indirectly enhances the power 
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of executives. In Tanzania, neither RCs nor DCs have authority to release the CDCF 
funds. Thus, the CDCF in Tanzania is an example of strengthening the power of MPs, 
and may also have an effect on recalibrating the power balance between MPs and 
presidential appointees at the local level by equally allocating public funds for their 
constituency service. 
 
3.5.3. To Supplement the Execution of the Development Budget by Local 
Governments 
 
As a third rationale, some MPs argue that the CDCF supplements the execution of the 
development budget by local governments. It also gives MPs opportunities to 
communicate with local government officials and communities effectively to address 
local development problems.
78
 In other words, there is an expectation that the CDCF 
would help MPs get more engaged with local development processes and increase their 
visibility on the ground. 
 This rationale leads to two areas of discussions. First, it implies that MPs did not 
fully participate in the budget planning and execution process at district levels before 
the CDCF was established. It is true that MPs cannot always attend district council 
meetings that are held four times per year due to the time conflicts with other official 
duties and send their personal assistants to the meetings. Yet, there is also criticism by 
the public that MPs spend most of their time in Dar es Salaam and are absent from their 
constituencies, to be discussed in Chapter 5.  
Second, this rationale also suggests that the government budget execution 
mechanism needs to be improved. MPs argue that the local government budget is 
inflexible once it is approved and it takes a long time for the budget to be disbursed. 
The CDCF, on the other hand, is flexible and can be used for urgent problems facing 
communities.
79
 The flexibility of the CDCF is exemplified in the case in which its 
funds were used for the projects that were supposed to be funded by the local 
development budget. For example, Tundu Antiphas Mughwai Lissu, MP for Singida 
East (CHADEMA), complained to the Deputy Minister for the PMO-RALG in 
Parliament in November 2011 that Tsh51 million (approximately US$32,000), which 
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was supposed to be spent by the central government to a water project in the Nkuhi 
village in his constituency did not arrive at the district council. Thus, Tsh4 million was 
allocated from the CDCF funds to provide water to the village (United Republic of 
Tanzania 2011a: 3).  
Some MPs emphasise that each constituency has its unique problems which cannot 
easily be solved by the regular government budget and a CDF would enable them to fill 
this gap.
80
 In response, one can argue that MPs should change relevant laws to improve 
the budget planning and execution structure, which is their primary function as MPs, 
instead of creating a new mechanism to channel funds for their constituency service. 
 
3.5.4. To Encourage Community-based Development Projects 
 
The last rationale for introducing a CDF was to accelerate community-based 
development projects, featured in the CDCF Act as one of the objectives to establish the 
fund (United Republic of Tanzania 2009a: 20). Partly because the size of the budget 
turned out to be small, the CDCF funds are to show acknowledgements by MPs of the 
community development efforts and encourage citizens to contribute to the projects in 
the form of either money or labour. There are several MPs who emphasised this point in 
the interviews, including Agrey Deaisil Mwanri, Deputy Minister of the PMO-RALG, 
in charge of the overall administration of the CDCF.
81
 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, in Kenya, there has been a long tradition of 
community fundraising, called harambee. Interestingly, while the Kenyan CDF was 
aimed at replacing the involvement of MPs in encouraging citizens to contribute to 
harambee, the Tanzanian CDCF promotes such involvement, perhaps because of the 
different evolution of community fundraising in the two countries. As will be discussed 
in Chapter 5, harambee was discouraged during the socialist period in Tanzania. 
Although Tanzanian MPs are increasingly invited to attend harambee (e.g. harambee 
dinners in Dar es Salaam) to raise funds for their constituencies these days, it is still a 
relatively new movement in Tanzania in comparison to Kenya. 
 Instead, there was a mechanism to implement community-based development 
projects in Tanzania. Towards the end of the 1970s, around 200 voluntary hometown 
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associations, called District Development Trusts (DDTs), were established in response 
to the failure of the government to deliver social services. DDTs were often based on 
ethnic groups and voluntary, but compulsory at times, contributions by patrons and 
citizens. DDTs were promoted by the elite and the middle classes in Dar es Salaam who 
mobilised funds among themselves and from the government to support the local 
community development projects in their hometowns. Like harambee in Kenya, the 
construction of secondary schools was particularly popular. DDTs cultivated 
patron-client relationships between the elite and villagers, and MPs were involved as 
patrons as well as mediators and influenced local politics through DDTs (Kelsall 2002: 
610–611; Kelsall 2003: 71; Kiondo 1993: 178–179; Mchomvu 1998: 47; Nyaluke 2008: 
6, 12). Although DDTs were eventually evolved into NGOs, they are an example of the 
tradition of community fundraising which underlies the objective of the CDCF to 
encourage community-based development efforts in Tanzania. 
 
As discussed so far, the rationales identified by Tanzanian MPs to justify the 
need for a CDF are related to various political and development challenges facing the 
country. While the first rationale was mentioned only by the Speaker of Parliament and 
a few MPs, the other three were mentioned during the parliamentary discussion on the 
CDCF in July 2009 and seem to be widely shared among MPs (United Republic of 
Tanzania 2009c). There is an assumption across all the rationales that MPs ought to play 
a benefactor role to support the lives of voters in their constituencies and MPs should 
get more actively engaged with local development. At the same time, these rationales 
are underpinned by the incentives of MPs to create their own space at district levels so 
that they could exercise their influence more effectively in local politics and be more 
responsive to voters’ expectations. 
Among these four rationales, the first two seem to be the primary explanations 
for the introduction of the CDCF in Tanzania, both of which are related to the power 
balance between political actors; the first rationale is to create a level playing field for 
MPs who have access to resources and those who do not; and the second rationale is to 
recalibrate the power balance between MPs, RCs and DCs at local levels. As noted in 
Chapter 1, the question as to who holds the power to distribute CDF funds is commonly 
discussed in the existing political studies on CDFs in developing countries, and it was a 
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key dimension to analyse the variation of the politics of CDFs in Chapter 2. 
The latter two rationales on the budget execution of local governments and 
community-led development initiatives are important in terms of the administrative and 
development challenges with which the country is confronted, but they seem to be 
secondary explanations for the introduction of the CDCF. In other words, there are 
probably other, perhaps more effective, ways to deal with these challenges. 
Nevertheless, the identification and articulation of multiple objectives by policymakers 
and supporters including the latter two rationales was crucial to push forward the CDCF 
agenda against the strong opposition by internal and external actors. 
 
3.6. Who Opposed the CDCF? And Why? 
 
While the introduction of the CDCF was unanimously supported by both ruling and 
opposition MPs in Parliament with the above rationales, its policy process was affected 
by the varying degrees of objections or reservations by groups of actors: opposition 
MPs, special seats MPs, bureaucrats, donors and CSOs. This section focuses on these 
actors and how they were involved in the policy process. 
 As discussed below, there were mainly three reasons for the opponents to be 
against the introduction of a CDF. First, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, they argued 
that a CDF breaches the democratic principle of the separation of powers between the 
legislature and the executive. By becoming the executors of the government budget and 
reporting to the PMO-RALG on the use of the funds, MPs would lose their supervising 
role of the government. Thus, a CDF undermines horizontal accountability in 
democracy.
82
 Second, a CDF contradicts with the government’s ongoing efforts in 
streamlining its budget transfer mechanism from central to local government. A CDF 
creates a parallel structure and increases the administrative costs of local governments 
(Nyimbi 2008: 6; Oxford Analytica 2009; Policy Forum 2008b). The third rationale is 
that a CDF is prone to corruption and mismanagement of funds by MPs or other actors. 
Such incidences are frequently reported in other countries where CDFs are in place. 
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3.6.1. Opposition MPs 
 
In Tanzania, MPs from both ruling and opposition parties were enthusiastic in their 
support of the adoption of the CDCF. It was particularly advocated by Willibrod Slaa, 
former MP for Karatu (1995–2010) and Secretary General of the CHADEMA. As a 
member of the Special Committee that proposed the establishment of a CDF in 2006, he 
advocated for the introduction of a CDF in public. Two other opposition leaders, Hamad 
Mohamed, MP for Wawi (CUF) and Opposition Leader in Parliament during the Ninth 
Parliament (2005–2010), and John Cheyo, MP for Bariadi East (UDP), who were 
members of the Special Committee and parliamentary team that drafted the CDCF Bill 
respectively, supported the CDCF actively.
83
 Opposition MPs would not have 
supported it, had they considered that the fund would increase incumbency advantage 
and contribute to the CCM’s dominance in Parliament.  
 Slaa and other opposition leaders’ support of the CDCF can partially be 
explained by the lessons they learned from the Kenyan experience. A major reason for 
MPs to support the adoption of CDFs in both Kenya and Tanzania was that it would be 
an advantage for incumbent MPs by enabling them to publicly use state resources for 
constituency service with the expectation that this would increase their chances of 
re-election. However, in the Kenyan elections in December 2007, the return rate of 
incumbent MPs, regardless of whether they sought re-election or not, was 
approximately 30%, which represented a decline of about 10% from 2002 
(Gutiérrez-Romero 2009: 1; Kihoro 2007; Republic of Kenya). Thus, the CDF does not 
seem to have contributed to enhancing the overall probability of re-election of 
incumbent MPs in Kenya in 2007 (The Standard 21 June 2009).
 
 
Although the consideration of the establishment of a CDF began in Tanzania 
before the 2007 Kenyan elections, opposition leaders in Tanzania were aware of the 
election results in Kenya and considered that the CDCF would not automatically 
enhance the incumbency advantage of MPs in Tanzania. In the interview, Slaa 
emphasised that it is a wrong view that the CDCF would increase incumbency 
advantage because politicians who are capable of ensuring the proper implementation of 
development projects in their constituencies would gain electoral support regardless of 
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whether they are funded by the CDCF or not.
86
 
During the fieldwork, only 3 out of 34 MPs expressed their objection or 
reservation towards the CDCF in the interviews. They are all CHADEMA MPs. First, it 
is Zitto Zuberi Kabwe, MP for Kigoma North (CHADEMA) (United Republic of 
Tanzania). As the youngest MP during the Ninth Parliament (2005–2010), he has been 
one of the most outspoken and influential opposition MPs in Tanzanian politics (Englert 
2008). He was opposed to the principle of CDFs with the view that Tanzania had one of 
the best local government systems that could deliver social services and the execution of 
projects by MPs through a CDF would be an interference with the executive branch. He 
has good networks with advocacy NGOs in the country, and even assisted local activists 
with their campaign against a CDF. 
 Yet, Kabwe’s position was unique and personal rather than his party’s. There 
were only five CHADEMA MPs in Parliament when a CDF was proposed in 2006. 
Among them, Willibrod Slaa was a strong advocate of the CDCF. It would have been 
difficult for Kabwe to get support from Slaa and other CHADEMA MPs. Instead of 
opposing the proposal, Kabwe engaged with the formulation of the CDCF as a member 
of the parliamentary team that redrafted the CDCF bill from his critical standpoints. He 
travelled to Kenya on his own expenses to evaluate the operation and impacts of the 
CDF, and contributed to the design of the CDCF. 
 Instead of supporting the CDCF, Kabwe argues that strengthening the power and 
capacity of MPs in lawmaking and oversight is more urgent.
87
 He published an article 
entitled ‘Creating the right incentives for MPs’ in The Citizen, a major English 
newspaper in Tanzania, in April 2011, which was later posted on the website of the 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association in Africa Region. He argues in the article 
that MPs have to perform lawmaking and oversight duties regardless of the CDCF and 
the challenges facing Tanzanian MPs such as the lack of access to information and 
adequate research and administrative support need to be addressed (Kabwe 12 April 
2011; Kabwe 2011). 
 Another MP who was against the CDCF in the interview was Tundu Lissu, MP 
for Singida East and Chief Whip of CHADEMA. He was newly elected in 2010 and 
was not in Parliament when the CDCF was enacted. As a lawyer previously working for 
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an advocacy NGO in Tanzania and a research institute in Washington DC, he has been 
critical of the corruption of the government. He considers that the CDCF is an example 
of pork barrel politics which gives MPs a financial means to distribute money to local 
projects. Finally, Mustapha Boay Akunaay, MP for Mbulu (CHADEMA) who was also 
newly elected in 2010, does not like the operational arrangement of the CDCF because 
voters accuse MPs if CDCF projects are not properly implemented despite the fact that 
MPs do not have full control over the implementation of the CDCF projects.
88
 Overall, 
the MPs who disagree with the principle of the CDCF are only a few. 
 
3.6.2. Special Seats MPs 
 
Another feature of the policy process of a CDF in Tanzania is the position of special 
seats MPs for women, as there was a debate on whether special seats MPs should also 
be allocated the funds. In 1985, Tanzania was the first African country that adopted 
gender quotas to increase women’s representation in Parliament (Yoon 2004: 450–451; 
Yoon 2011: 84).
89
 Special seats MPs are selected and ranked by political parties, and 
the seats have been distributed among parties based on the percentage of the votes each 
party receives in parliamentary elections (Yoon 2011: 86–87).90  The special seat 
system makes the current electoral system in Tanzania a combination of a 
first-past-the-post single-member plurality system and a proportional representation 
system. 
 The number of special seats kept increasing from 47 (17.1% of the total number 
of constituency MPs, members from the House of Representatives, and the Attorney 
General) in 1995 to 102 (41.6%) in 2010 (United Republic of Tanzania; Yoon 2011: 91). 
The increase corresponds with the call by the African Union in 2005 for a 50% 
representation of women at all levels of political decision-making positions by 2015. 
The increase in the ratio of female MPs was mentioned in the CCM election manifestos 
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in 2010 (Chama Cha Mapinduzi 2010; Makinda 2011: 28; Yoon 2011: 83). 
 Special seats MPs either represent a region, which includes four to nine 
constituencies, or certain groups of citizens. For example, during the Ninth Parliament 
(2005–2010), the CCM held 58 special seats. As there were 26 regions in the country 
during this period, each region was represented by two special seats MPs. CCM special 
seats MPs who do not serve a region represent universities, the disabled, the youth or 
NGOs. Special seats MPs of opposition parties served more than one region due to the 
limited number of seats they hold (Yoon 2008: 67). 
 When a CDF was proposed in Parliament in 2006, special seats MPs argued that 
they should also be eligible for it because they represent multiple constituencies or 
certain groups (Yoon 2008: 74). Yet, there was a counterargument that the fund 
allocation to special seats MPs would create complication in the coordination of the 
funds, as voters represented by constituencies and special seats MPs are duplicated.
91
 
As it became less likely that special seats MPs would be allocated the funds, some of 
them were against the fund and secretly expressed their support to CSOs’ campaign 
against it.
92
 In the parliamentary discussion on the CDCF Bill in July 2009, Stella 
Martin Manyanya, special seats MP (CCM), proposed that special seats MPs be part of 
the CDC Committees. In response, the Minister for the PMO-RALG said only that they 
would consider the proposal (United Republic of Tanzania 2009c: 77, 82). 
 Behind the logic of the complication in the coordination of the funds, there is a 
view that MPs elected from constituencies were afraid of an increase of special seats 
MPs’ influencing their constituencies through the CDCF.93 This is related to the 
political career paths pursued by many female politicians; the special seat system has 
been served as a stepping stone for female MPs to vie for constituency seats (Yoon 
2008; Yoon 2011: 92).
94
 The first contest in constituencies is the most challenging for 
women due to cultural barriers (Yoon 2008: 74) and the special seat system ‘has 
provided women with experience, skills, and confidence and has inspired some 
special-seat MPs to contest in constituencies’ (Yoon 2011: 91–92). Thus, some MPs 
elected from constituencies were worried that they might lose their seats to the special 
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seats MPs who perform well and are popular in the constituencies (Yoon 2011: 92).  
 Generally, special seats MPs find it difficult to pursue any agenda independently 
from constituency MPs in the same parties and they lack autonomy in conducting their 
business outside Parliament. For example; 
 
[w]henever a special-seat MP visits a constituency in her region, she must 
inform the constituency MP of her visit and her planned activities in the 
constituency. It is a norm for the special-seat MP to avoid discussing issues or 
projects that the constituency MP deals with, to avoid causing contention (Yoon 
2008: 74).  
 
This is because they are nominated by political parties. Special seats MPs have to 
balance between their intentions to establish their local support bases and their 
reputation by MPs elected from constituencies and other leaders in the parties. The 
exclusion of special seats MPs from the operation of the CDCF exemplifies the power 
dynamics between constituency and special seats MPs in Tanzania. 
 
3.6.3. Ministries 
 
The officers in the PMO-RALG and the Ministry of Finance kept a low-profile attitude 
towards the public debate on a CDF. As the expansion of the budget for the legislature 
‘comes at the expense of executive power’ (Barkan 2008: 131), they might not have 
welcomed the establishment of a CDF. Yet, they did not make any public comment on it. 
A director in the PMO-RALG criticised some donors for establishing separate funding 
channels to the local level which generate ‘confusion, perverse incentives and a lack of 
accountability as the planning standards, funding requirements, reporting, and 
monitoring are different’ (Nyimbi 2008: 6). This criticism can be applied to the CDCF, 
but there was no comment on it by the officials of the PMO-RALG. The stance of the 
bureaucrats may be explained by their strong linkages with the CCM (Kelsall 2003: 61). 
In any case, bureaucrats in the relevant ministries played a passive role in the CDCF 
policy process. 
 
3.6.4. Donors 
 
Tanzania is one of the largest aid recipient countries in sub-Saharan Africa, which 
received around US$27 billion in aid between 1990 and 2010. Currently, around 40% of 
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the national budget and 80% of the development budget come from foreign aid (Tripp 
2012: 1; United Republic of Tanzania 2007d). The relationship between donors and the 
Tanzanian government changed over time. Major donor aid to Tanzania has been based 
on the national development strategy of the Tanzanian government, the National 
Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty or Mpango wa Kukuza Uchumi na 
Kuondoa Umaskini Tanzania (MKUKUTA) in Swahili. The Joint Assistance Strategy 
in Tanzania was formulated to support the implementation of the MKUKUTA 
effectively, which was signed by major bilateral and multilateral donors and the 
Tanzanian government in 2006. The second MKUKUTA has been implemented since 
FY2010/11 (Tripp 2012: 15–16; United Republic of Tanzania 2006a). 
 Along with the formulation of these strategies, major bilateral and multilateral 
donors shifted their aid modalities from project aid to basket funds and the General 
Budget Support (GBS) in the early 2000s. GBS is non-earmarked aid which is directly 
disbursed into the recipient government budget (Development Partners Group in 
Tanzania). Eleven bilateral and three multilateral donors have been providing GBS, and 
its ratio to the entire aid to Tanzania increased from 33% in FY2003/2004 to 51% in 
FY2007/08 (Tripp 2012: 17). 
 GBS is a unique aid modality that simultaneously strengthens the ownership of 
the Ministry of Finance of the aid recipient countries and the influence of donors on the 
national budget planning and execution of these countries. While project aid goes 
directly to the project execution agencies, GBS is disbursed into the national account of 
the Ministry of Finance of the aid recipient countries. GBS gives the ministry more 
centralised control over aid than project aid. At the same time, as GBS is mixed with the 
national revenue of the aid recipient countries, GBS donors can monitor the entire 
government budget more closely than project aid and this enhances the leverage of 
donors on the formulation and execution of development policies. Consequently, donors 
have become more powerful in the policy community than Tanzanian policymakers. 
 In addition to GBS, donors have been providing assistance to elections and 
Parliament through basket funds in Tanzania. Their aid to support the elections in 2005 
evolved into a basket fund to promote consolidation of democracy for a long term. With 
approximately US$17.6 million financed by eight donors and the Tanzanian 
government, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) implemented a 
project called the Deepening Democracy in Tanzania Programme (DDTP) from 2007 to 
2010. The Parliamentary Corporate Plan 2009–2013 was formulated as one of the 
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DDTP’s outputs (United Nations Development Programme 2010: 8). Based on this plan, 
the Legislatures Support Project (LSP), a successor project to the DDTP, has been 
implemented since 2011 (Cook, Munishi and Mutembei 2010). The LSP supports the 
two parliaments in Tanzania, the National Assembly in Mainland and the House of 
Representatives in Zanzibar, with a focus on strengthening the capacity of MPs to fulfil 
their representative, legislative and oversight responsibilities. It does not provide 
support to their constituency service.
95
 
 There are also two basket funds among donors in supporting the Local 
Government Reform Programme (LGRP), which is one of the governance reforms 
stipulated in the MKUKUTA. One of them is the Local Government Capital 
Development Grant (LGCDG), a joint basket fund of the Tanzanian government and 
donors established under the PMO-RALG in FY2004/05 to finance development 
projects identified through local participatory planning processes (Nyimbi 2008: 6).
96
 
When a CDF was proposed in Parliament, donors were concerned not only about the 
breaching of the separation of powers, but also the contradiction with the LGRP which 
was aimed at streamlining the national budget mechanism to ensure timely and effective 
fund transfer from central to local governments, and the duplication of a CDF with the 
LGCDG. Thus, donors in the Governance Working Group (GWG), which monitors the 
overall governance cluster of the MKUKUTA, and the LGRP Working Group requested 
for detailed information on the CDF proposal and expressed their concerns to their 
Tanzanian counterparts in the relevant ministries. Yet, as mentioned earlier, civil 
servants were not in a good position to discuss the CDF proposal. 
 In July 2008, donors obtained a draft CDF bill which states that the CDF budget 
would be no less than 2.5% of the national recurrent budget except national debt 
(United Republic of Tanzania 2008a). They were increasingly concerned about the scale 
of the impact of the CDF on governance and brought the issue to the higher levels of 
dialogues with the Tanzanian government. Meanwhile, as mentioned earlier, President 
Kikwete announced the establishment of a CDF in Parliament in August 2008. The 
Heads of Missions, usually ambassadors or directors of the development aid agencies, 
who chaired the GWG and the LGRP Working Group, made a formal request to meet 
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Prime Minister Pinda and Speaker Sitta to discuss it. In October 2008, donor 
representatives had a meeting with Speaker Sitta, where Sitta defended the CDF 
proposal and pushed back strongly.
97
 
 Not only Sitta but other Tanzanian MPs started to express their frustration at 
donors’ interference with the CDCF. For example, John Momose Cheyo, MP for 
Bariadi East (UDP) and a member of the parliamentary team that drafted the CDCF Bill, 
stated at a meeting with Tanzanian CSOs in July 2008 that ‘there was a need for the 
nation to stop depending on donor funding and that CDF was an alternative way’ (The 
Guardian 4 August 2008). He added that Tanzanians ‘need to have [their] own fund so 
that donors should not dictate their terms on [Tanzanians]’ (The Guardian 4 August 
2008), which shows an intention of Tanzanian policymakers to create their own space to 
engage with local developments, independently from donors. 
 At the parliamentary discussion on the CDCF Bill in July 2009, Bernard 
Kamillius Membe, Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, criticised 
some ambassadors on their attempts to influence public views towards the CDCF. 
Drawing on the Vienna Convention of 1961, Membe asserted that the ambassadors who 
were not satisfied with any aspects of Tanzania should communicate with his ministry 
in writing, instead of telling citizens what to do (The Guardian 1 August 2009; United 
Republic of Tanzania 2009c: 73–74). He further stated: 
 
…we want [Ambassadors] to respect the laws and procedures of our country, 
and not to interfere with [our] internal affairs.…if we find evidence that [an 
Ambassador] uses his money to put pressure on people … so that Tanzanians 
would deal with issues as he wants, we will immediately take a diplomatic 
action to make him accountable (United Republic of Tanzania 2009c: 74).
98
 
 
As such, the CDCF almost became a diplomatic problem between the Tanzanian 
government and donors. 
 However, donors’ pressure on the Tanzanian government seems to have already 
been declining after their meeting with Speaker Sitta. Their concerns gradually shifted 
from the principle of the CDCF to how to ensure transparency and accountability in the 
management of the funds. Following the enactment of the CDCF Act into law in August 
2009, donors expressed their concerns on the management of the CDCF to the 
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PMO-RALG. Since then, the LGRP donors have been monitoring the CDCF and raised 
a related issue at the LGRP annual review in October 2010; however, it was only a 
technical aspect. Donors requested the government not to include the CDCF in their 
calculation of the national budget allocation to local governments, which was one of the 
outcome indicators to assess the progress in the LGRP.
101
 
 There are several reasons why donor involvement in the CDCF gradually 
declined. First, the scale of the CDCF budget turned out to be significantly smaller than 
what was proposed in the draft bill circulated among donors in 2008, and they 
considered that its impacts would be limited. Although there is no evidence, the 
pressure by donors and CSOs might have had some influence on the scale of the CDCF 
budget. Second, donors were aware that, despite its controversies, the CDCF was a 
domestic issue and Tanzanian CSOs were the more legitimate actors to get involved in 
the process. Once it was approved in Parliament in accordance with the formal 
legislative procedure, there was not much donors could do to change the decision. They 
decided to re-evaluate the CDCF after its operation becomes fully fledged. Finally, 
there were changes in the staff of donor agencies in Tanzania. Some ambassadors and 
governance advisors completed their assignments and left Tanzania after the CDCF was 
introduced and their successors did not have the same level of interests in it after it was 
launched.
102
 
 As a broader background, at the time when the CDCF was formulated, donor aid 
in Tanzania was at a turning point. Mainly due to slow progress in various reforms and 
social services, some donors started to reduce their GBS budgets. The total amount of 
GBS dramatically declined from US$755 million in FY2009/10 to US$452 million in 
2011/12. The European Union, for example, reduced its GBS by 27% in FY2012/13 
because of ‘the need for more measurable results and improved accountability, 
particularly relating to corruption and public financial management’ (Tripp 2012: 17). 
This change indicates that there was a growing recognition of the limited influence 
donors can have on national policymaking and the implementation of MKUKUTA. The 
gradual decline of their involvement in the CDCF corresponds with the beginning of the 
changing aid relationship between donors and Tanzania. 
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3.6.5. Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) 
 
The key actors who were against the creation of a CDF in Tanzania were CSOs. Since 
the late 1980s, the number of CSOs increased in the country following the political 
liberation in the early 1990s. It was also due to the emphasis placed by donors on the 
importance of civil society in building democracy. Tanzanian CSOs have been 
addressing a wide range of issues including human rights, gender equality and 
environmental conservation, and they have increasingly been playing important roles as 
a watchdog of the government (Kelsall 2003: 72; Tripp 2012: 9).
103
 While the 
government has been inviting CSOs to the consultative process of national 
policymaking, it has remained cautious of CSOs with a suspicion that they might be 
supporting opposition parties or competing for donor funding (Tripp 2012: 9–10). 
 CSOs did not pay much attention to the CDF proposal at the beginning, but 
apparently they learned about it from an article written by a foreign researcher based in 
Tanzania which was published in The Citizen in December 2006.
104
 CSOs began to 
criticise the proposal with the three rationales discussed at the beginning of this section. 
Policy Forum, a network of over 75 CSOs in Tanzania, played a central role in raising 
public awareness and consolidating the views of CSOs. They published several papers 
discussing the pros and cons of CDFs, organised a public debate among CSOs and 
donors and analysed the experience of CDFs in Kenya and Uganda (Policy Forum 2007; 
Policy Forum 2008b; Policy Forum 2009). 
 There were several consultations between MPs and CSOs in the process. In June 
2007, Wilson Mutagaywa Masilingi, then Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on 
Constitution, Law and Good Governance, met CSOs in Dodoma to explain why a CDF 
was proposed (Peter 2007–2008). Subsequently, Policy Forum established international 
networks with Kenyan CSOs and the International Budget Partnership to place pressure 
on the government effectively. In July 2008, the members of the Policy Forum travelled 
to Mombassa in Kenya to observe social audits of the CDF-funded projects in the 
Bahari constituency which was organised by a Kenyan NGO, Muslims for Human 
Rights (Policy Forum 2008a; Policy Forum 2008b).
105
 In July 2008, soon after the 
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study tour to Mombasa, the members of the Policy Forum were invited by the team of 
the Parliamentary House Business Committee to a meeting in Dodoma, and they 
requested Parliament not to adopt a CDF ‘until there has been much greater awareness 
and wide stakeholder debate about its implications’ (Policy Forum 2008b: 5; The 
Guardian 4 August 2008). 
 When the CDCF Bill was tabled in Parliament in July 2009, thousands of 
activists organised a demonstration outside the Parliament in Dodoma, which was 
widely covered by the local media. It was rare at that time for CSOs that were based in 
Dar es Salaam to protest in Dodoma (Daily News 28 July 2009). Apparently, even some 
Kenyan CSOs also came to support the demonstration (United Republic of Tanzania 
2009c: 68). Willibrod Slaa was called to meet CSO representatives. It was a strategic 
move by Parliament to send the opposition leader to the meeting, as he was a strong 
advocate against corruption and generally favoured by activists. Despite the efforts by 
CSOs, the CDCF Act was passed in Parliament.
106
 
 In March 2011, seven CSOs jointly filed a petition to the High Court to seek 
nullification of the CDCF Act by challenging the constitutionality of the CDCF. Their 
argument is that the CDCF ‘compromises powers of the National Assembly to supervise 
the executive’ (The Citizen 16 March 2011). CSOs wanted to initiate the litigation 
process soon after the CDCF was launched (The Citizen 29 August 2009). Yet, it was 
delayed because key activists were occupied with monitoring of the general elections in 
October 2010. The case came for the first mention in May 2011, and the Attorney 
General, respondent of the case, was required to file a reply to the petition (Policy 
Forum 2011: 9). In parallel with the lawsuit, CSOs have been monitoring the operation 
of the CDCF funds. The Policy Forum, for example, examined the operation of the 
CDCF in six case constituencies in 2012, the report of which was expected to be 
published in 2013 (Policy Forum 2012: 4).
107
 
 Yet, overall, similar to donors’ attitudes, there has not been much public 
discussion on the CDCF compared with the time when the CDCF was prepared. There 
are only a few public discussions. Some of the few exceptions are the article written by 
Faustine Ndugulile, MP for Kigamboni (CCM), on the benefits brought by the CDCF to 
his constituency in Dar es Salaam on his blog and a comment by Semkae Kilonzo, 
                                                                                                                                                     
Gone?’ (International Budget Partnership 2009). 
106
 Interviews, Mwakagenda (2010), Baker (2010), Kilonzo (2010) and Sungusia (2011). 
- 81 - 
Coordinator of the Policy Forum to criticise the CDCF (Ndugulile 17 March 2011) and 
messages posted by MPs and Kilonzo on the CDCF on Twitter in 2011. 
 
Although donors and CSOs could not halt the introduction of the CDCF, their 
engagement was not in vain. The power of MPs in the appointment of the CDC 
Committees and the disbursement of the funds was restricted by law to avoid the risk of 
potential mismanagement of the funds. Tanzanian policymakers were firmly determined 
to establish the CDCF and may have compromised in terms of the power of MPs to 
ensure the introduction of the fund before the elections in 2010. In the parliamentary 
discussion on the CDCF Act in July 2009, the Minister of the PMO-RALG summarised 
the concerns raised by the opponents, including their three reasons against the fund, and 
explained how the CDCF Act addresses each of them (United Republic of Tanzania 
2009c). This suggests that there was a certain level of maturity in the debates on the 
CDCF after three years of deliberation on the fund since it was first accepted in 
Parliament in 2006. 
 
3.7. Conclusion 
 
This chapter explained how a CDF was introduced in Tanzania in 2009 by shedding 
light on various state and non-state actors involved in the policy process. There was a 
competition between MPs on the one hand and donors and CSOs on the other, which 
was underpinned by their rationales to support or oppose the establishment of the fund. 
The CDF policy process also demonstrates the power dynamics between constituency 
MPs and special seats MPs. Among the actors involved in the process, donors are 
commonly viewed by scholars and Tanzanian politicians as influential actors in 
policymaking in Tanzania. This, coupled with the change of their aid modalities during 
the last decade, created ‘parallel accountability’ in the country.  
Yet, the CDF policy process shows a different picture. The proposal was 
initiated and moved forward by Tanzanian MPs and local CSOs were actively 
advocating against it. Donors expressed their concerns on the erosion of the democratic 
principle and the creation of parallel funding mechanisms but gradually stepped back 
from the heated debate between policymakers and CSOs, partly because the scale of the 
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funds turned out to be small and its impact seemed to be limited. Thus, although there 
was a certain level of influence by donors, the introduction of the CDCF exemplifies a 
policy process that was largely navigated and owned by domestic actors in Tanzania. 
This chapter also found that the power of MPs in the operation of the funds is 
restricted by law; MPs cannot appoint the members of the CDC Committees or 
authorise the disbursement of the CDCF funds. Given the strong CCM networks 
established within local governments, this arrangement gives a certain level of control 
to the CCM, especially its local branches. 
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Chapter 4  Bunge lenye Meno (Parliament with Teeth): 
Legislative Development and the Introduction of a CDF in 
Tanzania 
 
The ideal situation is to have the teeth, and also to have the meat to chew on. I 
think we are slowly reaching that point.’ — Samuel John Sitta, Speaker of the 
National Assembly (2005–2010) (Sitta, Slaa and Cheyo 2008: 34). 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Frequently coined as ‘rubber-stamp’ organisations, legislatures in sub-Saharan Africa 
were generally weak institutions with limited power and capacity to perform their core 
functions in lawmaking and oversight for years after independence. Following the 
transition to multiparty democracy in the late 1980s and in the 1990s, some of the 
African legislatures gradually gained power and autonomy from executives and started 
to exert influence on the national policy discussions (Barkan 2010). 
 The Tanzanian Parliament is a case in point whose power and autonomy was 
substantially strengthened during the Ninth Parliament (2005–2010), a decade after the 
transition to multiparty system in 1992. This change is illustrated in a booklet entitled 
‘Bunge Lenye Meno: A Parliament with Teeth, for Tanzania’ published by the African 
Research Institute, a London-based think tank, in 2008 (Sitta, Slaa and Cheyo 2008). It 
is a collection of papers written by the then Speaker of Parliament and two opposition 
leaders who chaired the Parliamentary Committees on public accounts.
108
 They are 
pivotal players in changing Parliament into an effective government institution through 
the renewal of the Standing Orders, a set of formal rules of Parliament, and monitoring 
of the government performance. As described by the Speaker above, the Tanzanian 
legislature started to have its own meno (teeth) in its relationship with the executive and 
the ruling party that had held supreme power in politics since the country’s 
independence. 
 As explained in the CDF policy process in Chapter 3, the introduction of a CDF 
was proposed by the Parliamentary Special Committee that reviewed and revised the 
Standing Orders and thus, a CDF can be considered as part of a broader legislative 
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reform at that time. This chapter examines the development of the Tanzanian Parliament 
and legislative reform during the Ninth Parliament (2005–2010) with a focus on its 
oversight role that secures horizontal accountability between government branches, and 
how the introduction of a CDF constituted this reform. Through the analysis of the 
legislative development in Tanzania, this chapter examines Barkan’s (2009) theory on 
the emergence of a coalition for change among MPs that alters the structure of 
incentives of MPs and leads to strengthening the legislature. This chapter highlights the 
emergence of reformers within the CCM, enabling the legislative reform including the 
adoption of a CDF to happen. It sets the stage for the Chapter 5 which examines the 
internal changes within the CCM during this period. 
 
4.2. Horizontal Accountability and African Legislatures 
 
The legislature is an essential government institution that ensures vertical and horizontal 
accountability in democratic systems. While vertical accountability exists between the 
state and society (e.g. accountability between MPs and voters), as discussed in Chapter 
1, horizontal accountability refers to the relationship between different branches of the 
government (e.g. the executive, the legislature, the judiciary). These government 
institutions oversee, sanction or impeach each other over unlawful actions such as the 
encroachment by one institution upon the authority of another or the corruption of 
public officials (O'Donnell 2003). As such, the aim of horizontal accountability is to 
secure checks and balances among government institutions in democracy. 
 Horizontal accountability is different from vertical accountability in that state 
agencies are not strictly in principal-agent relationships; one state agency does not 
delegate power to another (Kenney 2003: 57–58). Yet, similar to vertical accountability, 
a core feature of horizontal accountability is the ability of one agency to sanction 
another, or what is referred to as enforcement in Schedler’s (1999) conceptualisation of 
accountability discussed in Chapter 1.
109
 The legislature is at the juncture of vertical 
and horizontal and accountability as voters are empowered to sanction individual MPs 
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through regular elections, while the legislature has the power delegated by voters to 
monitor and sanction executives and other government branches for their misconduct. 
Horizontal accountability tends to be weak in emerging democracies in 
developing countries including sub-Saharan Africa due to the concentration of power in 
executive branches of government (Barkan 2009; Wang 2005). Until recently, African 
legislatures had been unable to scrutinise the performance of executives and hold them 
accountable effectively. This is partly due to their historical legacy; legislatures in 
Anglophone countries originated in the Legislative Councils established by the British 
colonial government, which functioned as a coordinating body between the colonial 
government and local elite and the public. Members of the Legislative Councils were 
initially appointed by the governor of each country, and later selected by elections in 
gradual stages towards the time of independence. These countries adopted a presidential 
system after independence, while maintaining the Westminster parliamentary system, 
and legislatures remained as a deliberative body rather than an independent 
policymaking and oversight institution. For example, after independence, the role of 
legislatures in the budgetary process was kept to a minimum; they could only accept or 
reject the budget in its entirety. The legislatures in Francophone and Lusophone African 
countries experienced similar limitations to the former British colonies (Barkan 2009: 
9–12). 
 From the mid-1960s to the late 1980s, African legislatures were characterised by 
neopatrimonial rule by executives.
110
 In the countries under one-party rule, 
parliamentary elections only provided an opportunity for voters to hold individual MPs 
accountable, but not the regime or the ruling party for their overall performance. 
Legislatures were dependent on executives that had the authority to appoint MPs as 
cabinet ministers and kept the remuneration of MPs low while controlling the 
distribution of patronage (Barkan 2009: 15). Thus, there was only weak horizontal 
accountability between legislatures and executives in the region. 
 Following the transition to multiparty democracy in the late 1980s and in the 
1990s, some legislatures in Africa gradually gained power and autonomy to perform 
their lawmaking and oversight functions independently from executives (Barkan 2009). 
Yet, the changes did not occur immediately after the political liberalisation. The 
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transition to multiparty democracy generally intensified electoral competition between 
political parties and MPs, and politicians were increasingly focusing on constituency 
service and bringing tangible benefits to their constituencies to win electoral support. As 
MPs allocated a disproportionate amount of their time to constituency service instead of 
parliamentary activities such as lawmaking and oversight, African legislatures remained 
a weak institution (Barkan 2009: 17). 
Eventually, some legislatures in Africa started to have an influence on national 
policymaking and gained power and autonomy from executives. Barkan (2009) analyses 
the evolution of legislatures in six African countries and proposes a hypothesis that this 
change is likely to occur when a coalition for change is formed among MPs that alters 
the structure of incentives faced by individual MPs so that they will be more engaged 
with collective actions in lawmaking and oversight without sacrificing their reputation 
in constituency service (17–18). 
 Barkan (2009) argues that there are potentially two types of MP in coalitions for 
change; one is reformers who are keen on transforming the weak legislature into a 
modern autonomous institution, and the other is opportunists who are ‘primarily 
interested in improving their own terms of service, especially a raise in salary and other 
perks that sustain their political careers’ (Barkan 2009: 18). Opportunists are not so 
interested in improving the institutional performance of the legislature as reformers, yet 
they do not have strong reasons to oppose reforms either. Both reformers and 
opportunists may form a coalition for change but with different motivations. Although 
reformers are the key drivers of change, the number of reformers tends to be limited. 
Thus, it is important for reformers to gain wide support from opportunists (Barkan 
2009: 18). 
 Although Barkan (2009) does not go into detail on reformers and opportunists, 
most MPs would probably subscribe to both reformers’ and opportunists’ views to 
participate in a coalition for change, but to varying degrees. For example, reformers 
who take initiatives in changing legislatures are not motivated solely by normative 
reasons to empower legislatures but may have opportunistic reasons as well. The 
strengthening of the lawmaking and oversight functions of legislatures can benefit some 
MPs more than others in terms of advancing their political careers, as it increases the 
power and visibility of MPs who are in high ranks and/or have skills to participate 
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effectively in the debates in legislatures. These MPs are more likely to become 
reformers than MPs whose capacity is limited to individual constituency service. As 
such, there is an opportunistic dimension in the motivation of reformers. 
 Under what conditions does a coalition for change emerge? Barkan (2009) 
makes the point that such a coalition is likely to emerge when there is a decline of 
cohesion within the ruling party. This is because, when there is strong party cohesion, 
MPs prioritise their parties to the legislature. In other words, the ruling party MPs, who 
have more decision-making power than opposition MPs, are unlikely to make an effort 
to strengthen the legislature to challenge the executive that is led by their own party. 
The experiences of legislative development in Uganda, Kenya and Nigeria exemplify 
that the formation of coalitions for change were facilitated by weak party cohesion 
(Barkan 2009: 237). Brierley (2012) demonstrates that a coalition for change has not 
emerged in Ghana due to an established two-party system and strong party identities 
that help the executive control MPs in the ruling party. 
As in other African countries, the Tanzanian Parliament during the one-party 
period was a weak institution due to the strong executive and the supremacy of the 
ruling party, CCM. Following the transition to multiparty system in 1992, the CCM 
strengthened party discipline to ensure the continuation of its dominant power in 
Parliament. Yet, after President Kikwete was elected in 2005, the party cohesion began 
to weaken and the Speaker of Parliament and reformers from the CCM and opposition 
parties moved forward a reform to strengthen the power and autonomy of the 
legislature. 
 
4.3. Development of the Legislature in Tanzania 
 
The Parliament in Tanzania originated in the Legislative Council during the British 
colonial rule which was first established in 1926. It was chaired by the Governor of 
Tanganyika who appointed all 20 members of the Council. In 1958, the first Speaker 
was appointed to replace the Governor as the chairman of the Council, and a few 
council members were selected by elections for the first time. Three political parties 
nominated candidates, and only the Tanganyika African Nationalist Union (TANU) 
won and became the first party to have its members in the Council.
111
 In 1960, the 
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appointment of the council members by the Governor was abolished and all the council 
members were selected by elections. The Legislative Council was changed into the 
National Assembly in preparation for independence in 1961 (United Republic of 
Tanzania). 
At the time of independence, the executive and the ruling party, the TANU, 
recognised the National Assembly as a supreme institution by law. Yet, when 
Tanganyika became a republic and the Constitution of Tanganyika was promulgated in 
1962, vast power was shifted to the executive, particularly to the president. For example, 
the new Constitution did not provide for a parliamentary vote of no confidence to 
remove the government from office, and the cabinet became answerable to the president 
instead of Parliament. Although several MPs opposed the centralisation of power to the 
president when the Constitution was discussed in Parliament, they eventually accepted 
it, by knowing that the first president would be Nyerere and trusting him (Tambila 
2004: 52–59). While the president was given limited veto over legislations and could 
not legislate without recourse to Parliament at the time of independence, he was 
empowered to legislate by decree when Tanganyika and Zanzibar were united to form 
Tanzania three years later (Tordoff 1967a: 3). In 1965, the Interim Constitutions 
enabled the president to appoint up to 82, about 40%, of the total 204 MPs (Tambila 
2004: 58–59). As such, substantial power was shifted from the legislature to the 
executive during the early years after independence. 
 The legislative power was also taken over by the TANU through the 
institutionalisation of a one-party state in 1965 and the Arusha Declaration adopted by 
the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the TANU in 1967, which brought a 
fundamental policy shift to socialism in the country. Parliament was not given an 
opportunity to discuss the Arusha Declaration but only passed relevant laws to 
nationalise major means of production and exchange after it was announced. The NEC 
further obtained some legislative functions such as the privilege of summoning 
witnesses and calling for papers in Parliament. The members of the NEC who were not 
MPs were paid as MPs (Tambila 2004: 49–59). Consequently, the role of MPs was 
limited to ratifying the policies that had already been approved by the elite of the TANU 
and explaining the policies to local constituents (Yeager 1989: 69). In 1964, the 
Presidential Commission, which was appointed under the chairmanship of Vice 
President Rashid Kawawa, even considered the possibility of amalgamating Parliament 
with the NEC (Tordoff 1967a: 2). 
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In the parliamentary session in October 1968, some MPs criticised the 
encroachment of the executive power into the legislature and demanded change. In 
response, the NEC expelled them from the party on the grounds that they violated the 
party’s creed and opposed to its policies (Tambila 2004: 60–61). In 1977, the TANU 
merged with the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) to form a new party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi 
(CCM), and party supremacy was further consolidated. As such, despite several 
attempts by individual MPs for change, Parliament was relegated to a rubber-stamp 
institution that only gave legal endorsement to the decisions made by the ruling party 
retrospectively. 
 In the late 1970s and the 1980s, the country faced an economic crisis and there 
was an increasing public demand for liberalising politics and the economy. In 1984, 
Parliament started to regain some of its power through the amendment of the 
Constitution which was initiated by the CCM. For example, the number of elected 
members increased from 111 in 1977 to 169, while the number of presidential 
appointees decreased. The new Constitution enhanced the position of the legislature by 
stipulating that: 
 
the National Assembly shall be the principal organ of the Untied Republic which 
shall, on behalf of the people, supervisor and advise the government of the United 
Republic and all its agencies in the exercise of their functions in accordance with 
this constitution (Tambila 2004: 66). 
 
The separation of powers between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary was 
declared for the first time in the Constitution (Tambila 2004: 65–67). In the following 
year, President Nyerere resigned from the president’s office, which marked the end of 
the one-party socialist period in the country. 
In the Sixth Parliament (1990–1995), the last one-party parliament before the 
transition to multiparty system in 1992, there were some changes to minimise the 
executive power. Parliament was able to pass a vote of no confidence in the prime 
minister and to impeach the president, and outspoken MPs were critical of the 
government for corruption scandals and other national issues in Parliament during this 
period (Kelsall 2003: 63; Killian 2010: 1). 
 However, the Seventh Parliament (1995–2000), the first multiparty parliament 
under President Benjamin Mkapa, made amendments to return some power to the 
executive and the CCM. The president regained the power to appoint up to ten MPs 
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which was abolished during the previous parliament (Kelsall 2003: 64). CCM MPs were 
in an ‘inter-party mode’ (Killian 2010: 2) and strongly bound by the party discipline. 
Main debates on national policies were held in party caucuses prior to the discussions in 
Parliament to ensure that the party would control the policy process and maintain its 
power (Kelsall 2003: 64; Killian 2010: 1–2). 
 The power of legislatures is also dependent on the presence of strong opposition 
parties. Tanzanian opposition parties remained weak and fragmented for the first ten 
years of the multiparty period. During the Eighth Parliament (2000–2005), opposition 
parties failed to represent 30% of all the MPs and could not form an official opposition 
camp (see Table 5.2 in Chapter 5 for the composition of parties in Parliament). Thus, 
the Standing Orders were revised so that opposition parties could form the camp as long 
as the number of opposition seats reached 12.5% of all MPs to facilitate the democratic 
procedure in Parliament (United Republic of Tanzania 2011c: 17). The CUF, the largest 
opposition party during the Eighth Parliament, was mainly concerned with the interests 
of the people in Zanzibar rather than challenging the government on the issues in 
Mainland, and the ability of the opposition to scrutinise the government was constrained 
by their limited resources (Kelsall 2003: 63–64). 
 Not surprisingly, there is no clear demarcation between executives and 
legislatures during the de jure one-party period as all the members of the two 
government branches belong to the same party. As Killian (2004) asserts, there is 
probably limitation in assessing the power balance between executives and legislatures 
in one-party states (183). Yet, even after the transition to a multiparty system, there may 
not be a major shift in the power balance in dominant party systems as is the case in 
Tanzania. CCM members are unlikely to have strong motivation to challenge the 
government led by their own party. Opposition MPs were less than 20% of the total 
MPs elected from constituencies between 1995 and 2005. Within this context, the 
initiative taken by the Speaker of Parliament and reformer MPs from the CCM who 
have power, expertise and motivations to make changes against potential resistance 
from the executive and other CCM MPs was a key for the implementation of the 
reform. 
 
4.4. The Changes in the Standing Orders 
 
A turning point arrived at the beginning of the Ninth Parliament (2005–2010). As 
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discussed in the previous chapter, the new Speaker of Parliament, Samuel Sitta, 
embarked on a process to strengthen the legislature by establishing a Parliamentary 
Special Committee to revise the Standing Orders in May 2006. The renewal of the 
Standing Orders brought substantial changes to the legislature and contributed to 
redefining its relationships with the executive and the public in general (Killian 2010; 
Slaa 2010). 
 The process of renewing the Standing Orders was ‘full of struggles, negotiations 
and compromises between the parliament and the executive’ (Killian 2010: 4). After the 
Special Committee completed their work as discussed in Chapter 3, the Speaker 
submitted the proposal of the revision of the Standing Orders to the prime minister in 
July 2006, with the reports of proposals to amend the Constitution and other relevant 
laws. In response, the government formed its own committee to examine the proposal. 
In April and May 2007, the Clerk of Parliament set up a committee consisting of experts 
from Parliament and the Attorney General’s office to discuss the new Standing Orders. 
There was strong opposition by the government against a few changes suggested by 
Parliament and some compromises were made between them. The proposal was also 
discussed at a seminar for MPs in August 2007. The revision of the Standing Orders 
was officially tabled by the Standing Orders Committee of Parliament and enacted by a 
Resolution in Parliament in November 2007 (Slaa 2010; United Republic of Tanzania 
2007c: 38–40). 
 Major changes were made to the Standing Orders to improve the lawmaking and 
oversight functions of Parliament and enhance its administrative capacity. In the area of 
lawmaking, the new Standing Orders enabled Parliament to initiate its own Bills 
through Parliamentary Committees. Under the old Standing Orders, only the 
government and individual MPs were able to submit Bills. The Parliamentary Legal 
Counsel was established to provide legal advice to Parliament and MPs in drafting and 
discussing Bills. Parliament is also empowered to influence national budgets by 
constituting a planning session in February to discuss government budget proposals and 
priorities for the following financial year (Killian 2010: 4–6; Slaa 2010: 85–86; United 
Republic of Tanzania 2007c: 42–43; 2008c: 14–15, 55). 
  There were also several key changes in strengthening the legislative oversight of 
the executive.
112
 First, following the British parliamentary system, the Prime Minister’s 
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Question Time was introduced for half an hour every Thursday so that MPs could ask 
questions directly to the prime minister (United Republic of Tanzania 2007a: 24). The 
introduction of the Question Time was opposed by the government but was enacted in 
Parliament in January 2008, while the entire Standing Orders were enacted earlier in 
November 2007 (Killian 2010: 5; Slaa 2010: 85–86; United Republic of Tanzania 
2008c). Second, the new Standing Orders strengthened the Parliamentary Committees. 
It is widely recognised by scholars that the level of effectiveness of legislatures in 
influencing policymaking and politics are dependent on the arrangement of 
parliamentary committees (Wang 2005: 9). For example, the new Standing Orders 
allocated the chairmanship of three committees that oversee public accounts to 
opposition parties: the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), the Local Authorities 
Accounts Committee (LAAC) and the Parastatal Organization Accounts Committee 
(POAC).
113
 The new Standing Orders also enabled the committees to open their 
meetings to the media and order the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) to execute 
special audits. The reports by the committees are tabled in Parliament and the 
government is required to respond to them (Killian 2010: 6–7; Slaa 2010: 86–87). Third, 
the impartiality of the Speaker who shall not be bound by decisions of any political 
parties in the performance of his/her duties was articulated in the new Standing Orders 
for the first time (Killian 2010: 5; United Republic of Tanzania 2007a: 6). The Speaker 
was also empowered to establish Select Committees to investigate urgent or 
controversial matters. Under the old Standing Orders, the formation of Select 
Committees required the votes of the whole Parliament. Thus, if requests made by MPs 
to establish Select Committees seemed inconvenient to the CCM, the party would 
impose a three-line whip to stop the formation of the committees (Killian 2010: 6; Slaa 
2010: 89). As such, the revision of the Standing Orders made a number of major 
changes to the operation of Parliament. 
 
4.5. Reformers and a Coalition for Change 
 
Why was it possible for Parliament to make such changes to strengthen its power during 
                                                                                                                                                     
Stapenhurst (2012). 
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 In February and March 2013, the Parliamentary Committees were reorganised and POAC was 
dismantled. PAC and LAAC have been chaired by CHADEMA and CUF MPs respectively since then 
(The Guardian 10 February 2013; The Guardian 16 March 2013). 
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the Ninth Parliament? There are several factors that explain this. First, as an external 
factor, the strengthening of legislatures was a growing trend in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Changing formal rules such as constitutions, the Standing Orders and other internal 
rules of legislatures is one of the common approaches in some African countries 
(Barkan 2009: 238–239). In East Africa, the Kenyan Standing Orders were revised at 
around the same time as the Tanzanian ones and some of the similar changes were made 
in the two countries (for example, introduction of a Prime Minister’s Question Time, the 
establishment of new Parliamentary Committees). In Kenya, the process of rewriting the 
Standing Orders began at the same time as Tanzania during its Ninth Parliament 
(2003–2008), but the Speaker was not keen on the reform and thus, the negotiation over 
the revision of them was carried over to the Tenth Parliament (2008–2013). The newly 
selected Speaker was supportive of the reform and the new Standing Orders were 
enacted in September 2008, one year after Tanzania’s adoption of the new Standing 
Orders (Barkan 2009: 66–67). Thus, there were some regional trends in strengthening 
the Parliament through the revision of the Standing Orders. 
 Another external factor that may have contributed to the legislative reform in 
Tanzania was the financial assistance by international donors. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
donors were increasingly assisting Parliament and they would certainly welcome the 
initiative by Tanzanians to strengthen the lawmaking and oversight functions of 
Parliament. Indeed, a donor group on public finance management had been supporting 
the three oversight Parliamentary Committees.
114
 Thus, there was an environment 
favourable for reformers to undertake the reform. 
 As an internal factor, there are key reformers who promoted the changes within 
Parliament. First, the Speaker of Parliament can be considered as the champion of the 
reform (Tripp 2012: 5).
115
 Barkan (2009) emphasises the importance of the role of the 
Speakers in the evolution of legislatures in Africa. The Speakers in some African 
countries continued to function as the agents of executives or ruling parties even after 
the transition to multiparty system and hindered the reform processes. For example, in 
Uganda and Ghana, the pace of legislative reforms was different depending on the 
Speakers (Barkan 2009: 20). Similarly, in Tanzania, the Speaker of the first two decades 
after the transition to a multiparty democracy laid the ground for the development of the 
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legislature but returned some of the legislative power to the executive, while the new 
Speaker initiated the reform process. Second, the members of the Special Committee 
established by the Speaker played crucial roles in executing the reform (see Table 3.1 in 
Chapter 3 for the list of the committee members). Job Yustino Ndugai, MP for Kongwe 
(CCM) who chaired the committee, was one of the most active MPs elected from 
constituencies between 2005 and 2010 (Daily News 19 October 2010; Twaweza 2010a: 
4). He was elected the Deputy Speaker in the Tenth Parliament in 2010. Harrison 
George Mwakyembe, MP for Kyela (CCM), a lawyer and former lecturer at the 
University of Dar es Salaam, is known as a strong advocate for anti-corruption and, as 
discussed below, later led the parliamentary investigation into a grand corruption 
allegation of the power supply contract in 2007 (Sitta, Slaa and Cheyo 2008: 81). 
Beatrice Matumbo Shellukindo, MP for Kilindi (CCM) is one of the few female MPs 
who advanced her political career from the special seats for women to be elected from a 
constituency. There were also two opposition leaders in the committee: Willibrod Slaa, 
then MP for Karatu and Secretary General of the CHADEMA, and Rashid Mohamed 
Hamad, MP for Wawi (CUF) and Opposition Leader during the Ninth Parliament 
(2005–2010). The appointment of these influential MPs to the Special Committee 
signals a determination of the Speaker to bring success to the reform. All the committee 
members, except Athumani Saidi Janguo, MP for Kisarawe (CCM) who did not contest, 
were re-elected in the 2010 elections. 
One of the potential reasons for the Speaker to take an initiative to strengthen 
Parliament was his dissatisfaction with the way in the CCM was controlled by a limited 
number of party leaders. Speaker Sitta is one of the CCM politicians who is purportedly 
interested in running for presidential elections after President Kikwete’s two terms end 
in 2015 (The Citizen 26 November 2011). The strengthening of the legislature vis-à-vis 
the executive might have been motivated by his intention to mitigate the influence of 
the cabinet members on the party. Although there is no evidence to support this 
proposition, Sitta is a strong advocate against corruption and he expressed his concern 
about the collusion between cabinet minister and the private sector in the interview. It 
underpins his rationale for the adoption of a CDF that it would prevent collusion 
between MPs and the private sector, as discussed in Chapter 3.
116
 The emergence of 
reformers from the CCM to move the reform forward and gain support widely from 
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other CCM members signifies a weakening of party coherence within the party. 
Another internal factor that contributed to the emergence of reformers from 
CCM was the changes in the vision and leadership style of presidents. President 
Kikwete has been more tolerant of different views than his predecessor, President 
Mkapa, and appears to be more willing to ‘let the parliament assert itself in fulfilling its 
key functions’ (Killian 2010: 8). Thus, Benson Bana, Head of the Political Science and 
Public Administration Department at the University of Dar es Salaam, calls Kikwete’s 
administration a ‘listening government’.117 For example, President Kikwete initiated a 
constitutional review process in response to the voice of the opposition and the public. 
In May 2012, he reshuffled his cabinet and removed six ministers and two deputy 
ministers, following an attempt by Zitto Zuberi Kabwe, then Deputy Leader of 
Opposition, to move a vote of no confidence in the prime minister over the allegation of 
the misuse of public funds by several ministers. Kikwete announced that he had heard 
Parliament's call to hold public officials accountable in reshuffling his cabinet (Daily 
News 4 May 2012). 
 
4.6. A CDF as a Pillar of the Legislative Reform 
 
As a CDF was proposed by the Special Committee together with the revision of the 
Standing Orders in 2006, the adoption of a CDF can be considered as a pillar of the 
broader reform. Whereas the revision of the Standing Orders was mainly aimed at 
strengthening the power of Parliament in lawmaking and oversight, a CDF was aimed at 
helping individual MPs with their constituency service. Collectively, the adoption of a 
CDF signals an increase of financial autonomy of the legislature from the executive, as 
MPs can use CDF funds for development projects in their constituencies without 
requesting extra funds from central ministries or local governments. A CDF would help 
MPs take stronger positions vis-à-vis the executive. Thus, a CDF makes the legislative 
reform more comprehensive and complete. 
 The CDF proposal was probably important for the Speaker and reformers to gain 
support to the legislative reform from other CCM MPs. The reform would give public 
visibility to MPs who are more capable of engaging with the lawmaking and oversight 
roles in Parliament than the MPs whose roles are limited to representation and 
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constituency service. In other words, reformers and some other MPs benefit more than 
other MPs from the legislative reform. Indeed, Sitta gained more power as the Speaker 
of Parliament through the revision of the Standing Orders. The CDF proposal might 
have had an effect on encouraging all the MPs to lend their support to the overall reform 
and avoided potential challenges posed by them. 
Barkan’s (2010) hypothesised that a coalition for change alters the structure of 
incentives of individual MPs so that MPs would get more actively engaged with the 
lawmaking and oversight activities of Parliament without sacrificing their reputation in 
constituency service. A CDF may indirectly contribute to MPs’ engagement with 
lawmaking and oversight by saving their time and energy for fundraising for their 
constituency service (Killian 2010: 7–8). Yet it is not directly aimed at changing the 
incentives of MPs but is founded on the existing electoral incentives of MPs. In contrast 
to Barkan’s argument, a coalition for change did not need to alter the structure of 
incentives of MPs to implement the reform because of the adoption of a CDF. 
 
4.7. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined legislative development in Tanzania and explored how the 
introduction of a CDF constituted a legislative reform through the revision of the 
Standing Orders during the Ninth Parliament (2005–2010). The Tanzanian case follows 
the trend of the strengthening of legislatures in sub-Saharan Africa but particularly 
demonstrates the importance of the role of the Speaker and the emergence of reformers 
from the ruling party in accelerating legislative development in the context of dominant 
party politics. In Tanzania, the Speaker himself initiated the reform process to enhance 
the power and capacity of Parliament and MPs vis-à-vis the executive and the ruling 
party. The proposal to introduce a CDF served as a pillar of the reform in the area of 
constituency service which is an essential task of MPs for the political survival of MPs. 
The adoption of a CDF was not aimed at directly changing the current structure 
of incentives of MPs, but it is based on the existing electoral incentives of MPs. Yet, by 
enhancing the financial autonomy of MPs from the executive and the ruling party by 
setting aside some public funds for constituency service, a CDF might have been aimed 
at strengthening MPs’ ‘teeth’ in overseeing the performance of the executive and 
enhancing horizontal accountability in the country. The chapter also argues that the 
proposal to establish a CDF was a strategy of reformers to gain wide support from CCM 
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MPs to the overall legislative reform. 
Although Sitta is credited with the reform, it eventually cost him the speaker’s 
chair. After the elections in 2010, Sitta vied for the Speaker of the Tenth Parliament 
(2010–2015) but failed to get a nomination from the CCM Central Committee.118 There 
was allegedly strong pressure on the Central Committee to block Sitta from being 
re-elected, though the party’s publicity secretary denied such pressure. The Central 
Committee nominated three female candidates to be voted by CCM MPs with a 
rationale to promote gender balance in the three branches of the government, and Anna 
Makinda, Deputy Speaker of the Ninth Parliament, was elected as the first female 
speaker in the country (The Guardian 14 November 2010). This was not only because 
Sitta took the initiative to reform the legislature but also because the legislature started 
to ‘bite’ the executive and the CCM after the reform. It generated factional politics and 
further weakened party coherence in the CCM, which will be discussed in the following 
chapter. 
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Chapter 5  From Takrima to the CDCF: Changing Election 
Strategies of the CCM in Tanzania 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
Since its independence in 1961, Tanzania has enjoyed relatively stable and peaceful 
politics. This can be explained by the effects of African socialism adopted by the first 
President Julius Nyerere between 1967 and 1985 and the one-party system between 
1965 and 1992 (Hyden 1999; Msekwa 2006: 1–19). Even after the transition to a 
multiparty system in 1992, Tanzanian politics has been characterised by the dominant 
power of the CCM, which continued to gain over 60% of votes in winning the 
presidency and over 77% of the parliamentary seats in the last four multiparty elections 
(Babeiya 2011b) (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2 for the results of the last four multiparty 
elections). 
 
Table 5.1  Results of Presidential Elections between 1995 and 2010 
 
Year  President (party) Percentage of votes 
1995 Benjamin William Mkapa (CCM) 61.8% 
2000 Benjamin William Mkapa (CCM) 71.7% 
2005 Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete (CCM) 80.3% 
2010 Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete (CCM) 61.2% 
Sources: African Election Database, Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in 
Africa  
 
Table 5.2  Results of Parliamentary Elections between 1995 and 2010 
 
 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Party No. of 
MPs 
% 
No. of 
MPs 
% 
No. of 
MPs 
% 
No. of 
MPs 
% 
CCM 186 80.2% 202 87.4% 206 88.8% 186 77.8% 
CUF 24 10.3% 17 7.4% 19 8.2% 24 10.0% 
CHADEMA 3 1.3% 4 1.7% 5 2.2% 23 9.6% 
NCCR-Mageuzi 16 6.9% 1 0.4% 0 0.0% 4 1.7% 
UDP 3 1.3% 3 1.3% 1 0.4% 1 0.4% 
TLP 0 0.0% 4 1.7% 1 0.4% 1 0.4% 
Total 232 100.0% 231 100.0% 232 100.0% 239 100.0% 
Note: The table includes only MPs who were elected from constituencies. 
Sources: United Republic of Tanzania, Parliament, African Election Database, Electoral 
Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa 
 
In this context, one can infer that any policy decisions relating to elections are 
significantly influenced by the CCM and the adoption of a CDF might also have been a 
CCM strategy to maintain its large majority in Parliament in the elections in 2010 by 
bestowing financial advantage on incumbent MPs, given that 89% of those elected to 
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the constituencies were CCM members when the introduction of a CDF was discussed 
in Parliament in 2009.
119
 In fact, in advance of the previous elections of 2000 and 2005, 
several laws in favour of CCM candidates were enacted to maintain its dominance in 
Parliament (Makulilo 2011: 247–248). 
 As discussed in Chapter 3, Tanzania’s CDF was designed in a way that the funds 
would be allocated to all the constituencies of MPs without any requirement to 
obtaining approval of the executive or local bureaucrats. This model could create the 
financial autonomy of MPs in their constituency service. It could reduce the level of 
dependency of CCM members on the executive and the party, which might lead to 
weakening of the control of CCM over its party members. Yet, Chapter 3 also noted that 
MPs were given limited power in the operation of the CDCF in the CDCF Act; MPs can 
neither directly appoint the members of the CDC Committees nor authorise the 
disbursement of CDCF funds to projects. The power to appoint the committee members 
and to disburse the funds rests on several officials of the district councils. In contrast, in 
the Kenyan CDF on which the Tanzanian CDCF was modelled, MPs were able to 
appoint the committee members until the CDF Act was amended in 2013.
120
 Thus, the 
Tanzanian CDF seems to have been more carefully designed to control the power of 
MPs than the Kenyan one. This gives part of the explanation to the initial question of 
this study as to why the CCM adopted a CDF in 2009 which might weaken its power 
over its MPs. The CCM accepted a CDF with a mechanism to limit the power of MPs in 
the operation of the funds. Yet, a broader question as to why CCM adopted a CDF at 
this particular point in time is not yet answered. 
Chapter 4 examined the introduction of a CDF from the perspective of the 
evolution of the legislature and demonstrated that a CDF was adopted as part of the 
reform to strengthen the power of the legislature. The reform was initiated by the 
Speaker of Parliament and signifies the weakening of party coherence within the CCM. 
Building on this finding, this chapter examines electoral politics to explain why the 
CCM introduced a CDF. Specifically, this chapter analyses the changes in the 
constituency roles of MPs following the transition to a multiparty system in 1992, the 
nature of electoral competition and the intraparty politics of the CCM and demonstrates 
that the introduction of a CDF was a CCM strategy to regain party coherence and public 
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support in preparation for the elections in 2010. 
 Before a CDF was proposed, the use of a unique financial instrument for 
election campaigns, called takrima, meaning ‘African hospitality’, became widespread 
in Tanzania. Takrima is a practice of politicians to give food, drink or money to their 
campaign staff as a token of appreciation for their support in elections. Takrima was 
legalised by the amendment of the Electoral Laws in 2000, and it was widely used not 
only for campaign staff but also for general voters before the elections in 2000 and 2005. 
Takrima was outlawed in 2006, and a CDF was proposed in the same year. Given the 
common objective of the two instruments to enhance the chances of (re-)election of 
MPs and the sequence of the events, the illegalisation of takrima in 2006 might have 
helped the introduction of a CDF to respond to the increased expectations of voters for 
material goods by MPs. This chapter analyses the relationship between takrima and a 
CDF and argues that the two instruments represent changing election strategies of the 
CCM under the multiparty system. 
 
5.2. Dominant Party Politics in Tanzania 
 
Single-party dominance is one of the central focuses of the studies on new democracies 
in developing countries. For example, the endurance of dominant parties is featured in 
the discussions on ‘competitive authoritarian regimes’ (Levitsky and Way 2002) and 
‘electoral authoritarianism’ (Schedler 2006). While many African countries were 
characterised by democracies with single-party dominance in the 1990s, regime changes 
gradually took place in the region and several countries such as Ghana, Zambia and 
Senegal even passed the two-turnover test of democratic consolidation (Huntington 
1991; van de Walle 2003). Tanzania is one of the African countries that have remained 
a dominant party state and electoral politics has largely been influenced by the ruling 
parties.
121
 The remainder of this section summarises the support base of the Tanzania’s 
dominant party. 
The TANU, later the CCM, is one of the oldest and most successful dominant 
parties in sub-Saharan Africa. It was originated in the Tanganyika African Association 
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(TAA), a political association that sought for the expansion of opportunities of civil 
servants, teachers and urban workers for higher education and posts in the government 
during the British colonial period. In the 1940s, the TAA’s objectives shifted towards 
nationalism and independence from the British colonial rule. Julius Nyerere became the 
president of the TAA in 1953, which evolved into the TANU in the following year. 
With the mobilisation efforts by Nyerere, other leaders and local initiatives, the number 
of TANU members rapidly increased from 15,000 in 1954 to over 200,000 in 1958 and 
over one hundred branches were established across Tanganyika (Kelsall 2000: 100; 
Pratt 1976: 35; Tripp 1992: 225–227; Yeager 1989: 17–23). 
 The TANU entered into politics through the elections of the Legislative Council. 
The TANU and TANU-supported candidates won all 30 contested seats in the first 
election in 1958–59 and 70 out of 71 seats in the election in 1960. An internal 
self-government was proclaimed in May 1961 with Nyerere serving as the prime 
minister, and Tanganyika achieved independence in December of the same year 
(Tordoff 1967a: 191–192; Yeager 1989: 24–25). 
After independence, the TANU, later the CCM, consolidated its status as a mass 
party supported by different social classes, ethnic groups, religions and ideologies, and 
successfully established its dominant support base across Tanganyika. The CCM had 
approximately 2.5 million members, 11% of the population of the country, by 1987 
(Tripp 1992: 229). It was underpinned by Nyerere’s inclusive policies providing all 
groups in society with places within the political framework as well as the capacity of 
the TANU to absorb dissidents (Hirschler 2006: 3). 
There were four key strategies by the TANU/CCM to establish a wide support 
base in the country. First, the TANU adopted an ujamaa (‘familyhood’) policy through 
the proclamation of the Arusha Declaration and a leadership code in 1967, and the party 
guidelines called Mwongozo in 1971. Under the ujamaa policy based on the socialist 
idea of ‘common ownership and production as well as equal distribution of goods 
among people of common descent’ (Hyden 1975: 54), people were encouraged to move 
into villages and engage with socialist activities. The leadership code and Mwongozo 
effectively controlled the behaviour of the political leaders. The leadership code 
articulated that political leaders must be peasants or workers and prohibited them from 
associating with the practice of capitalism such as holding shares or directorships in 
private companies, receiving multiple salaries and owning houses to rent to others 
(Hyden 1980: 156–160; Shivji 1976: 126; Yeager 1989: 73). 
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 Second, political and social associations such as trade unions and cooperative 
societies were integrated into the TANU/CCM voluntarily or coercively, which 
strengthened the rule of the TANU over civil society. Nyerere was strongly against the 
formation of organised political divisions within the society with a view that they might 
destroy the fragile unity of the new country. The TANU/CCM had established five 
national affiliate organisations on women, youth, workers, cooperatives and parents by 
the early 1980s (Kelsall 2002: 608–609; Mushi 2001: 3; Pratt 1976: 77–78; Tripp 1992: 
231; Yeager 1989: 67). 
 Third, the TANU strengthened its grassroots linkages through local government 
reforms and the establishment of ten-house party cells. After independence, the 
government replaced the National Authorities, colonial local government organs, and 
traditional chiefs by regional and district councils headed by politically-appointed 
Regional Commissioners and locally-elected District Councillors who functioned as 
communicators between the party and the people. As the council system became 
dysfunctional due to the lack of power, resources and capacity later, the TANU 
government placed regional and district councils under its direct control in 1972 
(Bryceson 1988: 42; Mamdani 2006: 117; Nyaluke 2008: 4; Tordoff 1967a: 22, 161; 
Yeager 1989: 67–74). 
The TANU also introduced a ten-house party cell system in 1963 to provide a 
communication channel between the party and the people. Each cell comprised ten 
TANU members with one leader, and over 200,000 cells were established across the 
country by 1987. The cell system contributed more to enhancing central access to the 
localities (for example, collecting taxes) than encouraging local participation in the 
national policy process (Havnevik 1993: 213; O'Barr 1972; Pratt 1976: 40, 67–68; 
Tordoff 1967a: 167; Tripp 1992: 229–230; Yeager 1989: 65–68). 
Finally, the merger with the ASP of Zanzibar to form the CCM in 1977 enabled 
the TANU to consolidate its rule over the entire country. Zanzibar became independent 
in 1963 and merged with Tanganyika in 1964 following the end of two hundred years of 
the Arab rule by the Zanzibar Revolution (Yeager 1989: 66–67). The second President 
of Zanzibar sought to strengthen the union with the TANU and his political influence on 
Mainland, and the TANU and the ASP coalesced into the CCM after a referendum. All 
former TANU and ASP members were automatically enrolled in the CCM (Yeager 
1989: 68). 
While Nyerere intended to achieve a democratic egalitarian society, the 
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TANU/CCM government established a centralised hierarchical party structure which 
was propelled by several threats to the TANU/CCM government. For example, there 
was a mutiny of the Tanganyikan army which sought redress of their grievances over 
conditions of service in 1964, which resulted in an intervention by the British Royal 
Marines to disarm them. This event led Nyerere to start to institute stricter policies to 
dissidents and over 500 people were detained (Tordoff 1967b: 162–165). In the late 
1970s, there was increasingly public criticism of Nyerere’s leadership and the party 
supremacy due to the economic failure of his socialist policy (Yeager 1989: 90–91). 
Nyerere resigned from the president’s office in 1985, which marked the end of the 
socialist period, and the government adopted a multiparty system in 1992. 
Since the reintroduction of multiparty democracy in 1992, the democratisation 
process has been slow and managed from the top, which Hyden (1999) terms ‘creeping 
democratization’ (143). President Ali Hassan Mwinyi, who succeeded Nyerere in 1985, 
eased the tight control of the CCM over economic policies. His ten years in office are 
remembered as the period of ruksa, meaning ‘permission’ or ‘do your own thing’, 
characterised by an epidemic of corruption, land grabbing and lawlessness (Hyden 
1999: 144). Yet, the CCM continued to exercise monopoly of power while opposition 
parties remained weak and fragmented. The CCM’s dominant power maintained 
political stability but also limited the extent of systemic change (Msekwa 2006). 
Most of the literature on Tanzanian politics after the transition to a multiparty 
system in 1992 discusses how the CCM controlled the democratic transition process and 
maintained its dominant power. Similar to other dominant party states, the CCM’s 
enduring power is largely attributed to state-party fusion and its control of patronage 
politics (de Mesquita and Smith 2009; Makulilo 2010; Makulilo 2008; Weinstein 2011). 
There are numerous examples of the use of state resources by the CCM for elections. 
For example, a road was constructed by the government in Kigoma prior to the 
by-elections in 1994 to encourage voters to choose the CCM candidate (Makulilo 2011: 
6–7). Regional and District Commissioners are reported to have used government 
vehicles for CCM election campaigns in 2010 (Babeiya 2011a). 
 At the same time, the CCM government has introduced regulations to control 
political competition, the media and civil society, including targeted coercive illegal 
actions to impede its competitors (Hoffman and Robinson 2010: 219). As an example of 
controlling political competition, the CCM allegedly buys voters’ cards in those 
constituencies where opposition has strong support. It is reported that, in the 2010 
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elections, CCM members and candidates directly or indirectly offered between 
Tsh5,000–10,000 (approximately US$3.5–7) per card in the Arusha Region returning 
the cards to each voter after the elections (Makulilo 2011: 6–7).122 The CCM has 
maintained an institutionalised organisation including the ten-cell system that reaches 
down to the lowest level of society and its legitimacy (Therkildsen and Bourgouin 
2012). Apparently, the endurance of the CCM’s dominance is also helped by the public 
nostalgia for the first President Nyerere who achieved independence and built the 
country (O'Gorman 2009; Phillips 2010). Combining all these factors, it is clear that the 
CCM has established a comprehensive system to maintain its dominant rule after its 
transition to a multiparty system. 
 Building on these studies, this chapter focuses on three factors in electoral and 
party politics in Tanzania to explain the underlying reasons for the adoption of a CDF in 
Tanzania. These factors are: 1) the growing benefactor role of MPs following the 
transition to a multiparty system in 1992; 2) the legalisation and illegalisation of a 
vote-buying practice, takrima, between 2000 and 2006; and 3) the impact of corruption 
scandals on the CCM since 2007. The following three sections discuss these factors. 
 
5.3. The Growing Benefactor Role of MPs 
 
The nature of electoral politics in Tanzania has changed over time, which can broadly 
be divided into two phases: a thirty-year one-party socialist period after independence 
from British colonial rule in 1961, and twenty years of multiparty democracy since 
1992. The subsequent section discusses the roles of MPs in the two phases. 
 
5.3.1. Election Campaigns and Constituency Roles of MPs during the One-party 
Socialist Period (1967–1992) 
 
While the first post-independent elections in 1965 were held under a multiparty system, 
all the candidates contested from the TANU. There was vibrant competition in this 
election, as veterans of the national movement who perceived to have lost interests in 
their constituencies were defeated by a number of new leaders (Hyden 1999: 143–144) 
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 An economics lecturer at University of Dar es Salaam who contested for a parliamentary seat from 
opposition, NCCR-Mageuzi, in Mwanza in 1995, reported in detail the various tricks, such as bribing and 
threatening, used by the CCM members to control the election process (Limbu 1997: 114–125). 
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However, the overwhelming public support of the TANU paradoxically reduced voters’ 
interests in participating in election debates, as they would support the TANU 
candidates in any case (Tordoff 1967a: 31). 
 The Zanzibar Revolution and the military mutiny in 1964 made TANU leaders 
think that intense electoral competition was undesirable for maintaining domestic 
security and they decided to shift to a one-party state in 1965 (Hyden 1972: 407; 
Tordoff 1967b: 600; Yeager 1989: 67). President Nyerere also adopted a socialist policy 
through by announcing the Arusha Declaration in 1967, lasting until 1985 when he 
retired from the presidency. 
 During the one-party socialist period, the nomination process of candidates for 
parliamentary seats was centrally controlled by the TANU/CCM (Hyden 1972: 408; 
Yeager 1989: 68). The government provided all the election expenses, and candidates 
were not allowed to raise campaign funds or to use private money to influence voters 
(Kiondo 1994: 67 cited in Yoon 2008: 69). The two candidates contesting for a 
parliamentary seat travelled together to campaign rallies, accompanied by a special 
supervisory committee that monitored whether the candidates followed the party 
regulations. The candidates were not allowed to question the party ideology in their 
campaign speeches (Hyden 1972: 409). 
 In advance of the elections in 1970, the TANU requested its candidates 
contesting for parliamentary seats to reside in ujamaa villages and to write on their 
nomination forms whether they were participating in ujamaa activities, though due to 
the uneven distribution of ujamaa villages in the country, only about 20% of candidates 
managed to do so. While a number of candidates were formerly businessmen, a majority 
of only a few candidates stated in their biographies that they were businessmen in the 
1970s elections. Yet, many politicians continued to be indirectly involved in business 
by, for example, transferring their business to relatives (Hyden 1972: 409–412). Despite 
the condition on ujamaa activities, the election results suggest that the participation in 
ujamaa activities did not substantially affect the election results. Instead, the candidates 
who were highly educated and in higher occupational categories were more successful 
(Hyden 1972: 412). 
 The constituency roles of MPs were similarly highly restrictive, as the party 
leaders regarded entrepreneurial activities by MPs such as the initiation of self-help 
development projects in their constituencies as incompatible with the government’s 
socialist policy which is aimed at achieving equality across the country (Barkan 1984a: 
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74–76). Their roles were restricted by regional and district commissioners, who were 
not only heads of administrative regions and districts, but also the secretaries of local 
party organisations (Tordoff 1967a: 49–50). The limitations on the constituency roles of 
MPs were reinforced by the adoption of the TANU leadership code in 1967 which 
prohibited public officials, including MPs, from accumulating personal wealth, as 
discussed earlier (Barkan 1984a: 77; Tanganyika African National Union 1971).  
 As decision-making and resource allocation were monopolised by the 
TANU/CCM and the government, MPs were messengers of the party in constituencies, 
by communicating government policies to people at grassroots level. Elections were the 
opportunity to confer on MPs the right to engage in lobbying and other entrepreneurial 
activities through which they extract resources and services from the centre for local 
communities (Barkan 1984a: 67, 75; Hyden 1972: 412–415). As a result, for MPs, 
establishing clientelistic relationships with voters was less important than securing 
central approval (Kelsall 2002: 608–609). 
 
5.3.2. Election Campaigns and Constituency Roles of MPs during the Multiparty 
Period (1992–present) 
 
In the mid-1980s and the early 1990s, Tanzania experienced political and economic 
liberalisation by shifting to a liberal economy and multiparty politics. In 1995, the 
Elections Act was amended to allow MPs to make financial contributions to community 
development before the election campaign period.
123
 These changes resulted in an 
increase in the engagement of politicians with economic activities and use of money in 
building their relationships with voters by financially contributing to communities and 
buying votes (Hyden and Mmuya 2008: 36; Liviga 2011: 22). Political office became a 
lucrative source of power and access to wealth. It also allowed business people to gain 
power over politics and policymaking processes, leaving aside the interests of the wider 
public (Liviga 2011: 22–23). 
 While all registered parties were entitled to the government subsidies to political 
parties, called ruzuku, until 1995, the amendment of the Political Parties Act in 1996 
restricted these to the parties that represented in Parliament, which impeded the 
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 Section 97(4) of the Elections (Amendment) Act 1995 stipulates that ‘an act or transaction shall not 
deemed to constitute bribery if it is proved to have been designed to advance the interests of community 
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- 107 - 
development of new parties. In 2000, ruzuku ceased due to budget constraints, and 
political parties began to receive funds from foreign donors such as European countries 
and Canada (Bryan and Baer 2005: 128; Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy 
in Africa 2010). 
 The provision of ruzuku eventually resumed and is currently calculated based on 
the percentage of votes for the presidential candidates and the percentage of 
parliamentary seats. Whereas the CCM used to receive 3% of the national budget to run 
the party during the one-party period, it has only received ruzuku since the transition to 
a multiparty system. This opened opportunities for rich people to stand in elections.
124
 
Although the subsidies for the CCM have decreased from Tsh1 billion (approximately 
US$698,000) to Tsh814 million (US$568,000) per month since the elections in 2010, it 
is still more than twice the total amounts allocated to all the opposition parties (Nipashe 
21 December 2010). The CCM also raises funds for its activities from the membership 
fees from up to 3.5 million members, and various businesses such as real estate and the 
sales of newspapers (Therkildsen and Bourgouin 2012: 40). Through this transition 
period, the CCM established its connections with the private sector and maintained its 
dominant power in politics, while opposition parties remained weak (Gasarasi 1997; 
Mmuya 1998). 
 In advance of the first multiparty elections in 1995, the government granted a 
subsidy to parties in the sum of Tsh1 million (approximately US$1,700
125
) for each 
candidate to cover their campaign costs, though the candidates still had to raise large 
amounts of their campaign expenses (Yoon 2008: 70). In 1999, the government decided 
not to provide the subsidies for election campaigns due to the allegation that some 
opposition parties randomly nominated candidates to qualify for the subsidies in 1995 
(Britain-Tanzania Society 1999; Weinstein 2011: 36–37; Yoon 2008: 70). Instead, the 
government granted a gratuity of Tsh15–25 million (approximately 
US$19,000–31,000126) for each incumbent MP before Parliament was dissolved prior to 
the election campaigns of 2000. It became a huge disadvantage for opposition 
candidates who had fewer resources than CCM candidates. 
 Nevertheless, many candidates spent much more in funds during their campaign. 
In addition, due to the growing benefactor role, MPs have to raise funds for their 
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constituencies by themselves. For example, one MP claimed to have spent Tsh75 
million (approximately US$94,000) of his own savings towards community projects in 
addition to the funding from his party (Kelsall 2002: 611–612). The growing 
significance of the benefactor role of MPs increasingly placed pressure on them and 
created a political environment conducive to the adoption of a CDF. 
 
5.4. Changing Norms and Practices of Takrima 
 
As part of the increasing involvement of politicians in economic activities and the use 
of their personal funds as a leverage to enhance their chances of election, the informal 
practice of candidates or their parties offering food, drinks, money, clothes or other 
material goods to voters in exchange for their electoral support became widespread in 
Tanzania. It was widely known as takrima, meaning ‘African traditional hospitality’ 
(Heilman and Ndumbaro 2002; Makulilo 2010: 5–6; Sansa 2010: 173–174).127 
 While the word takrima has generally been used in Tanzanian social life for a 
long time, the takrima practice by parliamentary candidates became legalised by the 
amendment of the Electoral Laws in April 2000, six months before the elections. Prior 
to the amendment, the National Assembly (Elections) Act 1964 which was changed to 
the Electoral Laws by the amendment in 1969 prohibited the practice of takrima. 
Section 79 (a) of the Act states that the following people shall be deemed to be guilty of 
treating, meaning vote-buying: 
 
every person who corruptly by himself or by any other person, either before, during, 
or after an election, directly or indirectly gives, or provides, or pays, wholly or in 
part, the expense of giving or providing food, drink, entertainment, or provision to 
or for any person, for the purpose of corruptly influencing that person, or any other 
person, to vote or refrain from voting at such election (United Republic of Tanzania 
1964: 32). 
 
In 2000, two clauses, known as the takrima provisions, were added to Sections 
98 in the Electoral Laws. Section 98 (2) states that ‘anything done in good faith as an 
act of normal or traditional hospitality shall be deemed not to be treating’ (United 
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 The lexical meaning of takrima is ‘generosity by one person to another for the purpose of helping 
him/her’ (translated by the author) (Baraza la Kiswahili la Zanzibar (Zanzibar Swahili Council) 2010: 
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Republic of Tanzania 2000: 10) and Section 98 (3) states that ‘[n]ormal or ordinary 
expenses spent in good faith in the election campaign or in the ordinary cause of 
election process shall be deemed not to be treating, bribery or illegal practice’ (United 
Republic of Tanzania 2000: 10). With this amendment, takrima was legalised with the 
view that it was different from corruption (Babeiya 2011a: 92). 
 Underpinned by the traditional gift-giving and reciprocity culture, takrima was 
widely used as a campaign strategy in the elections in 2000 and 2005 (Bryan and Baer 
2005 :129; Kelsall 2003: 73–74; Makulilo 2010: 5–6; Phillips 2009: 34–35; Sansa 2010: 
173–174). Consequently, the campaign period came to be known as the ‘harvesting 
season’ which is ‘the season of exchanging votes for gifts of money, beer, meals, and 
party apparel referred to colloquially as “food,” “soda,” “sugar,” or “tea.”’(Phillips 
2010: 123). The legalisation of takrima rendered the candidates who had more resources 
with significant advantages in standing for election. As mentioned above, the 
government also stopped providing subsidies to political parties for election campaigns 
in advance of the elections in 2000. These changes disadvantaged opposition candidates 
due to their poor financial base compared with the CCM candidates in 2000 and 2005 
(Babeiya 2011b: 93; Bryan and Baer 2005: 129). 
 In 2005, three CSOs jointly filed a petition to challenge the takrima provisions 
in the Electoral Laws as unconstitutional (Legal and Human Rights Centre and 
Tanzania Civil Society Consortium for Election Observation 2010; United Republic of 
Tanzania 2006d). In April 2006, four months after the 2005 elections, the High Court 
declared that the amendment of the Electoral Laws to allow takrima was 
unconstitutional on the grounds that the takrima provisions not only discriminated 
against lower-income candidates, but also legalised corruption in the electoral process 
and thus, violated the Constitution which guarantees the right to vote in free and fair 
elections (Babeiya 2011a: 93; United Republic of Tanzania 2006d: 35–36). 
 Even before takrima was legalised in 2000, it had been widely practised and 
thus, had already been institutionalised in electoral politics.
128
 While politicians could 
have clandestinely provided takrima, the question is why it was legalised in 2000. 
Political analysts consider that it was a CCM strategy to give disadvantage to opposition 
candidates and to avoid election petitions based on corruption filed by opposition 
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candidates against CCM MPs (Babeiya 2011a: 92–93; Sansa 2010: 173–174).129 Indeed, 
after the first multiparty elections in 1995, there were as many as 134 election petitions 
based on vote buying filed by opposition candidates (Kelsall 2002: 611; Omari 1997).
130
 
Some MPs were disqualified and by-elections were held, an embarrassment for the 
CCM.
131
 The amendment of the Electoral Laws in 2000, which legalised takrima, also 
introduced the requirement for an election petitioner to deposit a maximum amount of 
Tsh5 million (approximately US$6,200) as a security for costs, which made it difficult 
for opposition candidates to file election petitions (United Republic of Tanzania 2000: 
11). Thus, the combination of the takrima provision and the security for costs are 
considered to advance CCM’s incumbency advantage. 
Apparently, for CCM leaders, takrima was simply meant to ensure that the 
candidates for parliamentary seats could extend their gesture of appreciation to their 
supporters. Babeiya (2011a) notes that both the president and the two prime ministers 
found nothing wrong in candidates ‘giving the electorate things like drinks, food and 
entertainment as long as such things are given in what they described as good faith’ (93). 
Pius Msekwa, former Speaker of Seventh and Eighth Parliaments (1994–2005) and 
former Vice Chairman of the CCM in Tanzania Mainland (2007–2012), considers that 
takrima is part of the Tanzanian culture and the illegalisation of takrima in 2006 was 
unnecessary in tackling electoral corruption, because hospitality (takrima) and electoral 
corruption were distinguishable based on the timing of the offering of money or goods 
by politicians to voters and the intentions of politicians in doing this (Msekwa 2011: 
165–167).132 
Despite Msekwa’s claim, hospitality and electoral corruption cannot be clearly 
separated in practice. As quoted earlier, the National Assembly (Elections) Act 1964 
prohibits the offering of money or other goods ‘before, during and after an election’ 
which covers the whole election cycle; thus, the timing is not a determining factor. In 
practice, the timing of the practice does not matter much to its effects, as politicians can 
bribe voters before the official campaign period starts and claim the credits during the 
campaign period. Furthermore, it is almost impossible to discern whether politicians 
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give money to voters with or without intention to influence their votes.
133
  
Coincidently, takrima was legalised one year after the first President Nyerere 
died in 1999. The legalisation of takrima was symbolic of the change in the election 
rules from one-party socialist period to a multiparty period, as the use of money under 
the name of takrima could neither be widespread nor legalised during the leadership of 
Nyerere who was strictly against corruption. 
 There is a understanding among some MPs that takrima was originally meant as 
a token of appreciation and for compensation by the offering of food, drinks or money 
by candidates to campaign staff such as promotional art groups (e.g. dancers and 
drummers) who helped to organise campaign rallies. MPs claim that the legalisation of 
takrima was intended to ensure that the compensation to campaign staff is protected as a 
legal practice.
134
 Although this sounds a fair rationale, the compensation for campaign 
staff was legal even before 2000. There were at least two judgements by the Court of 
Appeal of 1996 and 1999 that declared that serving pilau (fried rice) to campaign staff 
was lawful: ‘Gilliard Joseph Maseko and Two others v. Corona Faida Busongo’, Civil 
Appeal No. 57 of 1996 and ‘Lutter Symphorian Nelson v. Attorney General and 
Ibrahim Said Msabaha’, Civil Appeal No. 24 of 1999 (United Republic of Tanzania 
1999). If takrima was meant as compensation for campaign staff, as some proponents of 
takrima argue, there was no need to legalise it because it was already legal before 2000. 
The judgement in 1999 also suggests ambiguity in separating campaign staff from the 
public in campaign rallies. The judgement states that: 
 
[t]he learned trial Judge analysed the evidence of the scales of justice and found 
himself unable to make a positive finding that, as was alleged by the appellant 
and his witnesses, the pilau was also served to members of the public. He 
entertained the view that what might have occurred was that pilau was prepared 
for, and served to the members of the campaign groups but some members of the 
public invited themselves to the meal (United Republic of Tanzania 1999: 
424–425). 
 
This statement suggests that the recipients of takrima could easily be expanded to voters, 
and it is difficult in practice to monitor all the events at the campaign rallies. 
There is no information on the number of petitions after the elections in 2000 
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and 2005 and whether there were election petitions in which appellants lost due to the 
takrima provisions between 2000 and 2006. Thus, it cannot be fully examined how the 
legalisation of takrima actually influenced the nature of election campaigns and 
ultimately, whether the CCM’s intention to limit electoral petitions by legalising 
takrima was successful. It should also be noted that takrima did not always benefit 
wealthy politicians in practice, as they tend to receive higher expectations from voters 
than other politicians. If voters know that politicians do not have access to resources, 
they would not expect MPs to bring large amounts of money to their constituencies. 
Voters are also aware that politicians have their own interests and allow them to gain 
personally from political office.
135
 However, the legalisation of takrima certainly gave 
financial advantage to the candidates who were able to distribute goods to voters, and it 
created a public view that the campaign period is a ‘harvesting season’. 
Whereas Section 8 of the CDCF Act explicitly prohibits the use of the funds as 
takrima during election campaigns, CSOs cautioned that CDCF funds might be used as 
takrima (Policy Forum 2008b; The Citizen 16 March 2011; United Republic of 
Tanzania 2009c: 52). Their view on takrima and the CDCF is presented in one of the 
illustrations (Figure 5.1) in the booklet that explains the problems of the CDCF Act, 
published by the Policy Forum. 
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Figure 5.1  An Illustration of Takrima and the CDCF in ‘Mapungufu 20 yaliyomo 
kwenye Sheria ya Mfuko wa Maendeleo ya Jimbo ya 2009 (20 Deficiencies in the 
Constituency Development Fund Act 2009)’ 
 
 
Note: While the tree called SHERIA YA TAKRIMA (Law of Takrima) on the left has 
already been stumped, a resident in the house of TZ (Tanzania) is surprised to find that 
the tree on the right newly named SHERIA YA MFUKO WA JIMBO (Law of 
Constituency Fund) has grown tall and its root has already penetrated his house. 
Permission was granted by the Policy Forum to reprint the illustration. 
Source: Policy Forum (n.d.: 13)  
 
As such, CSOs anticipate that the CDCF would have similar negative effects on the 
country as takrima. 
Takrima and the CDCF are different instruments for MPs, as takrima is mainly 
based on the private funds of politicians targeted at individual voters, or private goods, 
while the CDCF uses public funds for development projects, or club goods. Whereas the 
legalisation of takrima was opposed by opposition MPs with a view that it would 
benefit mainly CCM MPs who were endowed with financial resources, the CDCF was 
welcomed by MPs of both the CCM and opposition parties. Thus, there is probably no 
direct causal relationship between the legalisation and illegalisation of takrima and the 
adoption of the CDCF. 
However, takrima can be considered a contributing factor to the introduction of 
a CDF as both instruments are rooted in the politician-voter relationships based on the 
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exchange of tangible goods and votes. The widespread use of takrima certainly 
contributed to strengthening the public norm of the benefactor role of MPs. The changes 
in the practice and legal status of takrima illustrate not only a growing benefactor role 
of MPs, but also a changing norm on election finance and the politician-voter 
relationship. The wide use of takrima exceeded what the original meaning of African 
hospitality could justify, and it became equal to electoral corruption in the end. While 
takrima lost its legitimacy in 2006, voters continued to expect MPs to bring tangible 
goods to them near the elections. It placed pressure on MPs and motivated them to 
establish a CDF. Thus, with a caveat that takrima is only one example of many forms of 
tangible goods provided by MPs to voters, the legalisation and illegalisation of takrima 
can be considered as an important factor behind the introduction of a CDF in Tanzania. 
 
5.5. Corruption Scandals and Intraparty Competition within the CCM 
 
Following the illegalisation of takrima in 2006, the CCM was seriously shaken by 
several grand corruption scandals. It was triggered by the disclosure of the ‘List of 
Shame’ by Willibrod Slaa, Secretary General of the CHADEMA, at a public rally which 
named allegedly corrupt ministers and key party officials of the CCM in September 
2007 (Britain-Tanzania Society 2010). Parliament started to investigate the corruption 
allegations of cabinet ministers and senior government officials, which demonstrates the 
strengthening of legislative oversight coupled with the revision of the Standing Orders 
in 2007, as discussed in Chapter 4 (Tripp 2012: 5; Tsekpo and Hudson 2009). 
The most notable parliamentary investigation was on the contract between the 
Tanzania Electric Supply Company (TANESCO) and the Richmond Development 
Company based in the United States of America to supply emergency electricity to the 
country (Sitta, Slaa and Cheyo 2008: 82–83). The Parliamentary Committee on Trade 
and Investments examined the case and requested a further investigation by setting up a 
Parliamentary Select Committee. MPs supported the formation of a Select Committee in 
Parliament and one was formed which was chaired by Harrison Mwakyembe, one of the 
members of the Parliamentary Committee that revised the Standing Orders.
136
 The 
Committee revealed that the Richmond Development Company was a fake company 
which was not registered in the USA, and the procurement laws were not followed to 
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give the tender to the company. The Committee also found that Prime Minister Edward 
Lowassa instructed the TANESCO to enter into a contract with the Richmond 
Development Company (Sitta, Slaa and Cheyo 2008: 83–86; Slaa 2010: 90). 
In February 2009, after the Committee presented a report and called for the 
resignation of all government officials implicated in the scandal in Parliament, Lowassa 
announced his resignation as premier. The conclusions of the enquiry also resulted in 
the resignation of two ministers: Nazir Karamagi, Minister for Energy and Minerals, 
and his predecessor, Ibrahim Msabaha, who was Minister for East African Cooperation 
at the time of investigation. President Kikwete dissolved the cabinet, and Mizengo 
Pinda was appointed as prime minister (Legal and Human Rights Centre and Tanzania 
Civil Society Consortium for Election Observation 2010; Slaa 2010: 90). 
Apart from the Richmond scandal, the Governor of the Bank of Tanzania was 
fired by President Kikwete after an audit investigation uncovered fraudulent 
transactions involving the repayment of the country’s commercial external debt in 
January 2008. The repayment of the external debt at the Bank of Tanzania is widely 
believed to have been used to finance CCM’s election campaigns in 2005 (Therkildsen 
and Bourgouin 2012: 40). In April 2008, Andrew Chenge resigned as the Minister for 
Infrastructure due to the allegation of his involvement in a BAE radar purchase scandal 
in 1999 (Britain-Tanzania Society 2008). 
These corruption scandals made the public more aware of the privileges enjoyed 
by CCM leaders and the large amounts of money used for election campaigns by the 
party. They not only tainted the image of the party, but also created sharp divisions 
among CCM MPs and party coherence was at stake (Msekwa 2011; The Citizen 17 
February 2010). While there has always been intraparty competition within the CCM, 
the growth of intraparty divisions was particularly evident during the first 
administration of President Kikwete between 2005 and 2010.
137
 One group was led by 
the former Prime Minister Lowassa. His group was often dubbed by the media as 
mafisadi (meaning ‘corrupt people’). Lowassa and Rostam Abdulrasul Aziz, prominent 
businessman and MP for Igunga until he resigned from politics in July 2011, are known 
to have supported the election campaign of President Kikwete in 2005. Another group is 
called anti-mafisadi which was led by Samuel Sitta. Another influential politician in the 
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CCM is Bernard Kamillius Membe, Minister for Foreign Affairs and International 
Cooperation. Soon after the elections in 2010, local political analysts considered that the 
Lowassa and Membe groups were the two biggest forces within the CCM for the 
coming years, while Sitta and several other politicians would also play roles in the 
power game within the party.
138
 
Lowassa’s supporters believed that he was not guilty as charged but was framed 
by his political foes and blamed Sitta for not taking action to stop the attacks against the 
government and the party when he was moderating parliamentary discussions. In 
response to the intensified split, the CCM formed a committee of party elders led by the 
former President Ally Hassan Mwinyi to reconcile it (Legal and Human Rights Centre 
and Tanzania Civil Society Consortium for Election Observation 2010: 55). Despite the 
effort, the struggle between the two groups seriously affected the party up to the 
elections in 2010 (The Guardian 16 February 2010). 
 This was not the first parliamentary investigation of corruption allegation of 
cabinet ministers in the country. In 1996, a parliamentary probe committee investigated 
an allegation on tax exemptions improperly granted by the Ministry of Finance, which 
led to the resignation of Finance Minister Simon Mbilinyi from the cabinet post. 
Whereas there was no formal system of select committees at that time, Parliament could 
mandate special, quasi-judicial probe committees to examine the political events that 
were high concerns to MPs, the media and the public (Kelsall 2003: 64; Wang 2005: 
186–187). Apparently, the Mbilinyi’s case was driven by factional politics within the 
CCM. There was a group of politicians, called ‘old guard’, who had held senior 
positions in the former government led by President Mwyini but they were sidelined 
under the Mkapa’s administration. This group attempted to damage the Mkapa 
government by implicating Mbilinyi (Britain-Tanzania Society 1997). Iddi Simba who 
chaired the probe committee became Minister for Trade and Industries later, but he 
himself was forced to resign after he was implicated in a sugar importation scandal in 
2001 (The Guardian 29 June 2013). It is considered as a revenge of the ‘Southern bloc’, 
a group of politicians from southern regions, including Mkapa and Mbilinyi (Kelsall 
2003: 65). 
This case and the Richmond scandal suggest that there is a relationship between 
intraparty competition within the CCM and the exercise of sanctions by the legislature 
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over the executive. Yet, the Richmond case was unique as it was underpinned by the 
strengthening of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive and the CCM. 
 Against this background, financial resources serve as an important tool for CCM 
leaders, especially those who are interested in vying for the presidency in 2015, to gain 
support from the party members to strengthen their groups. The introduction of a CDF 
could reduce their leverage over the members by decentralising the allocation of public 
funds to individual MPs. Indeed, whereas the CCM does not provide funds for 
constituency service by MPs, senior and/or wealthy MPs provide financial support to 
other MPs for their election campaigns and constituency service on an individual basis. 
This can be initiated by either side. In some cases, politicians who need funds ask senior 
and/or wealthy politicians for assistance. In other cases, senior and/or wealthy 
politicians approach promising junior politicians and offer them financial assistance.
139
 
 As noted in Chapter 3, according to Sitta, the introduction of a CDF was aimed 
at mitigating the collusion between MPs and the private sector by reducing the 
temptation of MPs to seek funds from businessmen. In light of the financial power that 
Lowassa’s group had on the party, Sitta’s rationale can also be interpreted as the CDCF 
also aiming at mitigating the influence of CCM leaders, in particular Lowassa’s group, 
on party members. Yet, the CDF proposal was supported by all CCM leaders. This is 
partly because the offering of financial support from one party member to another 
would continue regardless of whether there is a CDF in place.
140
 In addition, the CDCF 
budget is small and thus, it is unlikely to affect factional politics within the CCM 
significantly. Thus, the intensified intraparty competition within the CCM might have 
been one driving factor but it does not fully explain why CCM leaders accepted the 
CDCF. 
 When the CDCF Bill was tabled and passed in Parliament in July 2009, the 
relationship between the executive and the legislature was deteriorating due to the 
corruption scandals. Not only opposition MPs, but also CCM MPs began to criticise the 
Kikwete administration openly. In such circumstances, the CDCF might have signified 
a gesture of the executive to show its support to MPs and relieve the tension between 
the executive and the legislature.
141
 As discussed in Chapter 3, the fact that civil society 
and donors were against the establishment of the CDCF helped in unifying MPs beyond 
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party lines. While the legalisation of takrima and the increase of the petition fees in 
2000 was a CCM strategy to favour its MPs, the introduction of the CDCF can be 
considered a symbolic concession made by CCM leaders to the legislature to regain 
their support in preparation for the elections in 2010. 
 
5.6. Elections in 2010 
 
As the 2010 elections approached, the Kikwete government made an effort to show its 
commitment to curb electoral corruption and improve the public image of the CCM. In 
March 2010, the Election Expenses Act was passed into law with an aim to hold 
candidates and political parties more accountable for their campaign finance. It sets a 
monitoring mechanism of the funding of nomination processes, election campaigns and 
elections (Babeiya 2011a: 97–99; National Democratic Institute 2010; United Republic 
of Tanzania 2010a). In addition, the Election Expenses (Maximum Amount of Funds) 
Order (supplement No 26) of 2010 issued by the Prime Minister stipulated the 
maximum amounts allowed for each candidate to run for a parliamentary seat between 
Tsh30 million (approximately US21,000) and Tsh80 million (US$56,000), depending 
on the size, population and communication infrastructure of the constituency. The 
expenditure for the intraparty nomination process of each candidate was allowed up to 
Tsh2.5 million (US$1,700) (Babeiya 2011a: 99). 
To prohibit the practice of takrima, the election expenses for promotional art 
groups at campaign rallies were also clarified. Section 7(2) of the Election Expenses 
Act 2010 stipulates that ‘[a]ll funds used for promotional art groups for purposes of 
presentation of a candidate to voters including the cost of providing food, drinks, 
accommodation or transportation which has been reasonably incurred by a candidate for 
members of his campaign team shall be deemed to constitute election expenses’ (United 
Republic of Tanzania 2010b: 7). 
There was also a change in the rule of kura za maoni (‘opinion poll’) or the 
primary election of the CCM by increasing the number of party members who could 
vote to curtail vote buying including takrima by candidates in the primary election.
142
 
Whereas only hundreds of selected party numbers were eligible to vote in the primary 
election in the past elections, all party members who paid annual fees in the amount of 
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Tsh1,200 (approximately US$1) became able to vote in the primary election in August 
2010. 
A legal expert in Parliament considers that the legalisation and illegalisation of 
takrima and the adoption of the Election Expenses Act was a learning process; 
Tanzanians learnt from their mistakes made with takrima.
143
 Moreover, in view of the 
impact of the corruption scandals on the public image of the CCM, the adoption of the 
Election Expenses Act was important for the CCM to show its commitment to curb 
electoral corruption prior to the elections in 2010. The CDCF and the Election Expenses 
Act supplement each other, as the former gives financial power to MPs in providing 
constituency service, while the latter restricts their campaign finance. 
Despite the above effort by the CCM to regain trust of the party members and its 
supporters, the elections in 2010 marked a turning point in its dominant power in the 
country. President Kikwete was re-elected with a lower support rate in 2010, from 
80.3% in 2005 to 61.3% in 2010. The CCM also reduced the number of parliamentary 
seats from 206 (88.8% of the total MPs who were elected from constituencies) in 2005 
to 186 (77.8%) in 2010, while the CHADEMA MPs increased from 5 to 23. Pius 
Msekwa states that the CCM returned to the ‘position it held at the commencement of 
multi-party electoral competition in 1995’ (Msekwa 2011), because the percentage of 
the votes the CCM obtained for elections in 2010 was similar to the one in 1995. The 
voter turnout in the 2010 elections was the lowest since the transition to a multiparty 
system in 1992, and dramatically declined from 72.5% in 2005 to 39.5% in 2010 
(International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance). This suggests that 
voters did not want to vote for the CCM but were not keen on voting for opposition 
candidates either.
144
 
 There are several reasons for the decline in the public support to the CCM. First, 
Tanzanians were dissatisfied with the failure of the CCM in delivering what they 
promised in the election manifesto of 2005 such as the slow pace of economic growth 
and poverty reduction. Second, as discussed above, it was due to the weakening of party 
unity of the CCM because of grand corruption scandals and internal divisions. Third, 
the CCM apparently started to lose its grips on some of the traditional supporters such 
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as the Trade Union Congress of Tanzania.
145
 
 Another reason is the increase in the number of voters in the primary election of 
the CCM. It generally made intraparty competition more intense, and despite the 
intention of the party to curb vote buying, some politicians spent more resources to buy 
votes and distributed fake party cards in some regions (Nipashe 1 November 2011).
146
 
Due to the intensified competition in the primary election, the candidates nominated by 
the party could not easily gain the support of those party members who voted for other 
candidates at the primary election. The CCM campaign manager stated that ‘it becomes 
more difficult to iron out differences amongst CCM members, since the system involves 
many people in the voting process’ (The Guardian 3 November 2010). 
 Finally, the decline in the public support of the CCM was attributed to the 
successful mobilisation of supporters by the CHADEMA, particularly from the youth in 
urban areas in northern regions. Willibrod Slaa, CHADEMA presidential candidate, 
attracted massive crowds during his election campaigns. The CHADEMA also 
established financial resources to compete with the CCM effectively. 
One of the features of the elections in 2010 was the prevalence of vote-rigging 
in the country, characterised by a new Swahili word, chakachua, meaning ‘adulterate’. 
The word was originally used for fuel adulteration by mixing petrol or diesel with 
cheaper kerosene, which became a nationwide problem as the fuel price kept going up 
between 2007 and 2009 (The Citizen 17 July 2009). In 2010, the word was used for 
misconduct in the elections and it became a popular word used by Tanzanians to refer to 
any forms of cheating in their daily lives. There were some incidents of chakachuaji 
(‘adulteration’) by CCM candidates in the vote counting process in the constituencies 
where opposition candidates won by narrow margins.
147
 Although vote-rigging is not a 
new phenomenon in Tanzania, the widespread use of the word chakachua indicates that 
the CCM struggled with winning some of the parliamentary seats. Despite the efforts 
made by the party to regain its coherence and the public support by establishing the 
CDCF with an accountability mechanism and enacting the Election Expenses Act, the 
CCM experienced a tougher competition in 2010 than in the past. 
The practice of takrima continued in the elections in 2010. According to the 
Views of the People 2012, more than half of the respondents (54%) considered that vote 
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buying by politicians was becoming more common, while 20% offered the opposite 
views (Research on Poverty Alleviation 2012: 36–37). This result does not necessarily 
mean that the vote-buying practice continued to grow in the country. Instead, it may 
suggest that Tanzanians have become more aware and critical of the practice partly due 
to the legal changes to prohibit it prior to the elections. Nevertheless, it means that the 
practice continued to exist. The enduring prevalence of vote buying can partly be 
attributed to weak law enforcement mechanisms in the country (Babeiya 2011a: 99; 
Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee 2011: 64). For example, the office of the 
Registrar of Political Parties which is supposed to track and control the amounts of the 
campaign expenses of political parties and candidates under the Election Expenses Act 
does not have an institutional capacity to exercise its duties (Babeiya 2011a: 99). In the 
actual interactions between politicians and voters, it does not significantly matter 
whether takrima is legal or illegal. If politicians reject the financial requests by voters 
on the basis of illegality, voters consider them ‘funny’.148 Apparently, because of the 
Election Expenses Act, money and gifts were given more secretly, for example, through 
third parties or at fake events such as weddings so that it would be more difficult for the 
government anti-corruption agency to identify the perpetrators.
149
 
The CDCF did not have a major impact on the 2010 elections mainly because no 
CDCF projects had been fully implemented by the time the country went to the polls, as 
discussed in Chapter 3. Apparently, some incumbent MPs made pledges during the 
campaigns on how they would spend CDCF funds if re-elected and the candidates who 
challenged more appealed for better use of the funds than the incumbents.
150
 However, 
as there was no major change in the re-election rate in 2010, the CDCF did not have an 
effect of incumbency advantage (see Table 5.3 below for the re-election rate in 2005 
and 2010). 
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Table 5.3  Number of Constituency MPs Re-elected in 2005 and 2010 
 
 2005 2010 
 Re-elected 
MPs 
Total Re-election 
rate (%) 
Re-elected 
MPs 
Total Re-election 
rate (%) 
CCM 96 189 50.8% 86 179 48.0% 
CUF 6 18 33.3% 7 24 29.2% 
CHADEMA 2 4 50.0% 4 22 18.2% 
NCCR-Mageuzi 0 0 0.0% 0 4 0.0% 
TLP 0 1 0.0% 0 1 0.0% 
UDP 0 1 0.0% 1 1 100.0% 
Total 104 213 48.8% 98 231 42.4% 
Note: The number of MPs is different from Table 5.2 due to the creation and 
abolishment of constituencies between the election years. John Magalle Shibuda who 
changed his party from CCM to CHADEMA in 2010 is not counted. 
Source: compiled by the author, based on the United Republic of Tanzania, Parliament 
 
5.6. Conclusion 
 
The CDCF was introduced in Tanzania against the background that the benefactor role 
of MPs had continuously expanded since the transition to multiparty politics in 1992. It 
was accelerated by the growing exchange of tangible goods and votes between 
politicians and voters, partly due to the legalisation of takrima between 2000 and 2006. 
However, takrima could not maintain its legitimacy after being utilised for two elections 
and the corruption scandals implicating the CCM politicians tarnished the image of the 
party. Thus, it was important for the CCM to demonstrate that it is fully committed to 
anti-corruption efforts and a fair player in the elections. The CDCF, which has clear 
rules and regulations and a monitoring mechanism, was an optimal choice for the CCM 
and the executive to show their support to CCM MPs and demonstrate fairness in 
advance of the 2010 elections. The above examination of the political events, changes 
made to the election regulations and the introduction of the CDCF suggests that CCM’s 
election strategy was adjusted to changing political conditions and challenges to 
maintain its level of responsiveness to its MPs, party members and voters. 
When the CDCF Bill was tabled and passed in Parliament in 2009, the 
relationship between the executive and the legislature was deteriorating due to the 
corruption scandals. Not only opposition MPs, but also CCM MPs began to criticise the 
Kikwete administration. In such circumstances, the CDCF might have signified a 
gesture of the executive to show its support to MPs and relieve the tension between the 
executive and the legislature. The fact that civil society and donors opposed the 
establishment of the CDCF helped in unifying MPs beyond party lines. This suggests 
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that the introduction of the CDCF was a concession made by CCM leaders to the 
legislature to regain the party unity. 
 Since the CDCF budget was set at relatively low levels and the power of MPs in 
the operation of the fund was restricted in the CDCF Act, it was evident that the 
financial autonomy of MPs created by the CDCF would be limited. The objective of the 
CDCF was neither to change the way in which public funds would be used for local 
development substantially nor to stop the formation of internal groups within the party. 
In other words, it was expected by party leaders that financial support from one party 
member to another would continue to happen regardless of the introduction of the 
CDCF. There would remain a space for party members to establish personal 
relationships between them. Thus, on the question as to why the CCM decided to 
introduce a CDF which might weaken their control over the party members, this study 
finds that CCM leaders probably did not perceive that a CDF would affect intraparty 
competition and power dynamics significantly. Instead, the introduction of the CDCF 
was a symbolic policy decision to acknowledge the role of MPs in bringing 
development to their constituencies and support it. 
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Chapter 6  Back from Bunge: The Relationship between MPs 
and Voters in Tanzania 
 
In my constituency, my house is a hospital and a police station. I am a doctor 
and a police officer. When people have problems, they come to my house first.  
— Said Mtanda, MP for the Mchinga constituency (CCM)151 
 
In developing countries, if an MP is doing his work properly, there is no one 
who understands the realities of development on the ground better than an MP.  
— Willibrod Peter Slaa, Secretary General of CHADEMA152 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
Tanzanian MPs and political analysts describe the constituency roles of MPs with 
various phrases, namely benefactors, providers, executors, social workers, saviours, 
multi-faceted donors and even walking ATMs.
153
 As Mtanda states above, voters 
directly seek assistance from MPs on their various problems. A common story told by 
MPs during the interviews is that, when they go home in their constituencies, people 
make long queues outside their houses every morning, and MPs meet them one by one 
to hear their requests for assistance before having breakfast. Thus, as Slaa argues, MPs 
may be in a position to know about local development challenges better than anyone 
else. These accounts suggest that the roles of MPs in their constituencies are not merely 
underpinned by the election incentives of individual MPs but have been institutionalised 
as a public norm in the country. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, one of the main reasons for establishing a CDF in 
Tanzania and other countries was to relieve the fundraising burden on MPs for their 
constituency service. Chapter 5 demonstrated that the benefactor role of MPs, which 
was prohibited during the one-party period, gradually expanded in the country after the 
transition to the multiparty system in the early 1990s. Building on these findings, this 
chapter examines what kinds of role Tanzanian MPs actually play in their constituencies, 
based on the interviews with MPs and other key informants to elucidate the benefactor 
role of MPs and the fundraising burden on them. The chapter also explores the public 
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perceptions of MPs through the regression analysis of the Afrobarometer survey results. 
Through a combination of the two analyses, this chapter explains the changing nature of 
the relationship between MPs and voters in Tanzania. 
Afrobarometer is a series of surveys on public attitudes towards social, political 
and economic conditions which have been undertaken in eighteen African countries 
since 1999. In Tanzania, five rounds of the Afrobarometer surveys were conducted by 
the Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA) in 2001 (with 2,198 samples), 2003 
(1,223), 2005 (1,304), 2008 (1,208) and 2012 (2,400). In the surveys, nationally 
representative, random, stratified probability samples were selected, the sizes of which 
were sufficient to yield an overall margin of error of +/-2% or +/-3% at a 95% 
confidence level. The REPOA’s Afrobarometer research team conducted face-to-face 
interviews with the respondents in Swahili (Afrobarometer). 
 
6.2. Constituency Roles of MPs in Tanzania 
 
The first section of the chapter analyses the way in which Tanzanian MPs and voters 
interact with each other and features various approaches taken by MPs to serve their 
constituencies, mainly based on the interviews with MPs and other key informants, and 
supplemented by the Afrobarometer surveys. The following four areas are explored: 1) 
how often and how long MPs visit their constituencies; 2) how and what kinds of 
requests voters make to MPs; 3) how MPs respond to these requests, with a focus on the 
sources of funds and the types of goods they provide; and 4) how important the CDCF 
is to the overall constituency service by MPs. The selection of the types of goods is 
indicative of what kind of relationships MPs intend to establish with voters in relation to 
the two types of accountability relationship between MPs and voters, namely 
programmatic and clientelistic relationships, discussed in Chapter 1. An examination of 
the above four areas confirms the significance of the benefactor role of MPs in their 
constituencies, and thus the MP-voter relationship is not programmatic based on public 
goods. Yet, there is wide variation in the way in which MPs respond to voters’ requests 
for assistance and the types of goods MPs provide to voters. This section also highlights 
the mechanisms set up by MPs to provide assistance to voters in systematic ways, which 
suggests that some MPs are shifting away from the provision of private goods on an 
ad-hoc basis. 
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6.2.1. MPs’ Visits to Constituencies 
 
As the Parliament of Tanzania is located in the country’s capital, Dodoma, which is 
approximately 500 kilometres away from Dar es Salaam, the largest city where most of 
the central ministries and major private companies are situated, the lives of Tanzanian 
MPs are characterised by the frequent movements between Dar es Salaam, Dodoma and 
their constituencies throughout the year. Parliamentary sessions in Dodoma are held for 
four months per year: two-week regular sessions in February, April and November and 
a ten-week budget session between June and August. Parliamentary Committee 
meetings are held in the office of Parliament in Dar es Salaam for two weeks before 
each of the parliamentary sessions, totalling two months per year (United Republic of 
Tanzania). 
If MPs attend all the parliamentary sessions and the committee meetings, they 
have a chance to visit their constituencies four times a year between these activities for 
up to six months. In reality, there is large variation in the time MPs spend in Parliament 
and their constituencies. Among the five MPs interviewed in 2011 and 2012, the time 
they spend in Parliament varies from 1 to 5 months, and in their constituencies from 50 
days to 6 months per year. While MPs are members of the full district council meetings, 
the frequency of their attendance to the council meetings also varies between 8 days and 
2 months among the five interviews MPs.
154
 
The time MPs spend in their constituencies is often viewed as an indication of 
the level of voter satisfaction of their MPs. There is a stereotype that MPs spend most of 
their time in Dar es Salaam, enjoying city life, and visiting their constituencies only 
before the elections. According to the Afrobarometer surveys, Tanzanian voters have 
higher expectations of MPs on the frequency of their visits to constituencies (Figure 
6.1). Almost 20% of the respondents expected MPs to spend almost all the time in their 
constituencies in 2005. While the ratio declined in 2008, a majority of the respondents 
still expected MPs to visit their constituencies at least once a month. A number of 
respondents consider that MPs never visited their constituencies or visited at least once 
per year in practice. 
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Figure 6.1  Time MPs Spend in Constituencies 
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Note: The values in the 2012 survey are ‘Never’, ‘Only Sometimes’, ‘Often’ and 
‘Always’ which are different from the other rounds of surveys. To make the data 
comparable across the years, the value of ‘Only Sometimes’ is translated as ‘At least 
once a year’, ‘Often’ as ‘At least once a month’ and ‘Always’ as ‘Almost all the time’ 
in the table. 
Source: Afrobarometer 
 
Despite the above public image, MPs do visit their constituencies between 
parliamentary sessions to inform voters about the parliamentary discussions on key 
issues, collect the views of voters and hear their problems so that they can effectively 
represent the constituents inside and outside Parliament.
155
 There are MPs known as 
grassroots politicians who spend most of their time in their constituencies except for 
parliamentary sessions and committee meetings.
156
 
 However, the frequency of their visits to or the lengths of their stay in their 
constituencies do not determine the actual level of voter satisfaction of the performance 
of MPs. For example, it does not necessarily matter to the MPs who make large 
financial contribution to the constituencies how often they visit there. The MP who said 
he spends only 50 days in his constituency in the interview exemplifies this type of MP. 
Another example is the cabinet members who have limited time for their constituency 
work. For example, Lazaro Samuel Nyalandu, MP for Singida North (CCM) and the 
then Deputy Minister for Industry, Trade and Marketing, usually visits his constituency 
only on weekends due to his responsibilities in the ministry, yet he has sustained a high 
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level of voter support.
157
 Not only cabinet members but also some backbench MPs 
argue that they cannot meet the financial demands of their constituents unless they go to 
Dar es Salaam, other large towns or abroad to raise funds for their constituency 
development. This suggests that the time MPs spend in their constituencies is not a 
determining factor of the voters’ assessment of responsiveness of MPs. 
 
6.2.2. Requests by Voters to MPs 
 
Voters seek assistance from MPs to solve their personal as well as community problems 
in various locations. Some voters even travel to Dodoma during parliamentary sessions 
to meet MPs as they think that it is easier to find MPs in Dodoma than in Dar es Salaam 
or their constituencies. As the use of mobile phones has expanded in the country, MPs 
are increasingly receiving calls and text messages from voters. The telephone numbers 
of MPs are publicly available, for example on the Parliament’s website, and it is not 
difficult for voters to find the numbers of their representatives. 
In the Afrobarometer surveys, there was a question as to how often respondents 
contacted their MPs to talk about important problems or to give them their views during 
the past year. In 2012, 22% of the respondents said they contacted their MPs once or 
more. This result suggests that on average, each MP was contacted by around 13,000 
voters between 2011 and 2012.
158
 The same question was asked in the past surveys. As 
Figure 6.2 shows, the ratio of the respondents who contacted MPs increased between 
2008 and 2012. Yet, even in 2008, each MP was contacted by around 10,000 voters per 
year on average.
159
 As such, although a majority of voters have never contacted their 
MPs, those who have contacted are a large number for each MP. 
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 Interview, Nyalandu (2011). 
158
 The voting-age population of 18 years old or older in Tanzania was around 21 million in 2010 and 
22% of it is 4.6 million (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance). If it is divided 
by the total number of constituency MPs and special seats MPs (which is currently 341), it will be around 
13,000. 
159
 15% of the voting-age population is 3.2 million. If it is divided by the total number of constituency 
MPs and special seats MPs (which was 307 then), it will be around 10,000. 
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Figure 6.2  Frequencies of Contacting MPs 
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Note: To make the data comparable across the years, the value of ‘Sometimes’ in the 
2001 survey is translated as ‘A few times’ in the table. 
Source: Afrobarometer 
 
Since MPs do not stay in their constituencies all the time, their personal assistants play a 
crucial role in their communication with voters. Almost all MPs have personal assistants 
in their constituencies. Their main task is to receive opinions and requests from voters 
and bring them to MPs or local governments depending on the nature of the issues.
160
 
Voters come to see them or write letters to the offices of MPs in the district council 
offices. For example, there are large files of request letters from voters to Mohammed 
Dewji, MP for Singida Urban (CCM), in his office within the Singida Municipal Office. 
Some of the personal assistants are active CCM members at the local level. For example, 
Dewji’s personal assistant is the CCM Publicity Secretary in the Singida District and a 
cadre member of the party. He facilitates the relationship between Dewji and the CCM 
members as well as other stakeholders in his constituency.
161
 
 The interviews with MPs confirm that they receive all kinds of financial requests 
from voters, including donations to community projects, school fees, medical expenses, 
weddings and funerals. In addition to the financial requests, MPs are also asked for 
non-financial assistance such as legal advice on the family disputes over inheritance and 
becoming guarantors for people in police custody. Due to insufficient public service 
provided by central and local governments, MPs have become the first point of contacts 
                                                   
160
 Interview, Tondoro (2011). 
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for voters on any serious problem they face in their daily lives. There is no major 
difference between urban and rural areas in the kinds of requests made by voters.
162
 
 There seems to be a tendency that voters seek assistance from MPs for less 
urgent matters for their survival. For example, Said Mtanda claimed that he receives 
more requests to help with the payment of school fees than medical expenses because 
medical problems are often more urgent than education of children.
163
 People who have 
urgent medical problems are more likely to seek assistance from their relatives, 
neighbours or friends, rather than MPs. MPs tend to receive requests of support for 
special medical treatments, such as the operations for chronic diseases in hospitals in 
Dar es Salaam or abroad. 
 Some voters even take advantage of MPs and try to manipulate them. For 
example, two MPs from the NCCR-Mageuzi announced in November 2011 that they 
would not receive any telephone calls and text messages from voters because they had 
received fabricated requests from voters asking for assistance regarding rapes and 
killings in their constituencies. They asked voters to send letters to their offices instead 
of calling or texting them (Mwananchi 28 November 2011). 
 Most of the interviewed MPs think that voters’ requests for financial assistance 
have grown over the years, while some politicians consider that needs for assistance had 
always been there but they have become more expressive of the demands, partly 
because of the increasing knowledge of the assistance provided by MPs to voters in 
other constituencies.
164
 MPs claim that they receive more requests during election years 
than non-election years. What these accounts suggest is that while the relationship 
between MPs and voters in Tanzania seems to be characterised by a patron-client 
relationship based on the provision of financial assistance by MPs to voters, Tanzanian 
voters are not necessarily ignorant clients dependent on their patrons; but rather, they 
can be opportunistic and strategic in their interactions with MPs. 
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 Interviews, Ibrahim (2011), Mazala (2011) and Ngimba (2011). 
162
 Interviews, Mdee (2012) and Zungu (2012). 
163
 Interview, a CCM MP (2011). 
164
 Interviews, Mziray (2011) and Cheyo (2011). 
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6.2.3. Responses by MPs to Voters’ Requests: Sources of Funds and Types of 
Goods 
 
There is variation in the way in which MPs respond to voters’ requests. One interviewed 
MP contributes materials (e.g. cement, bricks) to community projects instead of giving 
people money to avoid the potential misuse of it. Another MP provides partial financial 
support to individual voters, usually half of the amount voters ask for, as a token of 
encouragement. Some MPs consider that openness to listen to voters and give them 
encouragement is important even if they cannot offer any tangible assistance.
165
 
In terms of the types of goods, some MPs provide private as well as club goods 
to assist both individuals and communities. Other MPs try to provide only club goods 
and avoid offering private goods except for urgent cases. This is partly because of the 
higher transaction costs incurred in the provision of private goods. Yet, the unit cost of 
club goods is higher than that of private goods, which makes it difficult for some MPs 
who do not have access to large amounts of funds to provide club goods. There is also a 
strategic dimension in the provision of private goods. The recipients of private goods 
may act as agents of MPs and can mobilise support during the election campaigns. 
Private goods are probably better to establish such individual networks than club goods. 
MPs also negotiate with local government officials and heads of schools and hospitals 
to provide assistance or to grant exemption of payments to certain voters. 
The common source of funds for constituency service by MPs is their salaries 
and allowances. The remuneration of MPs varies significantly across the countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa. For example, the monthly remuneration of Ghanaian MPs was 
US$2,760 in 2008. Kenyan MPs received US$13,090 every month between 2008 and 
2013 (Barkan and Matiangi 2009: 56; Lindberg and Zhou 2009: 167). The monthly 
remuneration of Tanzanian MPs has been Tsh7.3 million (approximately US$5,100) 
since 2010, as summarised in Table 6.1. 
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 Interviews, four MPs (2011, 2012). 
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Table 6.1  Monthly Remuneration of Tanzanian MPs since 2010 
 
Item Amount 
Salary Tsh2.3 million 
(approximately US$1,600
166
) 
Constituency allowance Tsh800,000 
(approximately US$600) 
Parliamentary allowance Tsh1 million 
(approximately US$700) 
Office allowance (a personal assistant, a driver, an 
office attendant, stationary and secretarial service) 
Tsh700,000  
(approximately US$500) 
Mileage allowance (fuel for a private car) Tsh2 million 
(approximately US$1,400) 
Telephone allowance Tsh500,000 
(approximately US$300) 
Total Tsh7.3 million 
(approximately US$5,100) 
Note: The net salary is Tsh1.6 million after income tax (30%) is deducted.
167
 The 
allowances are exempt from income tax. MPs who do not represent constituencies 
receive special allowance instead of constituency allowance. 
Sources: United Republic of Tanzania (2008d), Mwananchi (10 December 2011; 18 
January 2012) 
 
In addition, each MP receives Tsh70,000 (approximately US$45) as a daily sitting 
allowance during the parliamentary sessions. Apparently, there is no strict regulation for 
MPs to use the allowances for the given purposes; they can use them for supporting 
constituents or any other activities.
168
 
 In December 2011, an increase in the sitting allowance of MPs during 
parliamentary sessions, known as posho in Swahili, caught wide public attention. The 
suggested increase was from Tsh70,000 to Tsh200,000 consisting of Tsh80,000 as per 
diem and Tsh50,000 for transport (Mwananchi 10 December 2011; Mwananchi 18 
January 2012). Prime Minister Pinda defended the increase and stated that ‘MPs have a 
chain of responsibilities that requires them to spend colossal amounts of money, chief 
among them attending to the problems of their constituents’ (The Citizen 26 January 
2012). This comment supports the norm on the benefactor role of MPs that their 
remuneration should be shared with their constituents.
169
 
                                                   
166
 US$1 = Tsh1,432.3 (2010) (Bank of Tanzania 2013). 
167
 Interview, Sitta (2012). 
168
 Interview, a parliamentary official (2011). For example, January Makamba, MP for Bumbuli (CCM) 
mentioned in a television programme that he used the allowance for purchasing a car to buy computers 
for his company that supports the development of his constituency (Orijino Komedi 2012). 
169
 Interview, Anangwe (2011). Sitta made a point in the interview that the request should have been 
made for increasing the constituency allowance if it was meant to help MPs’ constituency service (2012). 
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 During the election campaigns, political parties support their candidates in the 
constituencies where the level of competition is high. Yet, there is no formal system for 
MPs to get financial assistance from their parties for constituency service between 
elections. On the contrary, parties sometimes ask MPs to make contributions to various 
party activities at local levels. Instead, as noted in Chapter 5, some MPs seek assistance 
in mobilising funds from party members who are senior and/or wealthy on an individual 
basis.
170
 
 Most of the MPs have other sources of funds, such as businesses of their own or 
their families. They are eligible for higher loans from private banks than other citizens. 
For example, the maximum amount MPs can borrow from the National Bank for 
Commerce, one of the commercial banks in Tanzania, during their five-year term is 
Tsh200 million, ten times more than ordinary citizens whose loans are up to Tsh20-30 
million.
171
 
Some MPs have established funding mechanisms to systematically provide 
assistance to their constituents rather than providing assistance to voters on an ad-hoc 
basis. For example, Nyalandu established scholarships to support 2,600 secondary 
school students and 50 university students and a funding mechanism for water projects 
in his constituency. Dewji also has scholarships for secondary school fees and supported 
2,000 students in 2010.
172
 He also established funds for medical expenses for special 
treatment and helped fifteen people in 2010 including an operation in India.
173
 Mary 
Michael Nagu, MP for Hanang (CCM) and Minister for the Prime Minister’s Office for 
Investment and Empowerment, set up a Ward Fund for Education which is funded by 
herself and adults in her constituency. Part of the CDCF was also allocated to the fund. 
 January Makamba, MP for Bumbuli (CCM) and Deputy Minister for 
Communication, Science and Technology, is one of the young rising politicians who 
takes an innovative approach to the development of his constituency (The Guardian 26 
August 2012). As a former personal assistant to President Kikwete, Makamba considers 
that the government alone cannot solve the existing social problems of Tanzania and 
private enterprises need to tackle them as well. Based on this view, he established the 
Bumbuli Development Corporation (BDC), a private company which specifically aims 
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 Interviews, CCM members (2011), Msekwa (2011) and Slaa (2011). 
171
 Interview, an informant (2012). 
172
 Interviews, Nyalandu (2011), Nagu (2011), Dewji (2011) and Mazala (2011). 
173
 Interviews, Ibrahim (2011) and Mazala (2011). 
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to promote economic growth and reduction of poverty in his Bumbuli constituency. 
Based on the baseline research undertaken by a consultant, the BDC formulated a 
development strategy of the constituency with a focus on three areas: microfinance, 
nutrition and education. The BDC is currently implementing a three-year pilot 
programme of cash on delivery for education through which secondary schools receive 
awards based on the performance of students in examinations. Makamba also utilises 
technology in communicating with the people in his constituencies. For example, he set 
up a computer programme that receives all the telephone messages sent from his 
constituents to several toll free numbers. The programme is monitored by the BDC staff 
and he can efficiently keep track of the problems facing his constituents through this 
programme (Bumbuli Development Corporation ; Orijino Komedi 2012).
174
 As such, 
MPs can be social entrepreneurs in accelerating constituency development. 
While establishing funding mechanisms for constituency service requires the 
ability to raise funds and manage them effectively to maximise their effects, there is an 
example of another kind of mechanism to systematise constituency service. Muhammad 
Sanya, MP for Mji Mkongwe in Zanzibar (CUF) established a development committee 
consisting of twelve members from different areas of his constituency and an accounts 
officer to keep record of all the voters’ requests and his responses to make his 
constituency service fair and transparent.
175
 Although his constituency is small and the 
nature of his relationship with voters may be different from a majority of MPs of 
Mainland, it is an interesting example of how the assistance provided to voters by MPs 
can be systematised. 
 There are a number of factors explaining the variation in the approaches taken 
by MPs to their constituency service such as their vision and personal background, 
particularly, the level of their exposure to the west and career orientations. Constituency 
service is fundamental for MPs to retain their seats in Parliament but not sufficient for 
them to further advance their positions in the government and their parties. Thus, MPs 
have incentives to reduce the transaction costs for constituency service so that they 
could allocate more time and energy to other activities that would directly contribute to 
advancing their political careers. 
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 Interview, Makamba (2011). 
175
 Interview, Sanya (2011). 
- 135 - 
 
6.2.4. The Significance of the CDCF to Constituency Service 
 
As there is wide variation in the amount MPs raise for their constituency service, the 
level of the significance of the introduction of the CDCF to MPs varies widely. Among 
several MPs interviewed in 2011, the ratio of the CDCF funds, their personal 
contribution to community projects and their personal contribution to individuals ranged 
from 30:1:2 to 1:10:15. Clearly, the CDCF is an important source of funds for 
constituency service for the MP who said the ratio was 30:1:2. The MP who answered 
1:10:15 may not represent typical MPs as he is a wealthy businessman. The ratios of 
other MPs fall between them (e.g. 1:2:2). Although the sample size is too small to 
generalise how important the CDCF is to MPs, these examples suggest that there is 
wide variation in the ratio of the CDCF to their entire financial contributions to the 
constituencies. It should also be noted that the level of significance of the CDCF to 
constituency service is contingent on the characteristics and skills of individual MPs, 
including their party affiliation and strategies for constituency development and 
elections. 
 
6.3. Public Views on MPs in Tanzania 
 
One of the core rationales for introducing a CDF in Tanzania was to relieve the 
fundraising burden on MPs to respond to the financial requests made by their 
constituents. As described in the previous section, MPs are indeed under constant 
pressure to meet the financial expectations of voters and some MPs have established 
mechanisms to raise and allocate funds for their constituents. This section examines the 
public views concerning MPs in Tanzania by analysing the Afrobarometer survey 
results. It explores how the public views have affected the constituency approaches 
taken by MPs and moreover, underpinned the rationale of ‘relieving the burden on MPs’ 
to adopt a CDF. The rest of the section consists of three analyses: 1) election incentives 
(takrima), 2) public expectations of the role of MPs and 3) public views on the 
performance of MPs. 
 
6.3.1. Election Incentives 
 
The first analysis is on the characteristics of voters who are likely to receive election 
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incentives, known as takrima as discussed in Chapter 5. Although legally prohibited, 
election incentives are one type of private goods used by politicians and political parties. 
In the Afrobarometer surveys in 2005 and 2012, the respondents were asked how often, 
if ever, a candidate or someone from a political party offered them something such as 
food, a gift or money in return for their votes in the 2000 and 2010 elections, 
respectively. As discussed in Chapter 5, takrima was legal between 2000 and 2006. A 
large majority of respondents did not experience any offers of election incentives 
(Figure 6.3). However, the ratio of the respondents who did increased by 7.1 percentage 
points from 6.3% in the 2000 elections (reported in the 2005 survey) to 13.3% in the 
2010 elections (reported in the 2012 survey). Thus, the legal changes made during the 
Kikwete’s first administration (2005–2010) (e.g. the illegalisation of takrima in 2006 
and the enactment of the Election Expenses Act in 2010) do not seem to have had an 
impact on curbing vote-buying practices in the country. 
 
Figure 6.3  Election Incentives Offered by a Candidate or Political Party 
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Source: Afrobarometer 
 
As the question was on an illegal vote-buying practice, there is a possibility of 
misreporting (Weghorst and Lindberg 2013: 7); some respondents might have tried to 
give what they perceived to be correct answers to the interviewers instead of their actual 
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experience. Although each respondent was told at the beginning that the surveys were 
conducted independently from the government or political parties,
176
 a number of 
respondents perceived that the surveys were conducted by the government. For example, 
in 2012, 65.6% of respondents considered that the interviewers were sent by the 
government, political parties or politicians.
177
 Indeed, these respondents were slightly 
less likely to report that they were offered election incentives than those who perceived 
that the survey was conducted by a non-governmental agency (Kendall’s tau-b = - 0.05, 
P = 0.01). This suggests a slight possibility of underreporting on their vote-buying 
experience. However, if the group of respondents who perceived that the surveys were 
conducted by the government, political parties or politicians are excluded, the ratio of 
the respondents who were offered election incentives increased more radically than the 
whole group of respondents by 11.9 percentage points from 3.9% in 2005 to 15.7% in 
2012. Thus, it is fair to interpret that the use of election incentives expanded over years 
or Tanzanians became more honest about their vote-buying experience, irrespective of 
their perception of the survey sponsor. 
 The next step is to explore who were more likely to be targeted by candidates or 
political parties to influence their votes by using incentives. To answer this question, 
binary logistic regression models were adapted from Kramon’s (2009) Afrobarometer 
Working Paper, which examines the effects of election incentives on the voter turnout 
in the 2002 elections in Kenya. The first model examines the demographic 
characteristics of the respondents, namely, gender, age and residential (urban or rural) 
areas. The second model tests the socio-economic background of respondents by 
creating: 1) a dummy variable from the question on the frequency of running out of cash 
income in the past twelve months; 2) a dummy variable from the question on the 
frequency of running out of food in the past twelve months; and 3) an interval variable 
on the level of education (see Appendix C for the list of variables and questions of the 
Afrobarometer used for the analysis). The variables on cash income and food represent 
two levels of economic condition of the respondents; the former demonstrates economic 
instability (i.e. those who went without cash income are economically unstable) and the 
latter indicates extreme poverty (i.e. those who went without food to eat are extremely 
                                                   
176
 The interviewers were trained to state the following sentences as part of the introduction of each 
interview: ‘I am from the Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA), an independent research 
organization. I do not represent the government or any political party’. 
177
 The question (Q100) is ‘Who do you think sent us to do this interview?’ See Appendix C for the 
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poor). It is expected that there are a number of Tanzanians who are economically 
unstable but not extremely poor. The hypotheses for the model on socio-economic 
conditions are that ‘[p]oorer voters may be more susceptible to vote-buying because 
even small transfers are valuable to them’ (Kramon 2009: 7) and less educated voters 
may also be more targeted by politicians or political parties due to their lack of 
understanding of the legal and ethical problems inherent in election incentives 
(Lindberg 2010: 134). 
 The third model examines the nature and level of political engagement of the 
respondents. Following Kramon’s (2009) approach, this model includes political 
parties; whether the respondents supported the CCM or opposition parties.
178
 The 
responses in the 2005, 2008 and 2012 surveys are compiled in Table 6.2 below.
 
As there 
is no question on election incentives in the 2008 survey, logistic regression was run only 
for the 2005 and 2012 surveys. 
 
Table 6.2  Public Support to Political Parties 
 
Parties 2005 2008 2012 
CCM 69.1% 71.4% 57.8% 
CUF 3.7% 4.6% 5.5% 
CHADEMA 1.3% 2.7% 17.0% 
One of the other parties 1.2% 1.1% 1.0% 
Did not choose 24.7 20.3% 18.7% 
Source: Afrobarometer 
 
 It is widely known that takrima was used mainly by CCM politicians in the 
elections in 2000 and 2005. Opposition parties were against the legalisation of 
takrima.
179
 If Cox and McCubbins’ (1986) argument that ‘private goods (like bribes or 
gifts) are more likely to be targeted toward core supporters’ (Kramon 2009: 13) is right, 
CCM supporters are expected to have been offered election incentives more often than 
opposition supporters. Alternatively, if Dixit and Londregan’s (1996) argument that 
politicians often target resources at swing voters is right, CCM politicians might have 
targeted at swing voters or even opposition supporters. 
 While Kramon (2009) examines only political parties, this analysis also included 
                                                                                                                                                     
options for the answers. 
178
 The respondents were asked, ‘Do you feel close to any particular political party?’ (Q89A); and if they 
said yes, they were asked, ‘Which party is that?’ (Q89A). 
179
 Interview, Wankanga (2011). 
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four variables on political engagement from the survey data with a speculation that the 
more politically engaged the respondents are, the more likely they are offered election 
incentives, because it is easier for candidates or political parties to approach politically 
active citizens to offer incentives and convince them. The first indicator of the level of 
political engagement is whether they voted in the elections. The voter turnout had 
generally been high in Tanzania, except in the last 2010 elections; it declined 
dramatically from 72.4% in 2005 to 42.8% in 2010 (Legal and Human Rights Centre 
and Tanzania Civil Society Consortium for Election Observation 2010: 103). Yet, 
80.5% of the respondents said that they voted in the 2010 elections in the 
Afrobarometer survey in 2012. As Table 6.4 shows below, it did not make a difference 
on whether they voted or not in the regression analysis on election incentives; thus, I did 
not examine the gaps in the voter turnout further between the official report and the 
Afrobarometer. 
 In the 2012 survey, there are three more variables relating to political 
engagement of voters: 1) attendance at a campaign meeting or rally in the elections; 2) 
persuasion of others to vote for a certain presidential or legislative candidate or party in 
the elections; and 3) work for a candidate or party in the elections. Seventy-two per cent 
of the respondents attended campaign meetings or rallies, 25% persuaded others to vote 
for a certain candidate or political party, and 14% worked for a candidate or a political 
party (see Appendix C for the details of the variables). The 2005 survey does not have 
these questions. 
 The level of electoral competition might also have influenced the use of election 
incentives. The more competitive the elections are, the more likely the voters are 
perceived as pivotal to winning the elections and have been offered election incentives 
(Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Kramon 2009: 8; Lindberg 2008). With the assumption 
that ‘voters can estimate how close an upcoming election might be’ (Kramon 2009: 8), 
the vote margins of the 2010 elections were calculated and added to the Afrobarometer 
dataset, and to the model on political engagement (see Appendix C for the calculations 
of vote margins).
180
 
 Table 6.3 and Table 6.4 show the results of logistic regression of the 2005 and 
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 As CCM’s dominant power in politics has not been challenged by any other parties in Tanzania 
Mainland since independence, the primaries of the CCM have often been more competitive than the 
general elections, and election incentives may have been used more often during the party primaries. 
However, due to the lack information on the party primaries, only the vote margins of the general 
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2012 surveys, respectively. As Model 3 on political engagement showed that opposition 
supporters were more likely to claim that they were offered election incentives than 
CCM supporters, two models (Model 4 and Model 6) were added to test which 
opposition supporters were more likely to be offered incentives by creating two dummy 
variables in 2012: CUF supporters and CHADEMA supporters. As presented in Table 
6.2 above, the sample size of opposition supporters in 2005 was too small to test this. 
 
Table 6.3  Logistic Regression Analysis of Election Incentives (2005) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Demographic Socio-economic
Political
engagement
All
Male 0.502* 0.416
(0.25) (0.29)
Age - 0.005 - 0.003
(0.01) (0.01)
Urban - 0.605+ - 0.513
(0.33) (0.38)
Gone without cash income - 0.069 - 0.263
(0.33) (0.36)
Gone without food 0.377 0.112
(0.25) (0.30)
Education 0.191 0.161
(0.22) (0.28)
CCM supporters - 1.142** - 1.238***
(0.35) (0.36)
Voted in the last elections 0.463 0.487
(0.42) (0.48)
Constant - 2.737*** - 3.209*** - 2.095*** - 2.257**
(0.38) (0.52) (0.47) (0.82)
N 1248 1267 962 935
Pseudo-R
2
0.0137 0.0047 0.022 0.0388
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1  
Dependent variable: Dichotomous measure of whether the respondent was offered an 
election incentive (e.g. food, gift, money) by a candidate or someone from a political 
party in the last elections (0 = No, 1 = Yes). 
Source: the author, based on Afrobarometer 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
elections were tested in this analysis. 
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Table 6.4  Logistic Regression Analysis of Election Incentives (2012)  
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Demographic Socio-economic
Political
engagement (CCM
suppoerters)
Political
engagement
(opposition
supporters)
All (CCM
supporters)
All (opposition
supporters)
Male 0.132 0.158 0.142
(0.12) (0.16) (0.16)
Age - 0.009+ - 0.015* - 0.014*
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Urban - 0.202 - 0.497** - 0.527**
(0.13) (0.19) (0.19)
Gone without cash income 0.487* 0.683* 0.656*
(0.24) (0.33) (0.33)
Gone without food 0.519*** 0.424* 0.433**
(0.13) (0.17) (0.17)
Education 0.048 0.006 -0.018
(0.11) (0.15) (0.15)
CCM supporters - 0.326* - 0.301+
(0.16) (0.17)
CUF supporters 0.015 0.024
(0.32) (0.32)
CHADEMA supporters 0.498** 0.503**
(0.18) (0.19)
Voted in the last elections 0.197 0.217 0.308 0.325
(0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25)
Attended a campaign rally 0.643** 0.639** 0.563* 0.554*
(0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
Persuade others 0.342+ 0.351+ 0.332+ 0.341+
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
Worked for a candidate/party 0.061 0.077 0.140 0.161
(0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
Vote margin <=80 0.007* 0.007* 0.008* 0.008*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant - 1.550*** - 2.711*** - 2.611*** - 2.981*** - 2.957*** - 3.257***
(0.18) (0.32) (0.30) (0.29) (0.58) (0.58)
N 2388 2388 1418 1418 1417 1417
Pseudo-R
2
0.0036 0.0145 0.0256 0.0288 0.0525 0.0559
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1  
Dependent variable: Dichotomous measure of whether the respondent was offered an election 
incentive (e.g. food, gift, money) by a candidate or someone from a political party in the last 
elections (0 = No, 1 = Yes). 
Source: the author, based on Afrobarometer 
 
As a majority of voters were not offered election incentives, the improvements in the 
correct classification of Model 4 (full model) in 2005 and Model 6 (full model) in 2012 
are less than 0.01 percentage points.
181
 In 2005, male voters in rural areas were more 
likely to say that they were offered election incentives in the 2000 elections (Model 1 of 
2005). A large majority (91.9%) of respondents who selected a party are CCM 
supporters and they were less likely to claim that they were offered election incentives 
(Model 4 of 2005). In 2012, poor CHADEMA supporters in rural areas who were 
                                                   
181
 The ‘improvement in correct classification’ demonstrates how much more accurately we can predict 
the result. It is a gap between the baseline prediction (%) and the model prediction (%). The more 
accurate we are in the first place (i.e. the baseline prediction is high), the harder it is to improve it (i.e. to 
get a high improvement in correct classification). In this case, as a majority of voters were not offered 
election incentives, the baseline prediction is high and it is hard to get a high level of improvement in 
correct classification. 
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actively involved in election campaigns (e.g. attending campaign rallies, persuading 
others to vote for certain candidates or parties) were slightly more likely to be offered 
incentives. Their youth and the level of electoral competition in the constituencies also 
show a significant but very weak relationship. The respondents who worked for 
candidates or parties did not make significant difference. 
 The results suggest that CHADEMA supporters in rural areas were slightly more 
likely to be targeted by candidates or parties than CCM or CUF supporters for buying 
votes in the 2010 elections. There is no information on which candidate or party offered 
incentives to them. If the incentives had been offered by CCM politicians, as Dixit and 
Londregan (1996) argue, the respondents who expressed their support to the 
CHADEMA in the survey might have been perceived by the CCM as swing voters, and 
the incentives were used by the CCM to convince them to vote for CCM candidates. If 
incentives had been offered by CHADEMA politicians to motivate their supporters to 
go to the polls, it supports Cox and McCubbins’ (1986) argument on the use of 
incentives for core supporters. 
 There is, however, a caveat on potential misreporting. CHADEMA supporters 
may have been more honest and open about their experience of election incentives than 
CCM or CUF supporters. With the assumption that voters are aware that vote-buying is 
a wrong practice, they are expected to be open about the vote-buying practice of the 
politicians or parties they oppose, but hide the practice of the politicians or parties they 
support in the surveys. There were incidents that CHADEMA supporters received 
money at CCM campaign rallies and used it for CHADEMA’s election campaigns.182 
These CHADEMA supporters are probably critical about the prevalence of vote-buying 
by the CCM and its candidates, and might have been more honest about their experience 
of being offered incentives by the CCM.
183
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 Interview, an informant (2010). 
183
 In the 2012 survey, there were two more questions on election incentives. One is the repetition of the 
above question with slightly different wordings (Q83B-TAN), and the other is the question on election 
incentives offered to neighbours of the respondents (Q83C-TAN). The respondents who said they were 
offered incentives increased by 3.4 percentage points from 13.3% to 16.7% when the question was asked 
for the second time, perhaps because some respondents became more open about their experience of 
election incentives at the later stage of the survey. On the questions on election incentives to neighbours, 
27.1% said that their neighbours were offered incentives during the 2010 elections. As expected, it is 
higher than the incentives offered to the respondents themselves. Model 5 and Model 6 of the 2012 
analysis were tested for election incentives to neighbours, and the results are similar to those of election 
incentives to respondents themselves, except urban-rural areas, food, CCM supporters and vote margins 
which became insignificant for the question on neighbours. Interestingly, CUF supporters were less likely 
to report that their neighbours were offered incentives (coefficient = - 0.81, p < 0.05), while CHADEMA 
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 To sum up, the Afrobarometer surveys show that the use of takrima was 
increased in the 2010 elections, and the practice occurred not only between CCM 
candidates and CCM supporters, but it also involved opposition supporters. 
 
6.3.2. Public Expectations of the Role of MPs 
 
Second, what kinds of expectations do Tanzanians have toward MPs? Do they expect 
MPs to provide programmatic, club or private goods? What determines their 
expectations? In the Afrobarometer survey in 2008, respondents were asked to select the 
most important responsibility of their MPs among the four core functions of MPs: 1) 
listen to constituents and represent their needs; 2) deliver jobs and development to 
people; 3) make laws for the good of the country; and 4) monitor the performance of 
president and his government.
184
 A majority of respondents consider that representation 
is the most important responsibility of MPs, which is followed by constituency service 
(Table 6.5). 
 
Table 6.5  Most Important Responsibility of MPs (Afrobarometer 2008) 
 
Responsibility (options) percentage 
Representation (listen to constituents and represent their needs) 66.7% 
Constituency service (deliver jobs and development to people)
 
 20.0% 
Lawmaking (make laws for the good of the country) 9.2% 
Oversight (monitor the performance of president and his 
government) 
3.3% 
None of these / Don’t know 0.9% 
Source: Afrobarometer 
 
A similar result was found in the Views of the People in 2012, when the respondents 
were asked about the main responsibility of MPs (Table 6.6). 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
supporters were more likely to report on incentives offered to neighbours. 
184
 There is a caveat in interpreting the second option as constituency service. Although this option in the 
original questionnaire in English is ‘Deliver jobs or development to your constituency’ (underline added 
by the author), it was translated to ‘Kuwapatia watu kazi na maendeleo (to deliver jobs and development 
to people)’ (underline added by the author) in the Swahili questionnaire, which made the option less 
specifically related to constituency service. 
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Table 6.6  Main Responsibility of MPs (Views of the People 2012) 
 
Responsibility (options) percentage 
Representation (represent the interests of constituents) 65% 
Constituency service (bring benefits to their constituencies)
 
 19% 
Lawmaking (passing laws) 8% 
Oversight (supervising government) 5% 
Source: Research on Poverty Alleviation (2012: 38) 
 
These results are in line with the existing literature on the expected roles of African 
MPs (Barkan 2009; Lindberg 2010). However, it is important to note that Tanzanians 
weigh more on representation than constituency service. 
 There are also two sets of questions on the public expectation of MPs in the 
Afrobarometer. The first set is to measure the public preference for service- or 
constituency-oriented MPs. In the 2008 survey, the respondents were asked whether 
they preferred to vote for ‘an MP with capacity to bring citizens good services’ or ‘an 
MP who will bring policies that benefit every citizen’. While there are some overlaps 
between the two options, the first option weighs more on the role of MPs in delivering 
tangible goods to citizens than the second option which highlights their role in 
delivering public goods through policymaking.
185
 The survey result shows that 65.1% 
of the respondents preferred service-oriented MPs (the first option) while 34.9% 
preferred policy-oriented MPs (the second option). 
There was a related question in the survey in 2012. Each respondent was asked 
to choose between ‘a candidate who can deliver goods and services to people in [his or 
her] constituency alone’ and ‘a candidate who can make policies that benefit everyone 
in [the] country’. The former option refers to constituency-oriented MPs who deliver 
club or private goods while the latter refers to policy-oriented MPs who deliver public 
goods. A large majority (85.9 %) of the respondents preferred policy-oriented MPs and 
only 14.1% preferred constituency-oriented MPs.
186
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 The wordings of this question are different between the questionnaires in English and Swahili. In the 
English questionnaire, the options are ‘a candidate who can deliver goods and services to people in this 
community’ and ‘a candidate who can make policies that benefit everyone in [the] country’. In the 
Swahili questionnaire, the first option is ‘mbunge mwenye uwezo wa kuwaletea wananchi huduma bora 
(an MP with capacity to bring citizens good services)’and the second option is ‘ambaye ataleta sera 
zitakazomnufaisha kila mwananchi (an MP who will bring policies that benefit every citizen)’. As such, 
there are no words referring to ‘this community’ in the first option in Swahili. 
186
 One potential explanation for the low rate of support to constituency-oriented MPs is the influence of 
a ‘leading question’ (Johnson 2001: 322). The first option in the original questionnaire in English was ‘a 
candidate who can deliver goods and services to people in [his or her] constituency’ (Afrobarometer 
2012: 44), but when it was translated to Swahili, the word ‘pekee (alone)’ was added after ‘constituency’. 
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It should be noted that the respondents who prefer service- or 
constituency-oriented MPs are not necessarily clientelistic voters. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, the clientelistic relationship is characterised by the provision of club or 
private goods by MPs to voters in exchange for their electoral support, while the 
programmatic relationship is characterised by public or club goods. While public and 
private goods are relatively easy to identify, there is a wide range of club goods which 
can serve for either clientelistic or programmatic exchanges. For example, if an MP 
makes a contribution to the rehabilitation of a bridge which benefits everyone in his or 
her constituency, the bridge can be considered as a club good, or even a public good. 
This type of constituency service is less clientelistic in comparison to the bridge which 
benefits a limited number of residents in the constituency. Thus, the questions on 
service- or constituency-oriented MPs in the Afrobarometer surveys are indicative of 
their tendency for clientelism, but should be considered with a caution. 
 There is also a set of questions on public views on favouritism of MPs in the 
Afrobarometer surveys in 2003, 2005, 2008 and 2012. The question wordings in the 
first three surveys are slightly different from those of the 2012 survey. In the first three 
surveys, Tanzanians were asked to choose between the following statements: 1) ‘[s]ince 
leaders represent everyone, they should not favour their own family or group’ and 2) 
‘[o]nce in office, leaders are obliged to help their home community’. In 2012, they were 
asked to choose between the following statements: 1) ‘[o]nce in office, elected leaders 
are obliged to help their home community or group first’ and 2) ‘[s]ince elected leaders 
should represent everyone, they should not do anything that favours their own group 
over others’. Technically, the question is not specifically about MPs but about (elected) 
leaders, which also include the President and District Councillors. Yet, as the public 
perception of MPs is probably similar to the results of these questions, this chapter 
treats them as a variable on the public preference of favouritism of MPs. In the first 
statement of the 2012 survey, the phrase ‘their own family or group’ was qualified with 
the word ‘first’, which makes the degree of favouritism stronger in 2012 than the 
surveys of previous years. 
 In comparison to the questions on the public preference for 
service/constituency-oriented MPs, this set of questions on favouritism of MPs is more 
                                                                                                                                                     
The word ‘alone’ sounds exclusive of MPs’ activities at national levels and the respondents might have 
avoided this option. Thus, the respondents who selected constituency-oriented MPs in the last survey 
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strongly associated with clientelism. The types of goods provided by MPs in this 
scenario are club or private goods like the previous question, yet these goods are 
exclusively targeted to certain groups of people, which are more likely to contribute to 
generating the senses of reciprocity among voters. 
 There are two potential limitations in understanding the public views on 
favouritism through these questions. First, it is about what MPs should do, which might 
have prompted the respondents to provide their normative views rather than their actual 
preferences in elections. Second, if respondents do not belong to the ‘home community 
or group’ of the MPs elected from their constituencies, it is natural for them to select 
MPs who serve for all the constituents equally, regardless of whether they prefer 
favouritism or not. 
 Table 6.7 and Table 6.8 below show the results of the questions on favouritism 
in Tanzania and several other countries in 2008 and 2012. The 2012 survey results are 
available only for three countries. The ratio of the respondents who supported 
favouritism of leaders declined in Kenya and Tanzania in 2012, perhaps because the 
favouritism option in 2012 became more rigid than in the past surveys due to the 
wording of ‘first’ as mentioned above, than in the past surveys. In particular, Tanzania 
shows the lowest ratio among the three countries. 
 
Table 6.7  Public Preference for Favouritism of Leaders (2008) 
 
Country Respondents who prefer favouritism of 
leaders (who selected Statement 2*) 
Kenya 32.4% 
Tanzania 36.0% 
Uganda 29.4% 
Zambia (2009) 40.6% 
Ghana 45.1% 
* Statement 1: Since leaders represent everyone, they should not favour their own 
family or group. Statement 2: Once in office, leaders are obliged to help their home 
community. 
Source: Afrobarometer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
have immensely parochial view about the role of MPs. 
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Table 6.8  Public Preference for Favouritism of Leaders (2012) 
 
Country Respondents who prefer favouritism of 
elected leaders (who selected Statement 1*) 
Kenya 24.6% 
Tanzania 16.4% 
Uganda 33.1% 
* Statement 1: Once in office, elected leaders are obliged to help their home community 
or group first. Statement 2: Since elected leaders should represent everyone, they should 
not do anything that favours their own group over others. 
Source: Afrobarometer 
 
 Like the questions on election incentives discussed earlier, the respondents who 
perceived that the survey was conducted by the government might have tried to give 
what they perceived as correct answers instead of their actual preferences. However, 
chi-square tests show that, in 2012, the respondents who perceived that the survey was 
conducted by the government were slightly more likely to prefer constituency-oriented 
MPs (Kendall’s tau-b = 0.10, P = 0.00) and favouritism of MPs (Kendall’s tau-b = 0.07, 
P = 0.00). Thus, there is no issue of misreporting on these two questions derived from 
their perception of the survey sponsor. 
 As a next step, the characteristics of the respondents who prefer service-oriented 
MPs in the 2008 survey, constituency-oriented MPs in the 2012 survey and favouritism 
of leaders in both surveys were analysed by logistic regression. The models for election 
incentives discussed above were employed in these analyses, and the variable on 
whether respondents made contacts with MPs during the past twelve months was added 
to the model on political engagement (see Appendix C for the questions on the contacts 
with MPs). For the 2012 analysis, the variable on vote margins was removed from the 
model on political engagement because it was specifically related to the question on 
election incentives. As the variable on CCM supporters was not significant in any of 
these analyses, the difference between CUF and CHADEMA supporters was not tested, 
either. The variable on election incentives was added with the speculation that those 
who were offered election incentives were more likely to be clientelistic and support 
constituency-oriented MPs and favouritism of leaders (Model 4). Table 6.9 and Table 
6.10 show the results of the regression analysis of the public preference for 
service-oriented MPs in 2008 and constituency-oriented MPs in 2012, respectively. 
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Table 6.9  Logistic Regression Analysis of Service-oriented MPs (2008) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Demographic Socio-economic
Political
engagement
All
Male - 0.060 - 0.077
(0.12) (0.14)
Age 0.003 0.004
(0.00) (0.01)
Urban 0.042 0.223
(0.14) (0.17)
Gone without cash income - 0.172 - 0.188
(0.18) (0.20)
Gone without food 0.111 0.146
(0.13) (0.15)
Education - 0.140 - 0.127
(0.11) (0.14)
CCM supporters - 0.140 - 0.124
(0.23) (0.23)
Voted in the last elections - 0.135 - 0.146
(0.19) (0.20)
Contacted the MP - 0.284 - 0.311+
(0.18) (0.18)
Constant 0.544** 0.969*** 0.890*** 1.038*
(0.18) (0.28) (0.27) (0.46)
N 1182 1190 952 936
Pseudo-R
2
0.0004 0.0019 0.0029 0.0074
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1  
Dependent variable: Dichotomous measure of whether the respondent prefers an MP 
who will bring policies that benefit every citizen or an MP with capacity to bring 
citizens good services (0 = policy, 1 = service). 
Source: the author, based on Afrobarometer 
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Table 6.10  Logistic Regression Analysis of Constituency-oriented MPs (2012) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Demographic Socio-economic
Political
engagement
Election incentives All
Male - 0.245* - 0.106
(0.12) (0.14)
Age 0.003 - 0.008
(0.00) (0.01)
Urban - 0.025 0.240
(0.13) (0.15)
Gone without cash income - 0.282 - 0.509*
(0.19) (0.21)
Gone without food 0.272* 0.202
(0.13) (0.15)
Education - 0.489*** - 0.489***
(0.11) (0.13)
CCM supporters 0.091 0.168
(0.15) (0.16)
Voted in the last elections 0.549** 0.617**
(0.21) (0.22)
Attended a campaign rally - 0.454** - 0.462**
(0.17) (0.17)
Persuaded others 0.192 0.196
(0.18) (0.18)
Worked for a candidate/party - 0.119 - 0.131
(0.21) (0.22)
Contacted the MP 1.081*** 0.904***
(0.14) (0.15)
Election incentives 1.154*** 0.972***
(0.14) (0.17)
Constant - 1.809*** - 0.814** - 2.377*** - 2.014*** - 1.077*
(0.18) (0.27) (0.23) (0.07) (0.43)
N 2378 2378 1927 2371 1919
Pseudo-R
2
0.0023 0.0153 0.0441 0.0314 0.0785
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1  
Dependent variable: Dichotomous measure of whether the respondent prefers a 
candidate who can bring benefits to the whole country or the constituency alone (0 = 
country, 1 = constituency alone). 
Source: the author, based on Afrobarometer 
 
In 2008, there is almost no improvement in correct classification of Model 4 
(less than 0.01 percentage points). Neither demographic nor socioeconomic conditions 
have a significant influence on the public preference on the types of MPs. Their party 
support did not matter, either. It only shows that the respondents who contacted MPs 
were less likely to prefer service-oriented MPs. 
As mentioned earlier, in 2012, a large majority of respondents (85.9%) preferred 
policy-oriented MPs and thus, there was only marginal improvement in correct 
classification for Model 5 (0.41 percentage points). With the caveat of the low level of 
improvement in prediction, Model 5 suggests that less educated voters who did not 
attend campaign rallies but were offered election incentives and voted in 2010 are more 
likely to prefer constituency-oriented MPs. They are more likely to have contacted MPs 
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after the elections. This result demonstrates that the political engagement of voters who 
prefer constituency-oriented MPs was limited to the direct and personal interactions 
with MPs. 
 Table 6.11 and Table 6.12 show the results for the public preference for 
favouritism of leaders in 2008 and 2012, respectively. 
 
Table 6.11  Logistic Regression Analysis of Favouritism of Leaders (2008) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Demographic Socio-economic
Political
engagement
All
Male - 0.020 - 0.077
(0.12) (0.14)
Age 0.000 0.004
(0.00) (0.01)
Urban - 0.034 0.067
(0.14) (0.17)
Gone without cash income - 0.153 - 0.210
(0.18) (0.20)
Gone without food 0.371** 0.493**
(0.13) (0.15)
Education - 0.031 0.231
(0.11) (0.14)
CCM supporters 0.202 0.120
(0.23) (0.23)
Voted in the last elections - 0.212 - 0.283
(0.19) (0.20)
Contacted the MP 0.571** 0.547**
(0.18) (0.18)
Constant - 0.581** - 0.597* - 0.674* - 1.221**
(0.18) (0.28) (0.27) (0.47)
N 1174 1182 944 929
Pseudo-R
2
0.0001 0.0056 0.0092 0.0197
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1  
Dependent variable: Dichotomous measure of whether the respondent thinks that, once 
in office, leaders are obliged to help their home community (0 = No, 1 = Yes). 
Source: the author, based on Afrobarometer 
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Table 6.12  Logistic Regression Analysis of Favouritism of Leaders (2012) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Demographic Socio-economic
Political
engagement
Election incentives All
Male - 0.129 - 0.132
(0.11) (0.13)
Age - 0.005 - 0.010+
(0.00) (0.01)
Urban - 0.146 - 0.001
(0.12) (0.15)
Gone without cash income 0.128 - 0.030
(0.19) (0.22)
Gone without food 0.272* 0.148
(0.12) (0.14)
Education - 0.241* - 0.320**
(0.10) (0.12)
CCM supporters - 0.025 0.024
(0.14) (0.15)
Voted in the last elections - 0.155 - 0.071
(0.17) (0.19)
Attended a campaign rally - 0.131 - 0.131
(0.16) (0.17)
Persuaded others 0.223 0.187
(0.17) (0.17)
Worked for a candidate/party 0.076 0.132
(0.20) (0.20)
Contacted the MP 1.062*** 0.868***
(0.13) (0.14)
Election incentives 1.240*** 1.034***
(0.13) (0.16)
Constant - 1.321*** - 1.453*** - 1.793*** - 1.863*** - 1.053*
(0.17) (0.27) (0.19) (0.06) (0.41)
N 2384 2384 1933 2376 1924
Pseudo-R
2
0.0024 0.0075 0.0417 0.0367 0.0756
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1  
Dependent variable: Dichotomous measure of whether the respondent thinks that 
elected leaders should help their home community or group first (0 = No, 1 = Yes). 
Source: the author, based on Afrobarometer 
 
The improvement in correct classification was again marginal with only 0.32 percentage 
points for Model 4 in 2008 and 0.57 percentage points for Model 5 in 2012. Not 
surprisingly, in 2008, extremely poor Tanzanians who contacted their MPs were slightly 
more likely to prefer favouritism of leaders. In 2012, the result is similar to that of 
public preference for constituency-oriented MPs. Less educated voters who contacted 
MPs and were offered election incentives were more likely to support favouritism of 
leaders. Gender, residential areas, economic status, political parties or political 
engagement, except contacting MPs, did not make a significant difference. 
 The results of the above two analyses suggest that while a large majority of 
Tanzanians expressed their preference for MPs who would treat everyone equally and 
did not have direct interactions with MPs, there are groups of voters who established 
direct personal relationships with MPs regardless of their party affiliation. MPs or 
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political parties were more likely to target them in using election incentives, and they 
were likely to seek assistance from MPs to solve their community or individual 
problems after the elections. This represents a typical clientelistic relationship between 
MPs and voters. 
 Finally, by combining the two sets of questions on service/constituency-oriented 
MPs and favouritism of leaders, the characteristics of programmatic voters were 
examined. Here, programmatic voters are defined as those who did not select either 
service/constituency-MPs or favouritism of leaders. Programmatic voters significantly 
increased from 21.5% in 2008 to 88.7% in 2012. Although the difference in these 
results cannot be taken at face value because the question wordings were different 
between the 2008 and 2012 surveys, it at least suggests that Tanzanians were 
increasingly in favour of programmatic MPs who were capable of contributing to 
national policymaking. The results of logistic regression are shown in Table 6.13 and 
Table 6.14 below. 
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Table 6.13  Logistic Regression Analysis of Programmatic Voters (2008) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Demographic Socio-economic
Political
engagement
All
Male 0.097 0.139
(0.15) (0.17)
Age - 0.006 - 0.012+
(0.01) (0.01)
Urban - 0.226 - 0.471*
(0.17) (0.21)
Gone without cash income 0.381+ 0.327
(0.21) (0.24)
Gone without food - 0.352* - 0.416*
(0.15) (0.17)
Education 0.147 - 0.071
(0.13) (0.17)
CCM supporters 0.213 0.262
(0.27) (0.28)
Voted in the last elections 0.214 0.338
(0.23) (0.24)
Contacted the MP - 0.143 - 0.096
(0.22) (0.22)
Constant - 1.047*** - 1.709*** - 1.605*** - 1.204*
(0.21) (0.34) (0.32) (0.55)
N 1166 1173 938 923
Pseudo-R
2
0.0029 0.0071 0.0019 0.0186
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1  
Dependent variable: Dichotomous measure of whether the respondent prefer 
programmatic MPs: those who did not prefer either community-oriented MPs or 
favouritism of leaders (0 = No, 1 = Yes). 
Source: the author, based on Afrobarometer 
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Table 6.14  Logistic Regression Analysis of Programmatic Voters (2012) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Demographic Socio-economic
Political
engagement
Election incentives All
Male 0.195* 0.166
(0.10) (0.12)
Age 0.001 0.008+
(0.00) (0.00)
Urban 0.032 - 0.145
(0.10) (0.13)
Gone without cash income - 0.008 0.170
(0.16) (0.18)
Gone without food - 0.085 0.032
(0.10) (0.12)
Education 0.333*** 0.354***
(0.09) (0.11)
CCM supporters - 0.028 - 0.081
(0.12) (0.13)
Voted in the last elections - 0.095 - 0.167
(0.16) (0.17)
Attended a campaign rally 0.317* 0.296*
(0.14) (0.14)
Persuaded others - 0.137 - 0.107
(0.15) (0.15)
Worked for a candidate/party - 0.025 - 0.057
(0.18) (0.18)
Contacted the MP - 0.909*** - 0.729***
(0.12) (0.13)
Election incentives - 1.226*** - 1.098***
(0.13) (0.15)
Constant 1.007*** 0.593** 1.322*** 1.366*** 0.401
(0.15) (0.23) (0.17) (0.05) (0.36)
N 2368 2368 1920 2361 1912
Pseudo-R
2
0.0018 0.0069 0.0300 0.0351 0.0636
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1  
Dependent variable: Dichotomous measure of whether the respondent prefer 
programmatic MPs: those who did not prefer either constituency-oriented MPs or 
favouritism of elected leaders (0 = No, 1 = Yes). 
Source: the author, based on Afrobarometer 
 
 In 2008, there is almost no improvement of correct classification for Model 4 in 
2008 (less than 0.01 percentage points) and unsurprisingly, extremely poor Tanzanians 
in urban areas were less likely to be programmatic voters. In 2012, the improvement in 
correct classification for Model 5 is better than 2008 with 1.93 percentage points. The 
results confirm some key aspects of the earlier analyses on constituency-oriented MPs 
and favouritism; educated voters who attended campaign rallies were more likely to be 
programmatic voters. They were also less likely to have been offered election incentives 
in the 2010 elections or to have contacted MPs after the elections. 
 
6.3.3. Public Views on the Performance of MPs 
 
While the analyses so far demonstrate that there are clientelistic voters who are more 
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likely to have dyadic interactions with MPs and are prone to vote-buying practice, how 
do voters evaluate the performance of MPs in Tanzania? Do the types of goods offered 
by MPs matter to their assessment of the performance of MPs? In the 2005, 2008 and 
2012 surveys, the respondents were asked whether they approved or disapproved of the 
performance of MPs over the past twelve months (Figure 6.4). The results show that 
Tanzanians became increasingly dissatisfied with the performance of MPs, as the 
disapproval rate increased by 8.7 percentage points from 29.2% in 2005 to 38.0% in 
2012. 
 
Figure 6.4  Public Views on the Performance of MPs 
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Source: Afrobarometer 
 
While the participation to the parliamentary debates is an essential task of MPs to 
represent their constituencies, to make policies by crafting laws and to oversee the 
executive, African legislatures had been ineffective institutions in policymaking for a 
long time, as discussed in Chapter 4. Against this background, Twaweza, a Tanzanian 
civil society advocacy initiative, published the ranking of how actively MPs participated 
in Bunge by comparing the number of interventions they made in the Ninth Parliament 
(2005–2010) (Twaweza 2010b: 7–14). The interventions include basic questions, 
supplementary questions and contributions by MPs. Although this does not explain the 
quality or effectiveness of the interventions, the ranking can be treated as a proxy of the 
level of engagement of MPs with Parliament, or their programmatic roles. Based on the 
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ranking and 2010 election results, Twaweza (2010c) argues that backbenchers who 
were re-elected in 2010 were generally more active in Parliament than those who were 
not, as the average number of interventions made by re-elected MPs was 92, while that 
by non-returning MPs was 81 (4). This finding indicates that the more active MPs are in 
Parliament, the more likely their performance would be approved by their voters. 
With the assumption that voters have some ideas about how their MPs are 
engaged with Parliament through the media, meetings with MPs or word of mouth, I 
added the Twaweza’s intervention ranking to the Afrobatomer dataset to test if the level 
of engagement of MPs with Parliament affected the public views on the performance of 
MPs (Twaweza 2010b). Since ministers and deputy ministers represent the government 
and participate in Parliament differently from backbenchers, the respondents whose 
representatives were cabinet members between 2005 and 2010 were removed from the 
analysis (see Appendix C for the scatterplot of the MPs’ interventions in Parliament and 
the public assessment of the performance of MPs). 
 To analyse the factors determining the public views on the performance of MPs, 
logistic regression was run for the 2005, 2008 and 2012 survey data, by applying the 
models used for the previous questions on the public expectations of the roles of MPs. 
As discussed above, the interventions by MPs in Parliament can be considered as their 
efforts in producing public goods, while election incentives is one (extreme) type of 
private goods. While MPs’ interventions in Parliament and election incentives are only 
two examples of the goods provided by MPs to voters, they were added to the 
regression analysis as one model (Model 4) to examine the types of goods in 2012. The 
public preference for service/constituency-oriented MPs and favouritism of leaders were 
also added as a model on the expected roles of MPs. The results are presented in Tables 
6.15, 6.16 and 6.17 below. 
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Table 6.15  Logistic Regression Analysis of the Performance of MPs (2005) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Demographic Socio-economic
Political
engagement
Types of goods
Expected roles of
MPs
All
Male - 0.410** - 0.265
(0.13) (0.17)
Age 0.001 - 0.016*
(0.00) (0.01)
Urban 0.296+ 0.683**
(0.16) (0.21)
Gone without cash income - 0.082 0.024
(0.18) (0.23)
Gone without food - 0.211 - 0.105
(0.13) (0.17)
Education - 0.422*** - 0.607***
(0.12) (0.17)
CCM supporters 0.794** 0.861**
(0.25) (0.27)
Voted in the last elections - 0.094 0.035
(0.20) (0.25)
Contacted the MP 0.763*** 0.811***
(0.21) (0.23)
Election incentives - 0.747** - 0.933**
(0.24) (0.31)
Favouritism of leaders - 0.006 - 0.096
(0.17) (0.20)
Constant 1.015*** 1.834*** 0.164 0.925*** 0.865*** 1.832***
(0.20) (0.29) (0.28) (0.07) (0.07) (0.53)
N 1210 1230 945 1213 1167 853
Pseudo-R
2
0.0094 0.0096 0.0221 0.0066 0.0000 0.0624
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1  
Dependent variable: Dichotomous measure of whether the respondent approved or 
disapproved of the performance of their MPs over the past twelve months (Disapprove 
= 0, Approve = 1). 
Source: the author, based on Afrobarometer 
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Table 6.16  Logistic Regression Analysis of the Performance of MPs (2008) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Demographic Socio-economic
Political
engagement
Expected roles of
MPs
All
Male - 0.259* - 0.177
(0.13) (0.15)
Age 0.005 - 0.005
(0.00) (0.01)
Urban - 0.266+ - 0.184
(0.14) (0.17)
Gone without cash income - 0.126 - 0.212
(0.18) (0.21)
Gone without food - 0.237+ - 0.185
(0.13) (0.16)
Education - 0.190 - 0.273+
(0.12) (0.15)
CCM supporters 0.348 0.336
(0.22) (0.23)
Voted in the last elections - 0.149 - 0.033
(0.20) (0.22)
Contacted the MP 1.128*** 1.192***
(0.24) (0.25)
- 0.224+ - 0.022
(0.13) (0.15)
Favouritism of MPs 0.391** 0.302+
(0.13) (0.16)
Constant 0.659*** 1.266*** 0.423 0.691*** 1.339**
(0.18) (0.29) (0.27) (0.12) (0.50)
N 1171 1178 946 1156 910
Pseudo-R
2
0.0056 0.0043 0.0246 0.0082 0.0369
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1
Service-oriented MPs
 
Dependent variable: Dichotomous measure of whether the respondent approved or 
disapproved of the performance of their MPs over the past twelve months (Disapprove 
= 0, Approve = 1). 
Source: the author, based on Afrobarometer 
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Table 6.17  Logistic Regression Analysis of the Performance of MPs (2012) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Demographic Socio-economic
Political
engagement
Types of goods
Expected roles of
MPs
All
Male - 0.325*** - 0.301*
(0.09) (0.13)
Age 0.010** 0.006
(0.00) (0.01)
Urban - 0.151+ 0.166
(0.09) (0.14)
Gone without cash income 0.034 0.082
(0.13) (0.20)
Gone without food - 0.069 0.113
(0.09) (0.13)
Education - 0.117 - 0.025
(0.07) (0.12)
CCM supporters 0.750*** 0.736***
(0.10) (0.14)
Voted in the last elections - 0.007 -0.066
(0.14) (0.18)
Attended a campaign rally - 0.194 - 0.000
(0.12) (0.16)
Persuade others - 0.454*** - 0.350*
(0.13) (0.17)
Worked for a candidate/party 0.032 0.038
(0.16) (0.21)
Contacted the MP - 0.339** - 0.147
(0.11) (0.16)
0.001 0.001
(0.00) (0.00)
Election incentives - 0.868*** - 0.600**
(0.16) (0.19)
- 0.452*** - 0.465*
(0.13) (0.20)
Favouritism of leaders - 0.501*** - 0.339+
(0.12) (0.18)
Constant 0.327* 0.721*** 0.420** 0.519*** 0.640*** 0.107
(0.13) (0.20) (0.15) (0.10) (0.05) (0.41)
N 2380 2380 1931 1477 2357 1179
Pseudo-R
2
0.0074 0.0009 0.0348 0.0163 0.0143 0.0572
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1
MPs' interventions in Parliament (except
cabinet members)
Constitueny-oriented MPs
 
Dependent variable: Dichotomous measure of whether the respondent approved or 
disapproved of the performance of their MPs over the past twelve months (Disapprove 
= 0, Approve = 1). 
Source: the author, based on Afrobarometer 
 
As for the 2005 and 2008 results, improvements in correct classification were 
1.28 percentage points (Model 6) in 2005 and 0.66 percentage points (Model 5) in 2008, 
respectively. In 2005, female voters in urban areas and less educated voters were more 
likely to approve the performance of MPs (Models 1 and 2). While CCM supporters 
who contacted MPs were more likely to approve their performance (Model 3), those 
who were offered election incentives during the 2000 elections were less likely to 
approve it (Model 4). Their preference for favouritism of leaders did not have 
significant influence (Model 5). 
In 2008, female voters in rural areas were more likely to approve the 
performance of MPs (Model 1), while extremely poor voters were more likely to 
disapprove of it (Model 2). Similar to the 2005 survey, voters who contacted MPs were 
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more likely to approve their performance, while voters’ party preference did not have 
significant difference (Model 3). The result also shows an interesting combination of the 
public expectation; voters who expected MPs to contribute to  national policymaking 
but also to favour their home communities were more likely to approve the performance 
of MPs (Model 4). Less educated voters who contacted MPs and preferred favouritism 
were slightly more likely to approve the performance of MPs (Model 5). 
 In 2012, Model 6 shows a higher level of improvement in correct classification 
than the previous years with 3.82 percentage points. Again, the results suggest that 
female CCM supporters were more likely to approve the performance of MPs (Model 5). 
Those who persuaded others to vote for certain candidates or political parties were more 
likely to disapprove of the performance (Models 3 and 6). This implies that they might 
have supported the candidates who lost the election in 2010. Similar to the 2005 results, 
the respondents who were offered election incentives were more likely to disapprove of 
the performance of MPs. However, in contrast to the 2008 results, the respondents who 
supported constituency-oriented MPs and favouritism were more likely to disapprove of 
the performance of MPs. These results explain why MPs feel pressure to serve for their 
constituencies, as the clientelistic voters who were not satisfied with the performance of 
MPs may persuade others not to vote for them. 
 Despite the high public expectation of programmatic MPs in the country, the 
level of MPs’ engagement with Parliament did not affect the public views of the 
performance of MPs in 2012. This poses a question on the earlier assumption that voters 
have some ideas about how their representatives are engaged with Parliament. They 
may not have access to the information on parliamentary debates or may not be 
interested in them. At least, it suggests that this is not what voters really care about. 
Two findings can be drawn from these analyses. First, as the 2005 and 2012 
survey results show, the provision of private goods in the form of election incentives did 
not particularly help MPs gain long-term support from voters in Tanzania. It illustrates 
the negative effects takrima might have had on the public views of MPs; takrima may 
have helped some MPs win elections, but it made voters become more critical of the 
performance of MPs after the elections. 
 Second, as Model 4 of 2008 shows, during the time when a CDF was discussed 
in Parliament, clientelistic voters who preferred favouritism were more likely to be 
satisfied with the performance of MPs. It implies that MPs were meeting the 
expectations of clientelistic voters. Why was a CDF needed to be adopted while 
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clientelistic voters were still satisfied with MPs’ performance? One possible explanation 
is that, as Model 4 of 2008 demonstrates, voters who expected MPs to bring good 
services to citizens were more likely to be dissatisfied with their performance. In other 
words, MPs managed to satisfy only their home communities and not wider groups of 
voters in their constituencies. When it came to the elections, MPs needed to gain 
support not only from their home communities but from the whole constituencies. The 
Tanzanian CDF which was designed to deliver development projects across the 
constituencies widely fitted well with such need of MPs to provide goods to the whole 
constituencies. 
 In 2012, there was a small group of clientelistic voters who preferred 
constituency-oriented MPs and supported favouritism. They were more likely to have 
been targeted for vote-buying in the 2010 elections and to have sought assistance from 
MPs to solve their individual or community problems after the elections. However, due 
to their high expectation of MPs to deliver locally, they became less satisfied with the 
performance of MPs than non-clientelistic voters. This implies that it became difficult 
for MPs to keep their clientelistic supporters satisfied after the elections. As Lindberg 
(2010) argues, clientelism is costly and an unsustainable tool to establish long-term 
electoral support. Weitz-Shapiro (2012) argues that ‘clientelism decreases support from 
non-poor constituents even while it generates votes from among the poor’, but this 
result suggests that the support from the beneficiaries of clientelism also diminishes in 
the long run. As a Tanzanian MP described, voters easily forget what they have done for 
them.
189
 
 This result also supports the finding from the interviews with MPs in the 
previous section that some MPs, particularly those who were capable and aspired to 
advance their political careers, started to opt out of clientelism based on the provision of 
tangible goods on an ad-hoc basis. Perhaps, by recognising the negative effects of 
clientelistic behaviours such as favouritism and election incentives on their long-term 
reputations, some MPs started to focus on providing club goods in more systematic 
ways and tried to change the public views on the kinds of benefactor role they are 
playing. However, as demonstrated by the evidence of the increasing use of election 
incentives in elections in 2010, it should be noted that opting out of clientelism is not a 
consistent trend; MPs’ approaches to their constituencies vary across MPs and change 
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 Interview, an MP (2011). 
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along the election cycles. 
 
6.4. Conclusion 
 
Building on the previous chapters that examined legislative development and changing 
electoral strategies of CCM at the national level, this chapter examined the relationships 
between voters and MPs at constituency levels to understand one of the main reasons 
for adopting a CDF: to relieve the fundraising burden on MPs for their constituency 
service. This chapter presented that while Tanzanian MPs receive all sorts of financial 
requests by voters, there is some variation in the way in which they handle these 
requests, and some MPs started to provide club goods in more systematic ways rather 
than giving private goods on an ad-hoc basis to reduce their transaction costs, while 
maintaining their reputation in constituency service.  
This suggests their attempts to shift away from the conventional clientelism 
based on dyadic interactions with voters. The Afrobarometer surveys underscore this 
point. First, the last survey results in 2012 suggest that a majority of Tanzanians prefer 
MPs who can contribute to the whole country rather than only serving their 
constituencies, while there are a limited number of clientelistic voters who expect MPs 
to bring benefits to their constituencies. At the same time, it is increasingly difficult for 
MPs to continue to satisfy these clientelistic voters who had high expectations of MPs 
to favour their communities or themselves. This implies that clientelism is an 
unsustainable mode of relationship to establish wider long-term electoral support in the 
country. Against this background, a CDF fits into the needs of MPs as it is designed to 
serve wider groups of their constituents. 
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Chapter 7  Conclusion 
 
This research started with a question as to why Tanzania’s dominant ruling party, the 
CCM, adopted a CDF in 2009 despite the fact that it had not faced any threat of losing 
its power in Tanzania Mainland. Deriving from this question, this thesis was aimed at 
answering two questions. First, were there any changes in dominant party politics in 
Tanzania that explain the adoption of a CDF in 2009? Second, how does the 
introduction of a CDF affect the nature of electoral politics and accountability in the 
country, in particular the accountability relationship between MPs and voters? This 
chapter summarises the findings of this research to answer the first question and 
examines the design of the Tanzanian CDF in relation to the concept of clientelism to 
provide a partial answer to the second. The CDF was still a new mechanism in Tanzania 
when this research was undertaken and the nature of the fund and its implication to the 
MP-voter relationships in Tanzania could not be fully examined. As the discussion in 
this chapter to answer the second question is mainly based on the analysis of the design 
of the CDCF, and not on the actual practice, it is rather speculative. Nonetheless, 
drawing on the critical review of the concept of clientelism in Chapter 1, the discussion 
presents an example of how to assess whether a particular type of CDF is an instrument 
of clientelism. 
 
7.1. Why Did the CCM Adopt a CDF in 2009? 
 
As a first step, the thesis explored the interactions between CDFs and politics in seven 
countries in Asia and Africa to understand the similarities and differences across these 
countries based on the existing literature and other secondary sources (Chapter 2). This 
comparative analysis also situated the Tanzanian case in the global context to set the 
stage for the case study of the country. The thesis developed four patterns of CDF 
politics by identifying two major dimensions: 1) the power balance between the 
executive and the legislature (whether the introduction of a CDF strengthens the power 
of the executive led by the ruling party or the power of MPs) and 2) regime change 
(whether a CDF is introduced by new leaders following a regime change or not). 
Among the seven countries, India and Tanzania are the cases in which CDFs were 
adopted by the long-serving ruling parties without major regime changes that were 
designed to enhance the power of legislatures. These two countries exemplify a pattern 
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of alleviating the risk of losing support from MPs to the executive. There is, however, a 
difference between the two countries; when CDFs were adopted, India’s Congress was 
leading a minority government, while Tanzania’s CCM was holding a large majority of 
parliamentary seats. Apparently, the Indian CDF was for the Congress to support its 
MPs who feared losing access to patronage due to the growing influence of opposition 
MPs, yet it was unclear why the CCM adopted a CDF to strengthen the financial 
autonomy of MPs. Applying the logic of the Indian case, there might have been a need 
for the CCM to show support to its MPs and prevent a loss of its dominant power in 
politics. 
With this speculation in mind, the thesis examined the political background of 
the establishment of a CDF in Tanzania. First, it analysed the policy process in which a 
CDF was proposed, accepted and formulated in the country with a focus on various 
actors involved in the process in Chapter 3. The rationales for these actors to support or 
oppose the establishment of a CDF demonstrate the competing norms of the roles of 
MPs in Tanzania. Among the four rationales for the introduction of a CDF which were 
identified based on the interviews with Tanzanian MPs, two of them seem to be the 
primary explanations for the adoption of the fund. One was to level the electoral playing 
field and prevent the collusion between MPs and the private sector. The other was to 
relieve the fundraising burden on MPs and recalibrate the financial power balance 
between MPs and presidential appointees at the local levels. 
Chapter 3 also highlighted that the introduction of a CDF exemplifies a policy 
process largely led by domestic actors in Tanzania rather than donors who were 
considered to have substantial influence in the policymaking of the country. It also 
underscored that after the deliberation of the design of the CDF, the power of MPs in 
the management of the fund was restricted by law; MPs were not entitled to appoint the 
members of the project-selection committees or disburse the funds to projects. Council 
Directors and other local government officials have the authority to do so. Thus, the 
assumption of the initial research question that the Tanzanian CDF would give the 
financial power to MPs needed to be corrected; the introduction of a CDF gave financial 
power to MPs but with some restrictions. Given the strong CCM networks established 
within local governments, this arrangement gives a certain level of control of the fund to 
the CCM. Figure 7.1 shows again the patterns of CDF politics in which Tanzania is 
relocated to reflect its operational arrangement. 
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Figure 7.1  Patterns of CDF Politics of Selected Countries in Asia and Africa 
(with the Modification of Tanzania) 
 
Source: the author 
 
The thesis further analysed the two dimensions that affected the introduction of 
a CDF in Tanzania, legislative development and electoral politics, to explain why the 
CCM government adopted it in 2009 (Chapter 4 and Chapter 5). First, the thesis 
highlighted that the introduction of a CDF was a pillar of the reform to strengthen the 
legislature which was initiated and moved forward by the Speaker of Parliament and 
reformer MPs from the CCM and opposition parties. This reform was made possible 
partly due to the weakening of the control by the CCM over its members and the 
leadership style of President Kikwete who is more open to reforms and the initiatives 
taken by MPs than his predecessor. As the CDF would benefit all MPs regardless of 
their abilities in lawmaking and oversight, it may also have encouraged a majority of 
MPs to lend their support to the overall reform. 
The thesis also explored electoral politics of the country to explain why the 
CCM accepted a CDF. Specifically, it examined three sequential phenomena in 
electoral politics: 1) the growing benefactor role of MPs after the transition to a 
multiparty system in 1992; 2) the legalisation and illegalisation of takrima between 
2000 and 2006; and 3) an intraparty competition within the CCM which was intensified 
by the revelation of corruption scandals involving its senior members starting in 2007. 
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The revelation of corruption allegations involving cabinet ministers and senior CCM 
members and the parliamentary investigation into them enhanced public awareness of 
the privileges enjoyed by CCM leaders and the large amounts of money used by the 
party for election campaigns. As CCM MPs started to criticise the Kikwete government 
openly and the tension between the executive and the legislature escalated due to the 
corruption scandals and intensified factional politics with the party, the adoption of a 
CDF served as a gesture of the executive to show its support to MPs, regain their trust 
and re-establish party coherence in preparation for the elections in 2010. The 
introduction of a CDF was a symbolic rather than substantial policy decision; it was not 
aimed at substantially changing the power balance between the legislature and the 
executive, as the scale of the CDF budget was set at a low level and it had its own 
project-selection and monitoring mechanism so that the power of MPs was limited. 
The thesis finally analysed the relationship between MPs and voters at the 
constituency level to identify the underlying reason for the adoption of a CDF in the 
country (Chapter 6). The analysis of the Afrobarometer survey results found that while 
a majority of Tanzanians have expectations of MPs to serve for the country rather than 
serving only for their constituencies, clientelistic voters who expect MPs to help their 
home communities were increasingly dissatisfied with the performance of MPs after the 
elections in 2010. The interviews with MPs also found that some MPs had established 
mechanisms such as NGOs, scholarships and a committee system to play their 
benefactor role in systematic ways rather than on an ad-hoc basis. These trends 
underpin MPs’ need for a CDF that would enable them to provide tangible goods to 
wider groups of voters in systematic ways and save their time for other activities to 
advance their political careers while maintaining their reputation in their constituencies. 
 
7.2. Is the CDCF an Instrument of Clientelism? 
 
With the above understanding of why a CDF was introduced in Tanzania in 2009, this 
chapter returns to the broader question on CDFs and clientelism; is the Tanzanian CDF 
an instrument of clientelism?  
As discussed in Chapter 1, CDFs in general are a funding mechanism that 
enables MPs to allocate national public resources mainly in the form of club goods to 
their constituents. In contrast to public or private goods, club goods are ambiguous 
about whether they contribute to programmatic or clientelistic relationships between 
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MPs and voters. In terms of the mode of the allocation of the goods to voters, CDFs 
entail a combination of both programmatic and non-programmatic distributions, as 
discussed in Chapter 1; CDFs generally have public and binding rules in the allocation 
of the budget to constituencies (i.e. the information on the amounts allocated to 
constituencies is public and the set amounts are actually allocated), while there are no 
public rules in the allocation of the funds to the projects (i.e. projects are selected by 
MPs and other government officials and there are no criteria that are known to the 
public). While these are the generic feature of CDFs, there is variation in the way in 
which CDFs are operated and affect politics across the countries in reality. For example, 
the Philippine CDF can be considered an example of non-programmatic distribution, as 
the President controls the release of the CDF funds and thus, a binding rule is missing in 
the distribution of the budget to the constituency level. Therefore, it is difficult to 
discuss generally whether CDFs are an instrument of clientelism. 
Given the ambiguity in the types of goods and rules as well as the variations in 
CDFs, this chapter goes back to the three core elements of clientelism, namely, 
inequality, dyadic (two-person) interactions and reciprocity, and examines the CDCF in 
Tanzania. First, there is a less unequal relationship between MPs and voters in the 
CDCF than in other forms of the provision of club or private goods because, as 
discussed above, the power of MPs over the funds is restricted by a formal 
project-selection and monitoring mechanism. This mechanism is not as strict as the 
public and binding rules on the criteria for the distribution of resources, yet it makes the 
CDCF a more transparent form of constituency service and voters can potentially make 
MPs more answerable on the use of the CDCF than other types of distribution of 
resources by MPs. 
Second, the interaction between MPs and voters in the implementation of the 
CDCF is designed to be less dyadic than other forms of the provision of club or private 
goods. The projects are collectively selected by the CDC committee members and the 
implementation of the projects involves a number of people. Although the CDCF Act 
stipulates that the funds should be used for community-oriented development projects, 
the CDCF funds have been used to provide private goods such as scholarships to poor 
families in some constituencies. Yet, even in this case, they would be less dyadic as 
long as the scholarships are granted widely to a number of students with certain criteria. 
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The recipients of scholarships consider that they have been awarded the funds because 
they met the criteria, not because of the favours of MPs.
190
 
Finally, the reciprocal relationship between MPs and voters generated by the 
CDCF does not seem to be strong either. This is because, in the CDCF, the fixed 
amounts of public funds are automatically allocated to all the constituencies regardless 
of the performance of individual MPs. Voters may not feel benefit from incumbent MPs 
in the CDCF as much as when MPs voluntarily use their personal funds or raise funds 
from the government or other sources to offer them assistance. Voters may even 
consider that it is one type of public service provided by the government rather than a 
constituency service by MPs. Thus, voters are less likely to feel the obligation to 
reciprocate to MPs in elections. 
Since the three basic elements of clientelism are not strong in the CDCF in 
comparison with other forms of the provision of club or private goods by MPs to voters, 
the CDCF can be considered as a less clientelistic form of constituency service by 
design. This does not mean that all MPs and other actors involved in the operation of 
the funds follow the rules in practice. Yet, at least the CDCF is designed in the way that 
the allocation of funds will not be controlled solely by MPs but it will be managed 
collectively by MPs, local government officials and District Councillors. 
In summary, while there is wide variation in the design and operation of CDFs, 
the fund in Tanzania is by design a less clientelistic form of constituency service than 
other forms of the provision of tangible goods by MPs to voters. This is because there 
are public and binding rules in the allocation of the CDCF funds to constituencies and 
there is a formal project-selection and monitoring mechanism at the constituency level. 
This arrangement potentially makes the relationship between MPs and voters less 
unequal, less dyadic and less reciprocal, thus generating a less clientelistic relationship 
between the two. This interpretation of the CDCF conforms to and further elaborates 
Lindberg’s (2010) and Piattoni’s (2001) view that constituency service is different from 
clientelism. This thesis views constituency service as one of the core functions of MPs 
and does not argue that all the kinds of constituency service by MPs are non-clientelistic, 
yet it argues that there is a form of constituency service which is less clientelistic and 
the CDCF is an example of it. As mentioned earlier, this finding is largely based on the 
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 Stokes et al. (2013) make a similar point on private goods by stating that distributive programmes 
targeting at individuals that have public and binding rules are programmatic politics (12). 
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analysis of the design of the CDCF, and further research is needed to examine whether 
the actual interactions between MPs and voters in the CDCF become less clientelistic 
over time as they would expect. 
 
7.3. How Does the CDCF Affect the Nature of Accountability in 
Tanzania? 
 
The final question of this thesis is how the introduction of a CDF affects electoral 
politics and the nature of accountability in Tanzania. The thesis demonstrated that 
horizontal accountability between the legislature and the executive was strengthened 
between 2005 and 2010 and the parliamentary investigation into the corruption scandals 
involving cabinet ministers exemplified the strengthened oversight role of the 
legislature. This institutional change affected the public perception of the government, 
the CCM and politicians; voters became more critical of the political finance used by 
the CCM and its MPs. As such, the strengthening of horizontal accountability started to 
affect the way in which voters assess the responsiveness of MPs, or the nature of 
vertical accountability. The introduction of a CDF played a supplementary role in this 
change, first by facilitating the legislative reform and second by changing the way in 
which MPs provide assistance to their constituents. 
The CDCF did not have a major impact on the elections in 2010 partly because 
it was still a new mechanism and most of the projects had not been implemented by the 
time of the elections. Although the CDCF was aimed at regaining party coherence in 
preparation for the elections, the factional politics within the CCM continued and 
President Kikwete was re-elected with a lower rate of support in 2010 than the 2005 
elections. The CCM also lost some parliamentary seats.  
The impact of the fund on future elections needs to be examined further, but it is 
expected to be limited mainly due to the small size of the budget. Even if it functions as 
a ‘double-edged sword’ for incumbent MPs, as was the case in Kenya, it will not be as 
‘sharp’ as the Kenyan CDF. Similarly, it is unlikely to have a substantial impact on the 
power dynamics within the CCM or the nature of dominant party politics in the near 
future. 
On the other hand, the CDCF may affect the constituency roles or identities of 
Tanzanian MPs in the long run. As discussed above, the CDCF does not require 
fundraising skills or efforts by MPs. Instead, it requires skills in coordinating with other 
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stakeholders in managing the funds and supervising the execution of the projects. Thus, 
the introduction of the CDCF created a new role for MPs as managers of public 
resources rather than fundraisers or benefactors who use private resources to provide 
club or private goods to voters. For voters, the CDCF can be a new tool to evaluate the 
performance of MPs in managing and supervising public resources at the constituency 
level. This is what Rakesh Rajani, Head of Twaweza, describes as a shift ‘from no 
accountability to direct accountability’.191 ‘Direct accountability’ is based on the role of 
MPs in the distribution of public resources to their constituencies and thus, differs from 
programmatic accountability based on the provision of public goods. Yet, direct 
accountability is better than the situation of ‘no accountability’ where the voters’ 
assessment of the performance of MPs is limited to their arbitrary financial 
contributions based on private resources. CDFs may serve as an instrument to 
strengthen direct accountability between MPs and voters. 
Although the CDCF does not promote the programmatic relationship between 
MPs and voters directly, it also has the potential to contribute to it by reducing the 
transaction costs for constituency service. According to the latest Afrobarometer survey, 
a majority of Tanzanian voters preferred programmatic MPs who can contribute to the 
country to the parochial MPs who contribute only to their constituencies. The public 
expectation of MPs may be changing partly because people began to recognise the 
significance of the role of the legislature in holding the executive accountable. There is 
an incentive for Tanzanian MPs to shift away from clientelistic exchanges with voters. 
 
The introduction of a CDF in Tanzania in 2009 mirrors the shifting landscape of 
dominant party politics of the country. The growing benefactor role of MPs after the 
transition to a multiparty system in 1992 even led to the legalisation of the use of 
election incentives, takrima, yet it eventually lost its legitimacy. At the same time, the 
legislature was strengthened and the CCM started to lose its party cohesion which was 
accelerated by the corruption allegations of its leaders. A CDF was a strategy of the 
CCM to adapt to the changes in electoral politics including the social norm on political 
finance and to improve the relationship between the executive and the legislature and 
reconsolidate party unity to retain the same level of dominant power in the elections in 
2010 as before. 
                                                   
191
 Interview, Rajani (2010). 
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The thesis has also demonstrated that the adoption of a CDF contributed to 
strengthening horizontal accountability between the legislature and the executive and 
increased the level of transparency in political finance in the country. It also shows the 
potential to enhance direct accountability between MPs and voters. A CDF was adopted 
when clientelistic voters were increasingly dissatisfied with the performance of MPs 
and some MPs with fundraising capacity had begun providing financial assistance to 
voters systematically. With a formal project-selection and monitoring mechanism in 
place, the Tanzanian CDF has more potential to restrict the prevalence of clientelistic 
accountability than the provision of private or club goods by MPs based on private 
resources. 
While this thesis focused on the case in Tanzania, it has an implication to other 
developing countries where the responsiveness of MPs is primarily assessed by their 
performance in delivering tangible goods to their constituents. Given the current 
political and socioeconomic environment of these counties, the design of the Tanzanian 
CDF demonstrates the potential to control the influence of clientelism in the 
accountability relationship between MPs and voters. 
- 172 - 
Bibliography 
 
Africa Power and Politics Programme, www.institutions-africa.org/, (accessed 12 
January 2014) 
African Election Database, ‘Elections in Tanzania’, 
http://africanelections.tripod.com/tz.html, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
Afrobarometer, www.afrobarometer.org/, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
__________ (2012) ‘Data Codebook for a Round 5 Afrobarometer Survey in Tanzania’, 
www.afrobarometer.org/files/documents/codebook/tan_r5_codebook.pdf, 
(accessed 12 January 2014) 
Associated Press (31 December 1985) ‘Prime Minister Unveils Ambitious Program’ 
Babeiya, Edwin (2011a) ‘Electoral Corruption and the Politics of Elections FInancing in 
Tanzania’, Journal of Politics and Law 4.2: 91–103 
__________ (2011b) ‘Multiparty Elections and Party Support in Tanzania’, Journal of 
Asian and African Studies 47.1: 83–100 
Bagaka, Obuya (2010) ‘An Institutionalized View on the Creation of the Constituency 
Development Fund in Kenya’, Nairobi: Kenya Scholars and Studies Association, 
http://kessa.org/yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/1_Obuya_bagaka.140120140.pdf, 
(accessed 12 January 2014) 
Banful, Afua Branoah (2009) ‘Do Institutions Limit Clientelism? A Study of the 
District Assemblies Common Fund in Ghana’, The Centre for the Studies of 
African Economies (CSAE) Conference 2009 'Economic Development in 
Africa', Oxford, 22–24 March 2009, 
www.csae.ox.ac.uk/conferences/2009-EdiA/papers/210-BanfulDACFcsae.pdf, 
(accessed 12 January 2014) 
Bank of Ghana (2010) ‘2009 Annual Report’, Accra: Bank of Ghana, 
www.bog.gov.gh/privatecontent/Publications/Annual_Reports/2009.pdf, 
(accessed 12 January 2014) 
Bank of Tanzania, ‘Tanzania: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators 1995–2002’,  
www.bot-tz.org/Archive/EconomicIndicators/Economic_Indicators_1995-2002.
htm, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
__________, ‘Tanzania: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators 1998–2004’,  
www.bot-tz.org/publications/EconomicIndicators/Economic_Indicators.htm, 
(accessed 12 January 2014) 
__________ (2012) ‘Monthly Economic Review September 2012’, Dar es Salaam: 
Bank of Tanzania,  
www.bot-tz.org/Publications/MonthlyEconomicReviews/MER_%20Sep_FINA
L_2012.pdf, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
__________ (2013) ‘Monthly Economic Review November 2013’,  
www.bot-tz.org/Publications/MonthlyEconomicReviews/MER%20November%
202013.pdf, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
Kamusi la Kiswahili Fasaha (Dictionary of Eloquent Swahili) (2010) Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
Barkan, Joel D. (1984a) ‘Legislators, Elections, and Political Linkage’, in Joel D. 
Barkan with John J. Okumu (ed), Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and 
Tanzania, New York: Praeger Publishers 
__________ (1992) ‘The Rise and Fall of a Governance Realm in Kenya’, in Goran 
Hyden and Michael Bratton (eds), Governance and Politics in Africa, Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers 
__________ (2008) ‘Legislatures on the Rise?’, Journal of Democracy 19.2: 124–137 
- 173 - 
Barkan, Joel D. (ed) (1984b) Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania, New 
York: Praeger Publishers 
__________ (1994) Beyond Capitalism vs. Socialism in Kenya and Tanzania, Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers 
__________ (2009) Legislative Power in Emerging African Democracies, Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers 
Barkan, Joel D. and Matiangi, Fred (2009) ‘Kenya's Tortuous Path to Successful 
Legislative Development’, in Joel D. Barkan (ed), Legislative Power in 
Emerging African Democracies, Boulder and London: Lynne Pienner Publishers 
Baskin, Mark (2010a) ‘CDFs American Style: Distributive Policy and Member Items in 
New York State: Summary Paper’, SUNY Center for International Development, 
Rockefeller College of Public Affairs and Policy University at Albany, State 
University of New York (SUNY), New York, 20–21 May 2010,  
www.cid.suny.edu/publications1/CDFs%20American%20Style.pdf, (accessed 
12 January 2014) 
__________ (2010b) ‘Constituency Development Funds (CDFs) as a Tool of 
Decentralized Development’, 56th Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference, 
Nairobi, Kenya,  
www.cid.suny.edu/publications1/CDF%20-%20CPA%20Background%20Paper.
pdf, (accessed 4 August 2013) 
Bhutan (2009) Constituency Development Grant Rules, Thimphu: Ministry of Finance 
Bogaards, Matthijs (2008) ‘Dominant Party Systems and Electoral Volatility in Africa’, 
Party Politics 14.1: 113–130 
Branch, Daniel and Cheeseman, Nic (2008) ‘Democratizaion, Sequencing, and State 
Failure in Africa: Lessons from Kenya’, African Affairs 108.430: 1–26 
Bratton, Michael and van de Walle, Nicolas (1997) ‘Democratic Experiments in Africa: 
Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective’,  
Brierley, Sarah (2012) ‘Party Unity and Presidential Dominance: Parliamentary 
Development in the Fourth Republic of Ghana’, Journal of Contemporary 
African Studies 30.3: 419–439 
Britain-Tanzania Society (1997) ‘Political Developments’, Tanzanian Affairs, London: 
Britain-Tanzania Society, www.tzaffairs.org/1997/01/political-developments-2/, 
(accessed 2 October 2012) 
__________ (1999) ‘Politics - Latest Development’, Tanzanian Affairs, London:  
Britain-Tanzania Society,  
www.tzaffairs.org/1999/09/politics-latest-developments/, (accessed 12 January  
2014) 
__________ (2008) ‘Corruption - Recent Developments’, Tanzanian Affairs, London: 
Britain-Tanzania Society,  
www.tzaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/tzaffairs_90.pdf, (accessed 12  
January 2014) 
__________ (2010) ‘October 2010 - Election Guide’, Tanzanian Affairs, London:  
Britain-Tanzania Society,  
www.tzaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/tzaffairs_97.pdf, (accessed 12  
January 2014) 
Brown, Stephen and Kaiser, Paul (2007) ‘Democratisations in Africa: Attempts, 
Hindrances and Prospects’, Third World Quarterly 28.6: 1131–1149 
 
 
 
- 174 - 
Bryan, Shari and Baer, Denise (eds) (2005) ‘Money in Politics: A Study of Party 
Financing Practices in 22 Countries’, Washington, D.C.: National Democratic 
Institute for International Affairs (NDI),  
www.ndi.org/files/1848_polpart_moneyinpolitics_010105_full_text.pdf, 
(accessed 12 January 2014) 
Bryceson, Deborah (1988) ‘Household, Hoe and Nation: Development Policies of the 
Nyerere Era’, in Michael Hodd, Tanzania After Nyerere, London: Pinter 
Publishers 
Buchanan, James M. (1965) ‘An Economic Theory of Clubs’, Economica 32.125: 1–14 
Bumbuli Development Corporation, ‘Cash on Delivery (COD)’,  
http://bumbuli.or.tz/cash-on-delivery-cod/, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
Burnham, Peter et al. (2008) Research Methods in Politics, Hampshire and New York: 
Pulgrave Macmillan 
Business Daily (25 February 2013) ‘Does CDF Have a Place under the County 
System?’ 
Butler, Patrick and Collins, Neil (2001) ‘Payment on Delivery: Recognising 
Constituency Service as Political Marketing’, European Journal of Marketing 
35.9/10: 1026–1037 
Cain, Bruce E., Ferejohn, John A. and Fiorina, Morris P. (1987) The Personal Vote: 
Constituency Service and Electoral Independence, Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press 
Carey, John M. (2009) Legislative Voting and Accountability Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
Carey, John M. and Shugart, Mathew (1995) ‘Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: a 
Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas’, Electoral Studies 14.4: 417–439 
Carey, Sabine C. (2002) ‘A Comparative Analysis of Political Parties in Kenya, Zambia 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Democratization 9.3: 53–71 
Casas-Zamora, Kevin (2008) Paying for Democracy: Political Finance and State 
Funding for Parties, Colchester: European Consortium for Political Research 
Press 
Central Bank of Kenya, ‘Forex Exchange Rates’,  
www.centralbank.go.ke/index.php/rate-and-statistics/, (accessed 12 January  
2014) 
Chabal, Partick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal (1999) Africa Works: Disorder as Political 
Instrument, Oxford: James Currey 
Chama Cha Mapinduzi, ‘Taarifa Rasmi: Kuhusu Kikao Cha Halmashauri Kuu ya Taifa 
ya CCM (Official Report: Regarding the National Executive Committee 
Meeting of CCM)’, http://ccmuk.org/hm.html, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
__________ (2010) Ilani ya Uchaguzi ya CCM ya Mwaka 2010–2015 (CCM Election 
Manifesto for the year 2010–2015), Dar es Salaam: Chama Cha Mapinduzi 
(CCM) 
Chambers, Robert (1974) Managing Rural Development: Ideas and Experience from 
East Africa, Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies 
Cheeseman, Nic (2006) ‘The Rise and Fall of Civil-Authoritarianism in Africa: 
Patronage, Participation, and Political Parties in Kenya and Zambia’, Thesis for 
DPhil (unpublished), Oxford: Department of Politics and International Relations, 
University of Oxford 
__________ (2009) ‘Kenya Since 2002: The More Things Change the More They Stay 
the Same’, in Abdul Raufu Mustapha and Lindsay Whitfield (eds), Turning 
Points in African Democracy, Suffolk: James Currey 
- 175 - 
__________ (2011) ‘The Internal Dynamics of Power-sharing in Africa’, 
Democratization 18.2: 336–365 
Chella, Chomba and Kabanda, Simon (2008) ‘Lessons in Effective Citizen Activism: 
The Anti-third Term Campaign in Zambia’, SAIIA Occasional Papers Series, 
Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), 
www.saiia.org.za/images/stories/pubs/sops/saia_sop_06_chella_20080801_en.p
df, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
Chieni, Susan Njeri (1997) ‘The Harambee Movement in Kenya: The Role Played by 
Kenyans and the Government in the Provision of Education and Other Social 
Services’, Seventh Boleswa Symposium ‘Educational Research for Quality for 
Life’, Swaziland Educational Research Association, University of Swaziland, 
Kwalusuni, 28 July–1 August 1997, http://boleswa97.tripod.com/chieni.htm, 
(accessed 12 January 2014) 
Chileshe, Alexander (2011) ‘The Impact of the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) 
in Zambia’, ECAS 2011 - 4th European Conference on African Studies, 15–18 
June 2011, Uppsala,  
www.nai.uu.se/ecas-4/panels/61-80/panel-73/Alexander%20Chileshe%20-%20
Abstract.pdf, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
Clapham, Christopher (ed) (1982) Private Patronage and Public Power: Political 
Clientelism in the Mordern State, London: Frances Pinter 
Connell, John (1997) Papua New Guinea: The Struggle for Development, London: 
Routledge 
Cook, Margie, Munishi, Gasper and Mutembei, Kokuteta (2010) ‘Deepening 
Democracy in Tanzania Programme 2007–2010 Terminal  Evaluation Final 
Report’, United Nations Development Programme,  
http://erc.undp.org/evaluationadmin/manageevaluation/viewevaluationdetail.htm
l?evalid=4533, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
Cooksey, Brian, Court, David and Makau, Ben (1994) ‘Education for Self-reliance and 
Harambee’, in Joel Barkan D. (ed), Beyond Capitalism vs Socialism in Kenya 
and Tanzania, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers 
Cox, Gary W. and McCubbins, Mathew D. (1986) ‘Electoral Politics as a Redistributive 
Game’, The Journal of Politics 48.2: 370–389 
Daily Independent (1 April 2009) ‘Constituency Project Fund - for Lawmakers or Their 
Constituents?’ 
Daily Nation (7 May 2012) ‘Sh380m CDF Cash Misused, Says Report’ 
__________ (14 December 2002) ‘Key Proposal That Seeks to Set MPs Free’ 
__________ (17 April 2012) ‘Treasury in Budget Plan to Abolish CDF’ 
__________ (18 April 2012) ‘MP Says CDF Will Not Be Abolished’ 
__________ (26 June 2011) ‘Board Prepares to Hand over Projects to Counties as 
Devolution Takes Effect’ 
Daily News (4 May 2012) ‘Kikwete Ditches Six Ministers in Cabinet Reshuffle’ 
__________ (19 October 2010) ‘Ndugai Most Active MP - Study ’ 
__________ (28 July 2009) ‘Activists Oppose Constituency Development Fund’ 
de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno and Smith, Alastair (2009) ‘Tanzania's Economic and 
Political Performance: A District-Level Test of Selectorate Theory’, DRI 
Working Paper No. 40, http://nyudri.files.wordpress.com/2011/10/driwp40.pdf, 
(accessed 12 January 2014) 
Development Partners Group in Tanzania, www.tzdpg.or.tz/, (accessed 12 January 
2014) 
 
- 176 - 
Diamond, Larry and Plattner, Marc F. (eds) (2010) Democratization in Africa: Progress 
and Retreat, Second Edition, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 
Dixit, Avinash and Londregan, John (1996) ‘The Determinants of Success of Special 
Interests in Redistributive Politics’, Journal of Politics 58.4: 1132–1155 
Eisenstadt, Samuel N. (1973) Traditional Patrimonialim and Modern  
Neopatrimonialism, California: SAGE Publications 
Eisenstadt, Samuel N. and Roniger, L. (1984) Patrons, Clients and Friends: 
Interpersonal Relations and the Structure of Trust in Society, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa, ‘Tanzania: Election Archive’,  
http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/tanelectarchive.htm, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
__________ (2010) ‘Tanzania: Party Funding and Finances’, Johannesburg: Electoral 
Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa,  
www.eisa.org.za/WEP/tanparties2.htm, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
Englert, Birgit (2008) ‘Ambiguous Relationships: Youth, Popular Music and Politics in 
Contemporary Tanzania’, Wiener Zeitschrift für kritische Afrikastudien 14.8: 
71–96 
Erdmann, Gero and Basedau, Matthias (2008) ‘Party Systems in Africa: Problems of 
Categorising and Explaining Party Systems’, Journal of Contemporary African 
Studies 26.3: 241–258 
Erdmann, Gero and Engel, Ulf (2006) ‘Neopatrimonialism Revisited: Beyond a 
Catch-All Concept’, GIGA Working Paper, Hamburg: German Institute of 
Global and Area Studies,  
http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1577/pdf/wp16_erdmann_engel.pdf, 
(accessed 12 January 2014) 
European Union (2008) ‘Nepal: Final Report: Constituent Assembly Election 10 April 
2008’, Brussels: European Union,  
http://eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/election_observation/nepal/final_report_en.p
df, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
Fearon, James D. (1999) ‘Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: 
Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance’, in Susan C. 
Stokes and Bernard Manin (eds) Adam Przeworski, Democracy, Accountability, 
and Representation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Fenno, Richard F. Jr. (1978) Home Style: House Members in Their Districts, Boston 
and Tronto: Little, Brown and Company 
Gaines, Brian J. (1998) ‘The Impersonal Vote? Constituency Service and Incumbency 
Advantage in British Elections, 1950–92’, Legislative Studies Quarterly 23.2: 
167–195 
Gasarasi, C. (1997) ‘The Role of Socio-Cultural Factors in the 1995 General Elections 
in Mainland Tanzania’, in Samuel S. Mushi and Rwekaza S. Mukandala (eds), 
Multiparty Democracy in Transition: Tanzania's 1995 General Elections, Dar es 
Salaam: Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee (TEMCO) 
George, Alexander L. and Bennett, Andrew (2005) Case Studies and Theory 
Development in the Social Sciences, Cambridge and London: MIT Press 
Ghana Broadcasting Corporation (13 January 2011) ‘MP Constituency Development 
Fund Introduced’ 
Ghana, Republic of (2009) State of the Nation Address by His Excellency John Evans 
Atta Mills, President of the Republic of Ghana, Accra: Parliament 
Graphic Online (4 May 2013) ‘Parliament Wants Common Fund Increased’ 
 
- 177 - 
Gutiérrez-Romero, Roxana (2009) ‘Decentralization, Accountability and the MPs 
Elections: The Case of the Constituency Development Fund in Kenya’, iiG 
Briefing Paper 2, University of Oxford,  
www.iig.ox.ac.uk/output/briefingpapers/pdfs/iiG-briefingpaper-02-kenya-cdf.pd
f, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
Habari Leo (13 May 2013) ‘Wabunge Wadaiwa Kutumia Vibaya Mfuko wa Jimbo 
(MPs are Alleged to Abuse Constituency Fund)’ 
Havnevik, KJell J. (1993) Tanzania: The Limits to Development from Above, Uppsala: 
The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies 
Hay, Colin (2002) Political Analysis: An Critical Introduction, New York: Palgrave 
__________ (2006) ‘Political Ontology’, in Roberts E. Gooden and Charles Tilly (eds), 
The Oxford Handbook of Contexual Political Analysis, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
Heilman, Bruce and Ndumbaro, Laurean (2002) ‘Corruption, Politics, and Societal 
Values in Tanzania: An Evaluation of the Mkapa Administration's 
Anti-Corruption Efforts’, African Journal of Political Science 7.1: 1–19 
Herts, Rosanna and Imber, Jonathan B. (eds) (1995) Studying Elites Using Qualitative 
Methods, Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications 
Hirschler, Kurt (2006) ‘Tanzania in Transition: Violent Conflicts as a Result of Political 
and Economic Reform’, in Ludwig Gerhardt, et al. (eds), Umbrüche in 
afrikanischen Gesellschaften und ihre Bewältigung (Changes in African Society 
and their Management), Berlin: Hamburg University 
Hoffman, Barak and Robinson, Lindsay (2010) ‘Tanzania's Missing Opposition’, in 
Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds), Democratization in Africa: Progress 
and Retreat (Second Edition), Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press 
Hudson, Alan and Wren, Claire (2007) ‘Parliamentary Strengthening in Developing 
Countries’, London: Overseas Development Institute (ODI),  
www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/103.pdf, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
Huntington, Samuel P. (1991) The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 20th 
Century, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press 
Hyden, Goran (1975) ‘Ujamaa, Villagisation and Rural Development in Tanzania’, 
Development Policy Review A8.1: 53–72 
__________ (1980) ‘Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and Uncaptured 
Peasantry’,  
__________ (1999) ‘Top-Down Democratization in Tanzania’, Journal of Democracy 
10.4: 142–155 
__________ (2010) ‘Political Accountability in Africa: Is the Glass Half-full or 
Half-empty?’, Working Paper No. 6, Africa Power and Politics Programme 
(APPP), 
www.institutions-africa.org/filestream/20100118-appp-working-paper-6-politica
l-accountability-in-africa-is-the-glass-half-ful-or-half-empty-by-goran-hyden-jan
uary-2010, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
Hyden, Goran and Leys, Colin (1972) ‘Elections and Politics in Single-Party Systems: 
The Case of Kenya and Tanzania’, British Journal of Political Science 2.4: 
389–420 
Hyden, Goran and Mmuya, Max (2008) Power and Policy Slippage in Tanzania: 
Discussing National Ownership of Development, Stockholm: Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) 
 
 
- 178 - 
Institute of Economic Affairs and Kenya National Commission of Human Rights (2006) 
Kenyans' Verdict: A Citizens Report Card on the Constituencies Development 
Fund (CDF) Nairobi: Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) 
International Budget Partnership (2009) It's Our Money. Where's It Gone?,  
www.youtube.com/watch?v=z2zKXqkrf2E, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
__________ (2010) ‘Constituency Development Funds: Scoping Paper’, Cape Town: 
International Budget Partnership,  
http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/Constituency-Development-F
unds-Scoping-Paper.pdf, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, ‘Voter Turnout Data for  
United Republic of Tanzania’,  
www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?CountryCode=TZ, (accessed 12 January  
2014) 
__________, ‘Voting Age Population’, www.idea.int/uid/fieldview.cfm?id=80,  
(accessed 12 January 2014) 
International Monetary Fund, ‘Representative Exchange Rates for Selected Currencies 
for January 1995’,  
www.imf.org/external/np/fin/data/rms_mth.aspx?SelectDate=1995-01-31&repor
tType=REP, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
__________ (2009) ‘Ghana: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper—2006 Annual Progress 
Report’, Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund (IMF),  
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/cr09237.pdf, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
__________ (2012a) ‘India: Staff Report for the 2012 Article IV Consultation’, 
Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund (IMF),  
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr1296.pdf, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
__________ (2012b) ‘Pakistan: Staff Report for the 2011 Article IV Consultation and 
Proposal for Post-Program Monitoring’, Washington, D.C.: International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr1235.pdf,  
(accessed 12 January 2014) 
__________ (2012c) ‘Philippines: Staff Report for the 2011 Article IV Consultation’, 
Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund (IMF),  
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr1249.pdf, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
__________ (2012d) ‘Zambia: Staff Report for the 2012 Article IV Consultation’, 
Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund (IMF),  
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr12200.pdf, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan (2012) PRSP Budgetary Expenditures of FY 2010–11 and 
FY 2009–10 (Provisional), Islamabad: Ministry of Finance 
__________ (n.d.) Parliamentary History, Islamabad: National Assembly 
Jamaica (2008) Constituency Development Fund Gets $2.45 Billion, Kingston: Jamaica 
Information Service 
Jewell, Malcolm E. (1983) ‘Legislator-Constituency Relations and the Representative 
Process’, Legislative Studies Quarterly 8.3: 303–337 
Kabwe, Zitto Zuberi (12 April 2011) ‘Creating the Right Incentives for MPs’, The 
Citizen, http://allafrica.com/stories/201104121274.html, (accessed 12 January 
2014) 
__________ (23 May 2011) ‘Taarifa ya Utekelezaji wa Mfuko wa Jimbo-Kigoma 
Kaskazini hadi mwezi Mei, 2011 (Execution Report of the Constituency Fund in 
Kigoma North up to May 2011)’, Zitto na Demokrasia (Zitto and Democracy),  
http://zittokabwe.wordpress.com/2011/05/23/taarifa-ya-utekelezaji-wa-mfuko-w
a-jimbo-kigoma-kaskazini-hadi-mwezi-mei-2011/, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
- 179 - 
__________ (28 December 2011) ‘Matumizi ya Fedha za Mfuko wa Mbunge Jimbo la 
Kigoma Kaskazini Awamu ya Tatu (Tshs 21,719,000/=) (The Expenses of the 
Funds of MP's Fund for the Kigoma North Constituency, the Third Phase (Tsh 
21,719,000))’, Zitto na Demokrasia (Zitto and Democracy),  
https://zittokabwe.wordpress.com/2011/12/28/matumizi-ya-fedha-za-mfuko-wa-
mbunge-jimbo-la-kigoma-kaskazini-awamu-ya-tatutshs-21719000/, (accessed 
12 January 2014) 
__________ (29 September 2011) ‘Mfuko wa Jimbo Kigoma Kaskazini Mgao wa 
Awamu ya Pili (TZS. 21,719,000/=) (Constituency Fund for Kigoma North, the 
Allocation of the Second Phase (Tsh 21,719,000/=))’, Zitto na Demokrasia 
(Zitto and Democracy),  
https://zittokabwe.wordpress.com/2011/09/29/mfuko-wa-jimbo-kigoma-kaskazi
ni-mgao-wa-awamu-ya-pili-tzs-21719000/, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
__________ (2011) ‘Creating the Right Incentives for MPs’, CPA Africa Region,  
http://cpaafricaregion.org/sites/default/files/attachments/downloads/Creating%2
0the%20right%20incentives%20for%20MPs.pdf, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
Kanchan, Chandra (2007) ‘Counting Heads: A Theory of Voter and Elite Behavior in 
Patronage Democracies’, in Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson (eds), 
Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and 
Political Competition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Karue, Muriuki (2011) Episodes: From an MP's Diary, Nairobi: Lesako Foundation 
Kasuya, Yuko (2009) Presidential Bandwagon: Parties and Party Systems in the 
Philippines, Pasig City: Anvish Publishing 
Keefer, Philip and Khemani, Stuti (2009a) ‘When Do Legislators Pass on “Pork”?: The 
Determinants of Legislator Utilization of a Constituency Development Fund in 
India’, Policy Research Working Paper, Washington, D. C.: The World Bank, 
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-4929, (accessed 12 
January 2014) 
__________ (2009b) ‘When Do Legislators Pass on Pork? The Role of Political Parties 
in Determining Legislator Effort’, American Political Science Review 103.1: 
99–112 
Kelsall, Tim (2000) ‘Subjectivity, Collective Action, and the Governance Agenda in 
Tanzania’, Thesis for Doctor of Philosophy, London: School of Oriental and 
African Studies, University of London 
__________ (2002) ‘Shop Windows and Smoke-filled Rooms: Governance and the 
Re-Politicisation of Tanzania’, Journal of Modern African Studies 40.4: 
597–619 
__________ (2003) ‘Governance, Democracy and Recent Political Struggles in 
Mainland Tanzania’, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 41.2: 55–82 
Kenney, Charles D. (2003) ‘Horizontal Accountability: Concepts and Conflicts’, in 
Scott Mainwaring and Christopher Welna, Democratic Accountability in Latin 
America, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Khan, Shadiullah (2006) ‘Local Government and Participatory Rural Development: The 
Case Study of District Government in Northwestern Pakistan’, Thesis for PhD, 
Dera Ismail Khan: Department of Public Administration, Gomal University 
Kihoro, Wanyiri (2007) Politics and Parliamentarians in Kenya 1994–2007, Nairobi: 
Centre for Multiparty Democracy Kenya 
 
 
 
- 180 - 
Killian, Bernadeta (2010) ‘New Parliamentary Standing Orders and their Implications to 
the Functioning of Parliament’, Dar es Salaam: Research and Education for 
Democracy (REDET),  
www.redet.udsm.ac.tz/documents_storage/2010-2-24-17-41-46_%20killian.pdf, 
(accessed 12 January 2014) 
Kimenyi, Mwangi S. (2005) ‘Efficiency and Efficacy of Kenya's Constituency 
Development Fund: Theory and Evidence’, Department of Economics Working 
Paper Series, Connecticut: University of Connecticut,  
www.econ.uconn.edu/working/2005-42.pdf, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
King, Gary (1991) ‘Constituency Service and Incumbency Advantage’, British Journal 
of Politial Science 21.1: 119–128 
Kiondo, Andrew S. Z. (1993) ‘Structural Adjustment and Non-Governmental 
Organisations in Tanzania: A Case Study’, in Peter Gibbon (ed), Social Change 
and Economic Reform in Africa, Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African 
Studies 
Kitschelt, Herbert and Wilkinson, Steven I. (eds) (2007) Patrons, Clients and Policies: 
Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
Kramon, Eric (2009) ‘Vote-buying and Political Behavior: Estimating and Explaining 
Vote-buying's Effect on Turnout in Kenya’, Afrobarometer Working Papers,  
www.eldis.org/vfile/upload/1/document/1112/AfropaperNo114.pdf, (accessed 
12 January 2014) 
Lande, Carl H. (1977) ‘The Dyadic Basis of Clientelism’, in Steffen W. Schmidt et al. 
(eds), Friends, Followers and Factions, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University 
of California Press 
Leech, Beth L. (2002) ‘Interview Methods in Political Science’, Political Science and 
Politics 35.4: 663–664 
Legal and Human Rights Centre and Tanzania Civil Society Consortium for Election 
Observation (2010) Report on the United Republic Tanzania General Elections 
of 2010, Dar es Salaam: Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) and Tanzania 
Civil Society Consortium for Election Observation (TACCEO) 
Levitsky, Steven and Way, Lucan A. (2002) ‘Elections Without Democracy: The Rise 
of Competitive Authoritarianism’, Journal of Democracy 13.2: 51–65 
Limbu, Festus (1997) ‘Experiences of Campaigning for a Parliamentary Seat’, in C. K. 
Omari (ed), The Right to Choose a Leader: Reflections on the 1995 Tanzanian 
General Elections, Dar es Salaam: DUP Ltd 
Lindberg, Staffan I. (2009) ‘Accountability: The Core Concept and its Subtypes’, 
Working Paper No. 1, Africa Power and Politics Programme (APPP),  
www.dfid.gov.uk/r4d/PDF/Outputs/APPP/APPP-WP1.pdf, (accessed 12 January 
2014) 
__________ (2010) ‘What Accountability Pressures Do MPs in Africa Face and How 
Do They Respond? Evidence from Ghana’, Journal of Modern African Studies 
48.1: 117–142 
Lindberg, Staffan I. and Morrison, Minion K.C. (2008) ‘Are African Voters Really 
Ethnic or Clientelistic? Survey Evidence from Ghana’, Political Science 
Quarterly 123.1: 95–122 
Lindberg, Stattan I. and Zhou, Yongmei (2009) ‘Co-optation Despite Democratization 
in Ghana’, in Joel D. Barkan, Legislative Power in Emerging African 
Democracies, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers 
 
- 181 - 
Liviga, Athumani J. (2011) ‘Economic and Political Liberalization in Tanzania and its 
Unintended Outcomes’, Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review 27.1: 
1–31 
Makinda, Anne (2011) ‘Promoting Gender Equality in the Tanzanian Parliament’, in 
Frederick et al. Stapenhurst (eds), African Parliamentary Reform, Oxon and 
New York: Routledge 
Makulilo, A. B. and Raphael, C. (2010) ‘The October 2010 General Elections in 
Tanzania’, Nairobi: IFRA-Nairobi,  
www.ifra-nairobi.net/observatoire/THE%20OCTOBER%202010%20GENERA
L%20ELECTIONS%20IN%20TANZANIA.pdf, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
Makulilo, Alexander Boniface (2008) Tanzania: A De Facto One Party State?, 
Saarbrücken: Verlag Dr. Müller 
__________ (2011) ‘‘Watching the Watcher’: An Evaluation of Local Election 
Observers in Tanzania’, Journal of Modern African Studies 49.2: 241–262 
Malik, Anas (2010) Political Survival in Pakistan: Beyond Ideology, Oxon: Routledge 
Mamdani, Mahmood (2006) Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy 
of Late Colonialism, Princeton: Princeton University Press 
Marsh, David and Stoker, Gerry (eds) (2002) Theory and Methods in Political Science, 
Second Edition, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan 
Martin, Shane (2011) ‘Using Parliamentary Questions to Measure Constituency Focus: 
An Application to the Irish Case’, Political Studies 59.472–488 
Matukio-Michuzi, ‘Matokeo Kura za Maoni CCM Hadi Sasa (Results of the Primary 
Election of the CCM until Now)’,  
http://michuzi-matukio.blogspot.co.uk/2010/08/matokeo-kura-za-mai.html, 
(accessed 12 January 2014) 
Mayhew, David R. (1974) ‘Congress: The Electoral Connection’,  
Mchomvu, Andrew S. T. et al. (1998) ‘Social Policy and Research Practice in Tanzania’, 
Journal of Social Development in Africa 13.2: 45–53 
Mezey, Michael L. (2011) ‘Representation and Constituency Relations’, Comparative 
Assessment of Parliament (CAP) Note, New York: Center for International 
Development, Nelson A. Rockfeller College of Public Affairs and Policy, 
University of Albany, State University of New York,  
www.cid.suny.edu/capnotes1/Mezey_CapNote_011912.pdf, (accessed 12  
January 2014) 
Mmuya, Max (1998) Tanzania: Political Reform in Eclipse: Crises and Cleavages in 
Political Parties, Dar es Salaam: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 
Mnyika, KS et al. (2012) ‘Prevalence of HIV-1 infection in Zanzibar: results from a 
national HIV-1 serosurvey 2002’, East African Journal of Public Health 9.3: 
123–127 
Modern Ghana (31 July 2007) ‘District Assemblies’ Common Fund Increased’ 
Mohammed Enterprises Tanzania Limited, www.metl.net/, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
Moreno, Erika, Crisp, Brian F. and Shugart, Matthew Soberg (2003) ‘The 
Accountability Deficit in Latin America’, in Scott Mainwaring and Christopher 
Welna, Democratic Accountability in Latin America, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 
Msekwa, Pius (2006) Reflections on the First Decade of Multi-Party Politics in 
Tanzania, Dar es Salaam: Hanns Siedel Foundation 
 
 
 
- 182 - 
__________, ‘Reflections on the Fourth Multi-party General Elections of October, 
2010’, 
www.cms.ccmtz.org/index.php?section=news&cmd=details&newsid=127, 
(accessed 1 May 2011) 
Mukandala, Rwekaza S., Mushi, Samuel S. and Rubagumya, Casmir (eds) (2004) 
People's Representatives: Theory and Practice of Parliamentary Democracy in 
Tanzania, Kampala: Fountain Publishers 
Mukwena, Royson M. (2004) ‘Situating Decentralisation in Zambia in a Political 
Context’, African Training and Research Centre in Administration for 
Development, 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/CAFRAD/UNPAN0176
92.pdf, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
Mulisa, Godfrey (2007) ‘Tanzania's 2007/08 Budget Highlights and Its Governance 
Implications’, Dar es Salaam: Embassy of Finland in Tanzania, 
www.finland.or.tz/public/?contentid=97382&contentlan=2&culture=en-US, 
(accessed 12 January 2014) 
Müller, Wolfgang C. (2007) ‘Political Institutions and Linkage Strategies’, in Herbert 
Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson, Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of 
Democratic Accountability and Political Competition, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
Murray, Christina (2011) ‘Constituency Development Funds: Are They Constitutional?’, 
Budget Brief Year 04 No. 12, Washington, D.C.: International Budget Group 
(IBP), http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/brief12.pdf, 
(accessed 12 January 2014) 
Mushi, Samuel S. (2001) Development and Democratisation in Tanzania: A Study of 
Rural Grassroots Politics, Fountain Publishers 
MwanaHalisi (18 August 2010) ‘Waliopita, Waliobebwa Kura za Maoni CCM (Those 
Who Passed, Those Who Lost in the CCM Opinion Poll)’ 
Mwananchi (3 November 2011) ‘Kiatu cha Mbunge Chamuumbua Mkandarasi Kawe 
(MP's Shoe Shames Contractor in Kawe)’ 
__________ (10 December 2011) ‘Malipo ya Mbunge Sawa na ya Mwalimu kwa 
Miaka Mitatu (MP's Remuneration Equivalent to Teachers' for Three Years)’ 
__________ (18 January 2012) ‘Ndugai: Tutajadili Kufuta Posho Mpya za Wabunge 
(Ndugai: We Argue for the New Sitting Allowance of MPs)’ 
__________ (28 November 2011) ‘Wabunge Wapiga Marufuku Ujumbe wa Simu (MPs 
Ban Telephone Messages)’ 
National Democratic Congress (2012) ‘2012 Manifesto: Advancing the Better Ghana 
Agenda’, Accra: National Democratic Congress,  
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B4fn1Fz6J8K9WmZMMEhocjNNZEU/edit?pli
=1, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
National Democratic Institute (2010) ‘Statement of the National Democratic Institute 
(NDI) Pre-election Delegation to Tanzania's October 2010 Elections’, Dar es 
Salaam: National Democratic Institute (NDI),  
www.ndi.org/files/Tanzania_Pre-Election_Delegation_Statement.pdf, (accessed 
12 January 2014) 
National Taxpayers Association (2012) ‘Launch of NTA Citizens' Audit of CDF and 
LATF Funds’, Nairobi: National Taxpayers Association (NTA),  
www.nta.or.ke/reports/crc/Nairobi/NTA_Phase_IV_CDF_&_LATF_Ranking.pd
f, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
 
- 183 - 
Ndugulile, Faustine (17 March 2011) ‘Mfuko wa Jimbo’, Faustine's Baraza,  
http://drfaustine.wordpress.com/2011/03/17/mfuko-wa-jimbo/, (accessed 12 
January 2014) 
Nipashe (1 November 2011) ‘Msekwa: CCM Tumejeruhiwa (Msekwa: CCM We Have 
Been Wounded)’ 
__________ (21 December 2010) ‘Ruzuku: CCM Million 800/- (Subsidies: CCM 
Tsh800 Million)’ 
Nograles, Prospero C. and Lagman, Edcel C. (2008) ‘Understanding the 'Pork Barrel'’, 
Quezon City: Philippines House of Representatives,  
www.congress.gov.ph/download/14th/pork_barrel.pdf, (accessed 12 January 
2014) 
Norman, Omar (1989) ‘Pakistan and General Zia: Era and Legacy’, Third World 
Quarterly 11.1: 28–54 
Norris, Pippa (1997) ‘The Puzzle of Constituency Service’, The Journal of Legislative 
Studies 3.2: 29–49 
Norton, Philip (1994) ‘The Growth of the Constituency Role of the MP’, Parliamentary 
Affairs 47.4: 705–720 
Nyaluke, David (2008) ‘Ethnicity and Political Competition in Tanzania (Draft Paper)’, 
ECPR Graduate Conference in Barcelona, 25–27 August 2008,  
https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:RUHG-2px_EwJ:www.essex.ac.
uk/ecpr/events/graduateconference/barcelona/papers/416.pdf+Makambako+relig
ion&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESghWMv3ESDWUP5bYWGDyoRv
HVkLKIiDFgBBcciow0eoUwCVwa2SU6V5UE2Sswj7iusD-VmsCi_gHr0diRs
CEFCZCpJTHbRDx10JrVOIWUhHv5y68eCm81tus9W7TdkIr3zK-Pli&sig=A
HIEtbR1_xGRad0epP9rBdQ3fbq7euqKVA, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
Nyimbi, Solanus Meinrad (2008) ‘Harmonization and Alignment in the Field of Local 
Governance and Decentralization: The Tanzanian Experience’, Development 
Partners Working Group on Local Governance and Decentralisation, Strasbourg, 
16 November 2008,  
www.dpwg-lgd.org/cms/upload/pdf/HAin_the_field_of_Local_Governace_and_
Decentralization.pdf, (accessed 31 August 2009) 
O'Barr, Jean F. (1972) ‘Cell Leaders in Tanzania’, African Studies Review 15.3: 
437–465 
O'Donnell, Guillermo (2003) ‘Horizontal Accountability: The Legal Institutionalization 
of Mistrust’, in Scott Mainwaring and Christopher Welna (eds), Democratic 
Accountability in Latin America, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
O'Gorman, Melanie (2009) ‘Why the CCM Won't Lose: The Roots of Single Party 
Dominance in Tanzania’, CSAE Conference 2009: Economic Development in 
Africa, Oxford: St. Catherine's College, University of Oxford, 22–24 March 
2009, www.csae.ox.ac.uk/conferences/2009-EDiA/papers/457-OGorman.pdf,  
(accessed 12 January 2014) 
Ochanda, Gedion (2007) ‘The CDF Act Has No Transition Clause: What Next?’, Adili 
95, Nairobi: Transparency International Kenya,  
www.tikenya.org/phocadownload/adili95.pdf, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
Omari, C. K. (ed) (1997) The Right to Choose a Leader: Reflections on the 1995 
Tanzanian General Elections, Dar es Salaam: DUP 
Orijino Komedi (2012) Orijino Komedi na Mhishimiwa Februari,  
www.youtube.com/watch?v=2bpedyOi8eA, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
 
 
- 184 - 
Oxford Analytica (2009) ‘Bureaucracy, Inefficiency May Plague African Development’, 
Oxford Analytica,  
www.forbes.com/2009/04/03/africa-cdf-government-business-oxford-analytica.h
tml?partner=email, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
Pal, Rupayan and Das, Aparajita (2010) ‘A Scrutiny of the MP-LADS in India: Who Is 
It For?’, Economic and Political Weekly 45.2: 63–68 
Oxford Dictionary of English, Second Edition, Revised (2005) Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
Pelizzo, Riccardo and Stapenhurst, Frederick (2012) Parliamentary Oversight Tools: A 
Comprehensive Analysis, London and New York: Routledge  
Peter, Sitta (2007–2008) ‘Constituency Development Fund: Hopes and Challenges’, 
Civil Society Focus 
Philippine Daily Inquirer (26 November 2006) ‘To Get Pork, Butter Up the Boss, 
Senators Told’ 
Phillips, Kristin D. (2009) ‘Hunger, Healing, and Citizenship in Central Tanzania’, 
African Studies Review 52.1: 23–45 
__________ (2010) ‘Pater Rules Best: Political Kinship and Party Politics in Tanzania's 
Presidential Elections’, Political and Legal Anthropology Review 33.1: 109–132 
Piattoni, Simona (ed) (2001) Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation: 
The European Experience in Historical and Comparative Perspective, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Pierce, Jennifer L. (1995) ‘Reflections on Fieldwork in a Complex Organization: 
Lawyers, Ethnographic Authority, and Lethal Weapons’, in Rosanna Herts 
and Jonathan B. Imber (eds), Studying Elites Using Qualitative Methods, 
Thousand Oaks, London and New Delhi: SAGE Publications 
Pitcher, Anne, Moran, Mary H. and Johnston, Michael (2009) ‘Rethinking 
Patrimonialism and Neopatrimonialism in Africa’, African Studies Review 52.1: 
126–156 
Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel (1967) The Conept of Representation, Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press 
Policy Forum (2007) ‘Can Parliamentarians Work for Us through Constituency 
Development Funds?’, Jukwaa, Dar es Salaam: Policy Forum,,  
www.policyforum-tz.org/files/Jukwaa%20Constituency%20Development%20F
unds-%20issue%201apr.pdf, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
__________ (2008a) ‘Policy Forum In Mombasa For Social Audit Field Visit’,  
www.policyforum-tz.org/policy-forum-mombasa-social-audit-field-visit, 
(accessed 12 January 2014) 
__________ (2008b) ‘Policy Forum Position Paper on the Constituency Development 
Fund’, Dar es Salaam: Policy Forum,  
www.policyforum-tz.org/files/CDFPosition.pdf, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
__________ (2009) ‘Constituency Development Fund in Tanzania: The Right 
Solution?’, Dar es Salaam: Policy Forum,  
www.policyforum-tz.org/files/ConstituencyDevelopmentFund.pdf, (accessed 12 
January 2014) 
__________ (2011) ‘Annual Progress Report: January to December 2011’,  
www.policyforum-tz.org/files/FINALReport2011(forAGM).pdf, (accessed 18 
October 2013) 
__________ (2012) ‘Local Government Working Group Annual Report 2012’,  
www.policyforum-tz.org/sites/default/files/LGWGANNUALREPORT2012.pdf, 
(accessed 18 October 2013) 
- 185 - 
Policy Forurm (n.d.) ‘Mapungufu 20 Yaliyomo Kwenye Sheria ya Mfuko wa 
Maendeleo ya Jimbo ya 2009 (20 Deficiencies in the Constituency Development 
Fund Act 2009)’, Dar es Salaam: Policy Forurm 
Polity (16 June 2007) ‘2006/2007 Budget Statement Delivered in the National 
Assembly of Malawi by Honourable Goodall E. Gondwe, MP Minister of 
Finance’ 
Pratt, Cranford (1976) The Critical Phase in Tanzania 1945–1968: Nyerere and the 
Emergence of a Socialist Strategy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
PRS Legislative Research (9 March 2011) ‘Do We Need the MPLAD Scheme’, The 
PRS Blog, http://www.prsindia.org/theprsblog/?p=829, (accessed 12 January 
2014) 
Public Agenda (12 December 2007) ‘MPs Share of the DACF–Is It Legal?’ 
__________ (23 February 2009) ‘MPs Divided over Development Fund’ 
__________ (30 April 2007) ‘Making the Utmost Use of the DACF for the Benefit of 
the People’ 
Qureshi, Sarfraz Khan (2001) ‘An Overview of Government's Poverty Alleviation 
Policies and Programmes’, MIMAP Technical Paper Series No. 12, Islamabad: 
Pakistan Institute of Development Economics,  
www.pide.org.pk/Mimap/Report12.pdf, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
Republic of Ghana, ‘District Assemblies Common Fund’, www.commonfund.gov.gh, 
(accessed 12 January 2014) 
__________ (2012) State of the Nation Address by H.E. John Evans Atta Mills, 
President of the Republic of Ghana, Accra: Parliament 
Republic of India (2002) Guidelines on Member of Parliament Local Area Development 
Scheme, New Delhi: Ministry of Planning and Programme Implementation 
Republic of Kenya, ‘Constituencies Development Fund Board’, www.cdf.go.ke, 
(accessed 12 January 2014) 
__________, ‘Parliament of Kenya’, www.parliament.go.ke/, (accessed 12 January 
2014) 
__________ (2003) The Public Officer Ethics Act, 2003, Nairobi: Parliament 
__________ (2004a) Constituencies Development Fund Regulations, 2004, Nairobi: 
Parliament 
__________ (2004b) Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 107, The Constituencies 
Development Fund Act, 2003, Nairobi: Parliament 
__________ (2007) The Constituencies Development Fund (Amendment) Act, 2003, 
Nairobi: Parliament 
__________ (2013) The Constituencies Development Fund Act 2013, Nairobi: 
Parliament 
Research on Poverty Alleviation (2007) ‘Views of the People 2007’, Dar es Salaam: 
Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA),  
www.repoa.or.tz/documents/Views_of_the_People_2007_Complete.pdf, 
(accessed 12 January 2014) 
__________ (2012) ‘Views of the People 2012’, Final Report, Dar es Salaam: Research 
on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA) 
Reserve Bank of India (2012) ‘Annual Report 2011–12’, Mumbai: Reserve Bank of 
India, http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/AnnualReport/PDFs/01ANR230812FL.pdf, 
(accessed 12 January 2014) 
 
 
 
- 186 - 
Reynolds, Andrew, Reilly, Ben and Ellis, Andrew (2005) ‘Electoral System Design: 
The New International IDEA Handbook’, International Institute for Democracy 
and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), www.idea.int/publications/esd/, 
(accessed 12 January 2014) 
Rizvi, Hasan-Askari (1986) ‘The Civilianization of Military Rule in Pakistan’, Asian 
Survey 26.10: 1067–1081 
Rudolph, Susanne Hoeber and Rudolph, Lloyd I. (2008) ‘Congress Learns to Lose: 
From a One-party Dominant to a Multiparty System in India’, in Edward 
Friedman and Joseph Wong (eds), Political Transitions in Dominant Party 
Systems: Learning to Lose, London and New York: Routledge 
Sansa, Godfrey (2010) ‘The Impact of Institutional Reforms on Poverty and Inequality 
in Tanzania’, Thesis for Doctor of Philosophy, Bath: Department of Social and 
Policy Sciences, University of Bath 
Sasaoka, Yuichi (2008) ‘Politics of Fiscal Decentralization in Kenya’, Regional 
Development Dialogue 29.2: 74–85 
Schedler, Andreas (1999) ‘Conceptualising Accountability’, in Andreas Schedler, Larry 
Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds), The Self-Restraining State: Power and 
Accountability in New Democracies, London: Lynne Reinner 
Schedler, Andreas (ed) (2006) Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree 
Competition, Boulder and London Lynne Rienner Publishers 
Schmidt, Steffen W., Guasti, Laura, Lande, Carl H. and Scott, James C. (eds) (1977) 
Friends, Followers, and Factions, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press 
Scott, James C. (1969) ‘Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change’, American 
Political Science Review 62.4: 1142–1158 
__________ (1972) ‘Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia’, 
American Political Science Review 66.1: 91–113 
SEND Ghana (2010) ‘Making Decentralisation Work for the Poor’, Tamale: SEND 
West Africa,  
http://sendwestafrica.org/downloads/annual-reports/dacf%20report%20%20mak
ing%20decentralisaton%20work%20for%20the%20poor.pdf, (accessed 12 
January 2014) 
Shivji, Issa G. (1976) Class Struggles in Tanzania, London: Heinemann 
__________ (2006) ‘Debating Constitutional Amendments in Tanzania’, Working 
Paper 3, Dar es Salaam: HakiElimu,  
http://hakielimu.org/files/publications/document57debating_constitutional_amen
dments_tz_en.pdf, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
Sitta, Samuel, Slaa, Willibrod and Cheyo, John Momose (2008) ‘Bunge Lenye Meno: A 
Parliament with Teeth, for Tanzania’, London: Africa Research Institute,  
www.africaresearchinstitute.org/files/papers/docs/Bunge-Lenye-Meno-A-Parlia
ment-with-Teeth-for-Tanzania-LAXNNAJ547.pdf, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
Sivaramakrishnan, K. C. (2010) ‘Judicial Setback for Panchayats and Local Bodies’, 
Economic and Political Weekly 45.32: 43–46 
Slaa, Willibrod (2010) ‘Changing the Standing Orders of Parliament in Tanzania’, in 
Frederick et al. Stapenhurst (eds), African Parliamentary Reform, Oxon and 
New York: Routledge 
Solomon Star (28 June 2010) ‘RCDF Initiator Pledge to Redirect the Funding’ 
State Bank of Pakistan, ‘Historical Exchange Rate of US Dollar’,  
www.sbp.org.pk/ecodata/HER-USDollar.xls, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
 
- 187 - 
State University of New York, Center for International Development (2009) 
‘Constituency Development Funds Workshop Report’, Constituency 
Development Funds Workshop, New York, 8–9 December 2009, 
www.cid.suny.edu/publications1/CDF%20Albany%20Workshop%20Report.pdf, 
(accessed 12 January 2014) 
__________ (2011) ‘Principles and Guidelines for Constituency Development Funds’, 
New York: State University of New York, Center for International Development 
(SUNY/CID), 
www.cid.suny.edu/publications1/CDF_Guidelines_CPA-SUNY_June2011.pdf, 
(accessed 12 January 2014) 
Steeves, Jeffrey (2006) ‘Presidential Succession in Kenya: The Transiiton from Moi to 
Kibaki’, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 44.2: 211–233 
Stokes, Susan C. (2007) ‘Political Clientelism’, in Carles Boix and Suzan C. Stokes 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics, New York: Oxford 
University Press 
Stokes, Susan C. et al. (2013) Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of 
Distributive Politics, New York: Cambridge University Press 
Tambila, Kapwepwe (2004) ‘The Ups and Downs of the Tanzanian Parliament 
1961–1994’, in Rwekaza S. Mukandala, Samuel S. Mushi and Casmir 
Rubagumya (eds), People's Representatives: Theory and Practice of 
Parliamentary Democracy in Tanzania, Kampala: Fountain Publishers 
Tanganyika African National Union (1971) Tanzania: Party Guidelines: Mwongozo wa 
Tanu (Guideline of TANU), Dar es Salaam: Tanganyika African National Union 
(TANU) 
Tansey, Oisín (2007) ‘Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for 
Non-probability Sampling’, Political Science and Politics 40.4: 765–772 
Tanzania Daima (18 March 2008) ‘Pinda Akemea Rushwa Serikali na Mitaa (Pinda 
Criticises Corruption at District Governments)’ 
Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee (2011) ‘The 2010 Tanzania General 
Elections: Report of the Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee’, Dar es 
Salaam: Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee (TEMCO),  
www.temco.udsm.ac.tz/news_events/view_news_item.php?id=38&intVariationI
D=1&szTitle=Current, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
Taylor-Robinson, Michelle M. (2006) ‘The Difficult Road from Caudillismo to 
Democracy: The Impact of Clientelism in Honduras’, in Gretchen Helmke and 
Steven Levitsky (eds), Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin 
America, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
The Bhutanese (17 March 2012) ‘CDG Stopped: Political Gimmick or for Fair 
Elections?’ 
The Chronicle (9 May 2007) ‘DCE Knocks Down MP’ 
__________ (19 December 2005) ‘Ahwoi Urges Second Look at MPs Common Fund’ 
__________ (24 March 2006) ‘Administrator Hacks MPs Funds’ 
__________ (31 July 2003) ‘Decentralisation and Conflict in the Fourth Republic’ 
The Citizen (16 March 2011) ‘Activists Out to Block MPs From Constituency Funds’ 
__________ (17 February 2010) ‘CCM Finally Admits Split within Party ’ 
__________ (17 January 2912) ‘Court Gives Up on Poll Petitions over Lack of 
Funding’ 
__________ (17 July 2009) ‘Adulterated Fuel Swamps Pump Market’ 
__________ (22 May 2013) ‘Activists Blame MPs for Abusing Development Kit’ 
__________ (26 January 2012) ‘Pinda's Defence of Bunge Allowances ’ 
- 188 - 
__________ (26 November 2011) ‘CCM Battles Not Yet Over’ 
__________ (29 August 2009) ‘Activist to Challenge CDCF Law’ 
The Express Tribune (8 March 2012) ‘Pork-barrel Politics’ 
__________ (10 June 2013) ‘Weeding Out Graft: NEC May Abolish PM's 
Discretionary Fund’ 
__________ (11 June 2013) ‘Uplift Budget Fattened by Rs282b’ 
The Ghanaian Times (24 August 2010) ‘MPs Support Constituency Development Fund’ 
The Guardian (1 August 2009) ‘Keep Out of Internal politics, Membe Tells Off 
Envoys’ 
The Guardian (4 August 2008) ‘Policy Forum Asks the Parliament Not to Legislate 
CDF for Now’ 
__________ (10 February 2013) ‘House to Reconstitute Standing Committees’ 
__________ (14 November 2010) ‘How Sitta was Axed’ 
__________ (16 February 2010) ‘CCM Gives Mwinyi Team More Time’ 
__________ (16 March 2013) ‘Chenge to Head House Budget Committee’ 
__________ (29 June 2013) ‘MP Wants Probe Committee on Sugar and Rice Import 
Permits’ 
The Guardian (United Kingdom) (26 August 2012) ‘New Africa: The Politician 
Fighting Corruption in Tanzania’ 
The Manila Times (28 August 2009) ‘Pork Barrel 101’ 
The Philippine Star (19 May 2010) ‘President Controls Pork Barrel – DBM Official’ 
The Post (15 November 2003) ‘Acc Arrests Col. Ngoma’ 
__________ (16 October 2002) ‘Machungwa Accuses Fodep of Decampaigning Him’ 
__________ (25 September 2003) ‘Arrest Mabenga for Theft – Supreme Court’ 
The Standard (1 July 2009) ‘Uhuru in Fresh Row with MPs over Billions of CDF Cash’ 
__________ (21 June 2009) ‘CDF Monies a Double Edged Sword for MPs’ 
__________ (24 October 2002) ‘MPs Okay Motion on Sh20 Million for Constituencies’ 
Therkildsen, Ole and Bourgouin, France (2012) ‘Continuity and Change in Tanzania's 
Ruling Coalition: Legacies, Crises nad Weak Productive Capacity’, DIIS 
Working Paper, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), 
http://subweb.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/WP2012/WP2012-06-Continuity-an
d-change-Tanzania_web.pdf, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
Tidemand, Per (2009) ‘Sector Budget Support in Practice: Desk Study Local 
Government Sector in Tanzania’, Overseas Development Institute, 
www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/5583.
pdf, (accessed 30 October 2012) 
Times of Zambia (1 March 2000) ‘Sejani Counsels DAs’ 
__________ (18 August 2011) ‘MMD, PF And UND Battle It Out for Chifubu 
Constituency’ 
__________ (28 March 2003) ‘DAs Motion Thwarted Again’ 
Tordoff, William (1967a) Government and Politics in Tanzania: A Collection of Essays 
Covering the Period from September 1960 to July 1966, Nairobi: East African 
Publishing House 
__________ (1967b) ‘Tanzania: Democracy and the One-Party State’, Government 
and Opposition 2.4: 599–614 
__________ (1994) ‘Decentralisation: Comparative Experience in Commonwealth 
Africa’, Journal of Modern African Studies 32.4: 555–580 
 
 
 
- 189 - 
Transparency International Kenya (2001) ‘Harambee: Pooling Together or Pulling 
Apart?’, Nairobi: Transparency International Kenya,  
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/kenia/01394.pdf, (accessed 12 January 
2014) 
__________ (2003a) ‘Harambee: Patronage Politics and Disregard for Law’, Adili 50, 
Nairobi: Transparency International Kenya,  
www.tikenya.org/documents/Adili50.pdf, (accessed 28 August 2011) 
__________ (2003b) ‘Harambee: The Spirit of Giving or Reaping?’, Adili 37, Nairobi: 
Transparency International Kenya, www.tikenya.org/documents/Adili37.pdf, 
(accessed 11 July 2010) 
__________ (2005) ‘The Constituencies Development Fund: An Overview of Key 
Concerns’, Adilli 68, Nairobi: Transparency International Kenya,  
http://tikenya.org/images/downloads/adili/adili68.pdf, (accessed 30 May 2012) 
Tripp, Aili Mari (1992) ‘Local Organizations, Participation and the State in Urban 
Tanzania’, in Goran Hyden and Michael (eds) Bratton, Governance and Politics 
in Africa, Boulder and London: Lynne Rinner 
__________ (2000) ‘Political Reform in Tanzania: The Struggle for Associational 
Autonomy’, Comparative Politics 32.2: 191–214 
__________ (2012) ‘Donor Assistance and Political Reform in Tanzania’, Working 
Paper No. 2012/37, Helsinki: United Nations University, World Institute for 
Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER),  
www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/2012/en_GB/wp2012-037/, 
(accessed 12 January 2014) 
Tsekpo, Anthony and Hudson, Alan (2009) ‘Parliamentary Strengthening and the Paris 
Principle: Tanzania Case Study’, London: Overseas Development Institute,  
www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/4422.pdf, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
Twaweza (2010a) ‘Do People Prefer Active MPs?: MP Performance in 2010 CCM 
Primaries’, Dar es Salaam: Twaweza,  
www.uwazi.org/uploads/files/How%20they%20fared_final_120810(1).pdf, 
(accessed 12 January 2014) 
__________ (2010b) ‘Do They Work for Us?: Eight Facts About MPs in Tanzania’, 
Policy Note 01/2010, Dar es Salaams: Twaweza,  
www.twaweza.org/uploads/files/do_they_work_for_us_040210_final_eng_for_
publication.pdf, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
__________ (2010c) ‘Who Returned? Performance in the Bunge and MP Re-election’, 
Dar es Salaam: Twaweza, www.uwazi.org/uploads/files/Who%20returned.pdf, 
(accessed 12 January 2014) 
Uganda Debt Network (2007) ‘Briefing Paper on the Constituency Development Fund 
(CDF) in Uganda’, Kampala: Uganda Debt Network,,  
www.udn.or.ug/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/CDF-briefing-paper.pdf, (accessed 
12 January 2014) 
United Kingdom (2002) Local Government Decision-Making: Citizen Participation and 
Local Accountability: Examples of Good (and Bad) Practice in Kenya, London: 
Department for International Development (DFID) 
__________ (2013) You and Your MP, London: House of Commons 
United Nations Development Programme (2010) ‘Deepening Democracy in Tanzania 
Programme 2007–2010, Terminal  Evaluation’, New York: United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP),  
http://erc.undp.org/evaluationadmin/downloaddocument.html?docid=4366, 
(accessed 12 January 2014) 
- 190 - 
United Republic of Tanzania, ‘Parliament of Tanzania’, www.parliament.go.tz/, 
(accessed 12 January 2014) 
__________ (1964) National Assembly (Elections) Act, Dodoma: Parliament 
__________ (1977) The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es 
Salaam: Judiciary 
__________ (1999) Lutter Symphorian Nelson v. Attorney General and Ibrahim Said 
Msabaha, Civil Appeal No. 24 of 1999, Dar es Salaam: Court of Appeal 
__________ (2000) Electoral Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 2000, Dodoma: 
Parliament 
__________ (2006a) Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST), Dar es Salaam: 
Ministry of Finance 
__________ (2006b) Majadiliano ya Bunge, Mkutano wa Nne, Kikao cha Arobaini na 
Nne, Tarehe 16 Agosti, 2006 (Parliamentary Discussions, 4th Parliament, 44th 
Session, 16 August 2006), Dodoma: Parliament 
__________ (2006c) Majadiliano ya Bunge, Mkutano wa Tano, Kikao cha Tatu, Tarehe 
2 Novemba, 2006 (Parliamentary Discussions, 5th Parliament, 3rd Session, 2 
November 2006), Dodoma: Parliament 
__________ (2006d) Miscellaneous Civil Cause No. 77 of 2005, Dar es Salaam: High 
Court 
__________ (2007a) Kanuni za Kudumu za Bunge, Toleo la 2007 (Standing Orders of 
the Parliament, 2007 Edition), Dodoma: Parliament 
__________ (2007b) Majadiliano ya Bunge, Mkutano wa Nane, Kikao cha Arobaini na 
Saba, Terehe 17 Agosti, 2007 (Parliamentary Discussions, 8th Parliament, 47th 
Session, 17 August 2007) Dodoma: Parliament 
__________ (2007c) Majadiliano ya Bunge, Mkutano wa Tisa, Kikao cha Kumi na Tatu, 
Terehe Novemba, 2007 (Parliamentary Discussions, 9th Parliament, 13th 
Session, 15 November 2007) Dodoma: Parliament 
__________ (2007d) Speech by the Minister for Finance Hon. Zakia Hamdani Meghji 
(MP), Introducing to the National Assembly, the Estimates of Government 
Revenue and Expenditure for Financial Year 2007/08 on 14th June, 2007, Dar 
es Salam: Ministry of Finance 
__________ (2008a) ‘The Constituencies Development Fund Act, 2008 (draft)’,  
__________ (2008b) Hotuba ya Rais wa Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania, MH. 
Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete Aliyoitoa Bungeni Tarehe 21 Agosti 2008 (Speech of the 
President of the United Republic of Tanzania, Hon. Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete in 
Parliament 21 August 2008), Dodoma: Parliament 
__________ (2008c) Majadiliano ya Bunge, Mkutano wa Kumi, Kikao cha Tatu, 31 
Januari, 2008 (Parliamentary Discussions, 10th Parliament, 3rd Session, 31 
January 2008), Dodoma: Parliament 
__________ (2008d) The National Assembly (Administration) Act, Dodoma: Parliament 
__________ (2009a) The Constituencies Development Catalyst Fund Act, 2009, 
Dodoma: Parliament 
__________ (2009b) Hotuba ya Waziri wa Fedha na Uchumi Mhe. Mustafa Haidi 
Mkulo (MB.), Akiwasilisha Bungeni Mapendekezo ya Serikali Kuhusu 
Makadirio ya Mapato na Matumizi kwa Mwaka 2009/2010 (Speech of the 
Minister for Finance and Economy Hon. Mustafa Haidi Mkulo (MB.), 
Presenting at the Parliament the Government Proposal on the Estimates of the 
Revenue and Expenditures for Year 2009/2010), Dodoma: Parliament 
 
 
- 191 - 
__________ (2009c) Majadiliano ya Bunge, Mkutano wa Kumi na Sita, Kikao cha 
Arobaini na Tatu, Tarehe 31 Julai, 2009 (Parliamentary Discussions, 16th 
Parliament, 43th Session, 31 July 2009), Dodoma: Parliament 
__________ (2009d) Majadiliano ya Bunge, Mkutano wa Kumi na Sita, Kikao cha 
Thelathini na Sita, Tarehe 23 Julai, 2009 (Parliamentary Discussions, 16th 
Parliament, 36th Session, 23 July 2009), Dodoma: Parliament 
__________ (2010a) Election Expenses Act, 2010, Dodoma: Parliament 
__________ (2010b) Mfuko wa Maendeleo wa Jimbo (Constituency Development 
Fund), Dar es Salaam: Ministry of Finance 
__________ (2011a) Majadiliano ya Bunge, Mkutano wa Tano, Kikao cha Tatu, Tarehe 
10 Novemba, 2011 (Parliamentary Discussions, 5th Parliament, 3rd Session, 10 
November 2011),  
__________ (2011b) Mgawanyo wa Mfuko wa Maendeleo wa Jimbo - 2010/2011 
(Allocations for the Funds of Development of Constituency - 2010/2011), Dar es 
Salaam: Ministry of Finance 
__________ (2011c) Miaka Hamsini ya Uhuru (1961–2011): Maendeleo ya Bunge, 
Mafanikio na Changamoto (Fifty Years of Independence (1961–2011): 
Development of Parliament, Successes and Challenges), Dodoma: Parliament 
__________ (2012a) Annual General Report of the Controller and Auditor General on 
the Audit of the Financial Statements of the Central Government for the year 
ended 30th June, 2011, Dar es Salam: National Audit Office 
__________ (2012b) Postcode List, Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Communications 
Regulatory Authority 
__________ (2013a) 2012 Population and Housing Census: Population Distribution by 
Administrative Areas, Ministry of Finance and Office of Chief Government 
Statistician National Bureau of Statistics, President's Office, Finance, Economy 
and Development Planning, Zanzibar 
__________ (2013b) Annual General Report of the Controller and Auditor General on 
the Financial Statements of Local Government Authorities for the Financial 
Year ended 30th June 2012, National Audit Office 
__________ (2013c) The Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 3) Act, 2013, 
Dodoma: Parliament 
__________ (n.d.) Fact Sheet No. 1: The Legislative Process in Tanzania, Dodoma: 
Parliament 
United Republic of Tanzania, Parliament (2010c) The Constituencies Development 
Catalyst Fund Act Regulations, Dodoma: Parliament 
van de Walle, Nicolas (2003) ‘Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa's Emerging 
Party Systems’, Journal of Modern African Studies 41.2: 297–321 
__________ (2009) ‘The Democratization of Political Clientelism in Sub-Saharan 
Africa’, 3rd European Conference on African Studies, Leipzig, Germany, 4–7 
June 2009,  
www.uni-leipzig.de/~ecas2009/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_dow
nload&gid=1457&Itemid=24, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
van Hollen, Eliza (1987) ‘Pakistan in 1986: Trials of Transition’, Asian Survey 27.2: 
143–54 
van Zyl, Albert (2010) ‘Constituency Development Funds: African Parliaments' 
Faustian Bargain’, Open Budgets Blog, Washington, D.C.: International Budget 
Partnership, 
http://openbudgetsblog.org/2010/08/12/constituency-development-funds-african
-parliaments-faustian-bargain/, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
- 192 - 
Venugopal, Varsha and Yilmaz, Serdar (2010) ‘Decentralization in Tanzania: An 
Assessment of Local Government Discretion and Accountability’, Public 
Administration and Development 30.215–231 
Sudan Vision (24 September 2009) ‘Focus On South: Constituency Development Fund: 
Crooked theft by MPs’ 
Wang, Vibeke (2005) ‘The Accountability Function of Parliament in New Democracies: 
Tanzanian Perspectives’, CMI Working Papers, Bergen: Chr. Michelsen 
Institute, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PSGLP/Resources/TheAccountabilityfunctio
n.pdf, (accessed 12 January 2014) 
Waseem, Mohammad (1992) ‘Pakistan's Lingering Crisis of Dyarchy’, Asian Survey 
32.7: 617–634 
Wasti, Tahir (2009) The Application of Islamic Criminal Law in Pakistan: Sharia in 
Practice, Leiden: Brill 
Weghorst, Keith R. and Lindberg, Stattan I. (2013) ‘What Drives the Swing Voters in 
Africa?’, American Journal of Political Science 00.0: 1–18 
Weinstein, Laura (2011) ‘The Politics of Government Expenditures in Tanzania, 
1999–2007’, African Studies Review 54.1: 33–57 
Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca (2012) ‘What Wins Votes: Why Some Politicians Opt Out of 
Clientelism’, American Journal of Political Science 0.0: 1–16 
Wilkinson, Steven I. (2007) ‘Explaining Changing Patterns of Party-voter Linkages in 
India’, in Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson (eds), Patrons, Clients, and 
Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Yeager, Rodger (1989) Tanzania: An African Experiment, Boulder: Westview Press 
Yoon, Mi Yung (2004) ‘Explaining Women's Legislative Representation in Sub-Sahran 
Africa’, Legislative Studies Quarterly 29.3: 447–468 
__________ (2008) ‘Special Seats for Women in the National Legislature: The Case of 
Tanzania’, Africa Today 55.1: 61–86 
__________ (2011) ‘More Women in the Tanzanian Legislature: Do Members Matter?’, 
Journal of Contemporary African Studies 29.1: 83–98 
The Zimbabwean (27 April 2011) ‘CDF Audit Underway’ 
Zolberg, Aristide R. (1966) Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West Africa, 
Chicago: Rand McNally and Company 
 
 
- 193 - 
Appendices 
 
Appendix A  List of Interviewees 
 
1. Tanzania 
 
Two rounds of fieldwork were undertaken in Tanzania from October 2010 to April 2011 
and from October 2011 to March 2011, during which I interviewed 34 MPs, 3 leaders of 
political parties who were not MPs, 5 parliamentary staff, 2 officials of central 
ministries, 5 personal assistants of MPs, 4 officials at the District Councils in the Lindi 
and Singida regions and 3 District Councillors in the Singida Urban constituency, 9 
academics, 10 members of CSOs and private companies, 4 officials of donor agencies. 
 
1.1. MPs 
 
The MPs who provided me information and ideas related to this research, mainly 
through interviews but also conversations, are listed below. Although not listed here, I 
also heard the views of the special seats MPs who were not allocated the CDCF funds. 
I mainly interviewed two groups of MPs during the first fieldwork. First, I 
interviewed the members of the Parliamentary Special Committee that reviewed the 
Standing Orders (Table 3.1 in Chapter 3) and the parliamentary team that redrafted the 
CDF Bill (Table 3.2 in Chapter 3) to understand the CDF policy process in Tanzania. 
Second, I interviewed MPs who had served Parliament for three consecutive terms since 
2000 to hear their views on how the interactions between MPs and voters changed over 
time. There are some MPs listed below who are not in either of these categories, but I 
interviewed them through other contacts. I used a set of questions (Appendix B) for the 
interviews with ten MPs who are marked with an asterisk (*) in the list. I used the set of 
questions only partially for the remaining interviews due to time constraints, or I did not 
use it at all because the interviews were held before the questions were formulated. All 
interviews were held in English, except for Said Juma Nkumba who answered in 
Swahili. MPs are listed by their full names, constituencies and regions, political parties 
in parentheses, their positions in the cabinet or parties if any, which are followed by the 
interview dates. 
 
1. Said Mohamed Mtanda, MP for Mchinga, Lindi (CCM), 7 November 2010 and 
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many times in 2011 
2. Agrey Deaisil Mwanri, MP for Siha, Kilimanjaro (CCM), Deputy Minister of Prime 
Minister’s Office–Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG), 
16 November 2010 
3. Hamad Rashid Mohamed, MP for Wawi, Zanzibar (CUF), member of the 
Parliamentary Special Committee on the Standing Orders, 31 January 2011 
4. Festus Bulugu Limbu, MP for Magu Town, Mwanza (CCM), 11 February 2011* 
5. Abdallah Omar Kigoda, MP for Handeni, Tanga (CCM), 11 February 2011* 
6. Beatrice Matumbo Shellukindo, MP for Kilindi, Tanga (CCM), member of the 
Parliamentary Special Committee on the Standing Orders, 14 February 2011 
7. Zitto Zuberi Kabwe, MP for Kigoma North, Kigoma (CHADEMA), former Deputy 
Secretary General of CHADEMA (2007–2013) and a member of the Parliamentary 
Team that redrafted the CDF Bill, 14 February 2011 
8. John Momose Cheyo, MP for Bariadi East, Shinyanga (UDP), Chairman of UDP 
and a member of the Parliamentary Team that redrafted the CDF Bill, 15 February 
2011* and 7 February 2012 
9. Lazaro Samuel Nyalandu, MP for Singida North, Singida (CCM), Deputy Minister 
of Industry, Trade and Marketing, 17 February 2011* 
10. Mary Michael Nagu, MP for Hanang, Manyara (CCM), Minister for the Prime 
Minister’s Office for Investment and Empowerment, 17 February 2011 
11. Masoud Abdalla Salim, MP for Mtambile, Zanzibar (CUF), 17 February 2011* 
12. Tundu Antiphas Mughwai Lissu, MP for Singida East, Singida (CHADEMA), Chief 
Whip of CHADEMA, 17 February 2011* 
13. Mohamed Hamisi Missanga, Singida West, Singida (CCM), 24 February 2011* 
14. Nimrod Elirehema Mkono, MP for Musoma Rural, Musoma (CCM), member of the 
Parliamentary Special Committee on the Standing Orders, 11 April 2011* 
15. Job Yustino Ndugai, MP for Kongwa, Dodoma (CCM), Deputy Speaker and former 
Chairman of the Parliamentary Special Committee on the Standing Orders, 11 April 
2011 
16. Herbert James Mntangi, MP for Muheza, Tanga (CCM), 11 April 2011* 
17. Said Juma Nkumba, MP for Sikonge, Tabora (CCM), 12 April 2011* 
18. Mohammed Gulam Dewji, MP for Singida Urban, Singida (CCM), 14 April 2011 
 
During the second fieldwork, most of the MPs I interviewed were randomly 
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selected while trying to maintain a variety of political parties and representative 
geographical areas. The objectives of the interviews were 1) to understand constituency 
service by Tanzanian MPs by using standardised questions with ratings (e.g. asking for 
the ratings of significance between 1 (=Least) and 5 (=Most)) for potential 
generalisation and comparison across MPs and 2) to learn about how the CDC 
Committees function in their constituencies (see Appendix B for the questions). Due to 
the limited time available for each interview, I managed to use the standardised 
questions only for eight interviews. Despite the limited number of responses, the use of 
the standardised questions helped me objectively understand the variation in the way in 
which MPs interact with voters and provide assistance to them. The interview data are 
presented as examples in Chapter 6. The names of these interviewees are not marked 
below to ensure confidentiality. 
 
1. Mendrad Lutengano Kigola, MP for Mufindi South, Iringa (CCM), 10 November 
2011 
2. Hamisi Andrew Kigwangalla, MP for Nzega, Tabora (CCM), 15 November 2011 
3. David Zacharia Kafulila, MP for Kigoma South, Kigoma (NCCR-Mageuzi), 15 and 
16 November 2011 
4. Mustapha Boay Akunaay, MP for Mbulu, Manyara (CHADEMA), 16 November 
2011 
5. January Yusuf Makamba, MP for Bunbuli, Tanga (CCM), Deputy Minister for 
Communication, Science and Technology, 16 November 2011 
6. Gosbert Begumisa Blandes, MP for Karagwe, Kagera (CCM), 16 November 2011 
7. Khalfan Hilaly Aeshi, MP for Sumbawanga, Rukwa (CCM), 17 November 2011 
8. Muhammad Ibrahim Sanya, MP for Mji Mkongwe, Zanzibar (CUF), 18 November 
2011 
9. John Magale Shibuda, MP for Maswa, Shinyanga (CHADEMA), 31 January 2012 
10. Samuel John Sitta, MP for Urambo East, Tabora (CCM), former Speaker of the 
National Assembly (2005–2010) and Minister for East African Cooperation, 1 and 2 
February 2012 
11. Halima James Mdee, MP for Kawe, Dar es Salaam (CHADEMA), 3 February 2012 
12. Mussa Azan Zungu, MP for Ilala, Dar es Salaam (CCM), 7 February 2012 
13. Ahmed Juma Ngwali, MP for Ziwani, Zanzibar (CUF), 8 February 2012 
14. Chrisopher Ole Sendeka, MP for Simanjiro, Manyara (CCM), 9 February 2012 
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15. Silyvestry Francis Koka, MP for Kibaha Urban, Pwani (CCM), 10 February 2012 
16. Rajab Mbarouk Mohammed, MP for Ole, Zanzibar (CUF), 10 February 2012 
 
1.2. Party Leaders 
 
1. Peter Kuga Mziray, Chairman of the African Progressive Party of Tanzania 
(APPT-Maendeleo) and a presidential candidate in 2010, 4 February 2011. 
2. Pius Msekwa, former Deputy Chairman of the CCM Mainland (2007–2012) and 
former Speaker of the National Assembly (1994–2005), 6 December 2011 
3. Willibrod Peter Slaa, Secretary General of CHADEMA, a former member of the 
Parliamentary Special Committee on the Standing Orders and a presidential 
candidate in 2010, 15 December 2011 
 
1.3. Government Officials 
 
1. Nenelwa Mwihambi Wankanga, Deputy Chief of the Legal Counsel, National 
Assembly, 9 November 2010 
2. Angelo J. Haule, Senior Economist, Planning Department, Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Affairs, 26 January 2011 
3. Packshard Mkongwa, Director of Policy and Planning, Prime Minister’s Office 
Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG), 6 April 2011 
 
1.4. Academia 
 
Meetings with the scholars listed below were not only for collecting data but also for 
broader discussions on politics in Tanzania. 
 
1. Bernadeta Killian, Dean of the Department of Journalism and Mass Communication, 
University of Dar es Salaam, 15 October 2010 
2. John Jingu, Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, 
University of Dar es Salaam, 20 October 2010, 23 November 2010, 23 March 2011, 
13 October 2011, 12 January 2012 and more 
3. Richard Mbunda, Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Public 
Administration, University of Dar es Salaam, 9 December 2010, 24 March 2011 and 
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more 
4. Bashiru Ally, Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, 
University of Dar es Salaam, 10 November 2010 
5. Alexander Boniface Makulilo, Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Public 
Administration, University of Dar es Salaam, 24 March 2011 
6. Amukowa Anangwe, Professor, Department of Political Science and Sociology, 
University of Dodoma, 6 April 2011 
7. Benson Bana, Head of the Political Science and Public Administration Department, 
University of Dar es Salaam, 23 November 2011 
8. Chris Maina Peter, Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, 22 
December 2011 
9. Bruce Heilman, Professor, Department of Political Science and Public 
Administration, University of Dar es Salaam, 26 January 2012 
10. Godfrey Sansa, Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, 
University of Dar es Salaam, 8 March 2012 
 
1.5. CSOs and Private Companies 
 
Meetings with CSO representatives were a mixture of data collection and discussions. 
 
1. Hebron Mwakagenda, Director, the Leadership Forum, 9 October 2010 and 23 
October 2011 
2. Tony Baker, International Intern/Policy Analyst, Policy Analysis and Advocacy, 
HakiElimu, 21 October 2010 
3. Michael Ward, Director, Development Advisory Services, KPMG Tanzania, 22 
October 2010 
4. Geir Sundet, Programme Director of Accountability in Tanzania, KPMG, 22 
October 2010 
5. Rakesh Rajani, Head, Twaweza, 22 October 2010 
6. Semkae Kilonzo, Coordinator, Policy Forum, 4 November 2010 
7. Jamal Msami, Assistant Researcher, Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA), 20 
January 2011, 31 October 2011 and more 
8. Brian Cooksey, Director, Tanzania Development Research Group, 25 January 2011 
9. Peter Bofin, consultant, 25 January 2011 
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10. Harold Sungusia, Director of Advocacy and Reforms, Legal and Human Rights 
Centre, 12 December 2011 
 
1.6. Donors 
 
1. Miharu Furukawa, Project Formulation Advisor, Japan International Cooperation 
Agency, 8 October 2010 and 27 January 2011 
2. Diana Henderson, Governance Working Group Secretariat, 21 October 2010 
3. Steve Lee, Senior Governance Advisor, United Nations Development Programme, 
21 October 2011 
4. Aran Corrigan, Senior Governance Advisor, Embassy of Ireland, 10 January 2012 
 
1.7. Interviews in Lindi (March 2011) 
 
I accompanied a visit by Said Mtanda, MP for Mchinga (CCM), to his constituency for 
two weeks in March 2011 to understand the constituencies in rural areas and to observe 
his interactions with his personal assistant, District Councillors, local party members, 
voters, his family and friends. I interviewed his personal assistant to understand his role 
in the constituency and the two officials of the Lindi District Council. The interview 
with Rashid Ibrahim Tondoro was held in Swahili and translated by Said Mtanda, while 
the other two interviews were held in English. 
 
1. Rashid Ibrahim Tondoro, Personal Assistant to Said Mtanda, MP for Mchinga 
(CCM), 7 March 2011 
2. Hanus Yunah, District Planning Officer, Lindi District Council, 9 March 2011 
3. Selemani S. Ngaweje, District Natural Resources Officer and Acting District 
Executive Director, Lindi District Council, 9 March 2011 
 
1.8. Interviews in Singida (April 2011 and February 2012) 
 
I also visited the Singida town for two days in April 2011 to interview personal 
assistants of MPs, District Councillors and the officials of the Singida Municipal Office 
to understand their roles in relation to MPs and the operation of the CDCF. I went to the 
Singida town again for two days in February 2012 to see the projects funded by 
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Mohammed Dewji, MP for Singida Urban (CCM) and the project funded by the CDCF. 
The two regions were selected mainly due to my familiarity with the MPs and 
the seniority of MPs in the case of Singida. Singida was traditionally a stronghold of the 
CCM with three politicians. Lazaro Nyalandu, MP for Singida North and Deputy 
Minister of Industry, Trade and Marketing, and Mohamed Missanga, MP for Singida 
West have been MPs for three consecutive terms since 2000. Since 2005, Singida Urben 
has been represented by Mohammed Dewji, one of the leading businessmen in the 
country (Mohammed Enterprises Tanzania Limited). He spent US$500,000 from his 
income every year on various development projects in his constituency during his first 
term. He also contributed to the construction of 88 CCM branch office buildings across 
Singida Region.
192
 In 2010, Tundu Lissu, current Chief Whip of CHADEMA, won the 
newly created Singida East constituency. 
All interviews were arranged by Hassan Philip Mazala and held in Swahili with 
his presence. 
 
1. Hassan Philip Mazala, CCM Publicity Secretary in Singida District and Personal 
Assistant to Mohammed Gulam Dewji, MP for Singida Urban, 18 April 2011 
2. Mwajuma Shaha, District Councillor in Singida Municipality, CCM Special Seat, 18 
April 2011 
3. Halima Athumani Ngimba, Personal Assistant to Mohamed Hamisi Missanga, MP 
for Singida West, 18 April 2011 
4. Anisa Awadhi Mbaraka, District Councillor for Mughanga Ward in Singida 
Municipality (CCM), 18 April 2011 
5. Reuben E. Ibrahim, Personal Assistant to Lazaro Samuel Nyalandu, MP for Singida 
North, 18 April 2011 
6. Fatuma Omari Latu, Acting District Planning Officer, Singida Municipality, 19 
April 2011 
7. Bakari Ntamau Omari, Member of the Constituencies Development Catalyst (CDC) 
Committee in Singida Urban, 19 April 2011 
8. Eva Simon Mbelwa, Member of the CDC Committee in Singida Urban, 19 April 
2011 
9. Hamisi Homamedi Kisuke, District Councillor for Misuna Ward in Singida 
                                                   
192
 Interviews, Dewji (2011) and Mazala (2012). 
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Municipality, 19 April 2011 
10. Joseph S. Sabore, District Executive Director, Singida District Council, 19 April 
2011 
 
2. Kenya 
 
I interviewed key individuals who were engaged with the policymaking and operation 
of the CDF in Nairobi, Kenya, in January 2011. Most of the interviews were arranged 
by Munene Charles Kiura. 
 
1. Peter Kenneth, former MP for Gatanga, Murang'a (Kenya National Congress), 
former Assistant Minister for State for Planning, National Development and Vision 
2030 (2008–2013) and presidential candidate in 2012, 7 January 2011 
2. Muriuki Karue, former MP for Ol’Kalau, Nyandarua (NARC), 9 January 2011 
3. Lameck Siage, development consultant, 10 January 2011 
4. Michael Otieno Oloo, Adviser, National Taxpayers Association, 11 January 2011 
5. Tom Wolf, Lead Researcher, Synovate Kenya, 13 January 2011 
6. Jacton Omondi Ojow, Project Officer, CDF Board Secretariat, 13 January 2011 
7. Obuya Bagaka, lecturer, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, 
University of Nairobi, 13 January 2011 
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Appendix B  Questions for the Interviews with MPs in Tanzania 
 
I prepared two sets of guiding questions for semi-structured interviews with Tanzanian 
MPs. Some of them were adapted from Cheeseman’s (2006) questions for his 
interviews with Kenyan MPs. The questions were tailored to each interview depending 
on the interviewees as explained in Appendix A. 
 
1. Questions for First Fieldwork 
1.  Expectations of Constituents to MPs 
1) What do your constituents expect you to personally provide as an MP? Choose from 
the options below and give examples. 
a. Donation to local self-help projects 
b. School fees 
c. Medical expenses 
d. Wedding/funeral expenses 
e. Funds for local businesses 
f. Legal advice 
g. Others 
 
2) Have these expectations changed over years? Do expectations change between 
election and non-election years? If so, how? 
 
2.  Responses of MPs to Constituents (Constituency Service) 
1) How do you respond to these expectations of constituents? 
 
2) How much time do you allocate to responding to these expectations, in comparison 
to other activities as an MP (e.g. lawmaking, parliamentary committees)? 
 
3) How do you raise funds to respond to these expectations? 
a. Your own salary 
b. Funds allocated by the government 
c. Funds allocated by the party 
d. Leaders (e.g. senior party members, cabinet members) 
e. Your family members 
f. Business partners 
g. Borrow funds from a bank 
h. Others 
 
3.  Constituencies Development Catalyst Fund (CDCF) 
1) Why is the CDCF needed in Tanzania? Who promoted it? 
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2) What are/will be the criteria for the CDCF Committee of your constituency in 
selecting the projects? Choose from the options below and give examples. 
a. Sectors (e.g. education, water) which need assistance more urgently than other 
sectors 
b. Geographical areas which need assistance more urgently than other areas 
c. Management capacity of the implementing organisations 
d. Others 
 
3) Do you think that the CDCF will decrease the burden on MPs to raise funds to 
respond to the expectations of their constituents? 
 
4) Do you think that the CDCF will give MPs greater autonomy from their parties? 
 
4.  Takrima 
1) What is takrima in politics? How did it change over years? 
 
2) Did the legalisation of takrima by the amendment of the Electoral Laws in 2000 
affect your electoral campaigns? If so, how? 
 
3) Did the illegalisation of takrima in 2006 by the High Court judgement and the 
adoption of the Election Expenses Act in 2009 affect your electoral campaign? If so, 
how? 
 
5.  Roles of MPs in local government budget planning and execution process 
1) How do you engage with the local government budget planning and execution 
process in your constituency? 
 
2) Can you respond to some of the expectation of your constituents by allocating part of 
the local government budget? 
 
 
2. Questions for Second Fieldwork 
1.  Background 
1) Please tell me about the following information: year in which you were elected as an 
MP; current and past position(s) in your party if any; current and past cabinet 
position(s), including shadow cabinets, if any. 
 
2) How many personal assistants do you have? What are his/her/their main roles? 
 
2.  Allocation of Time to Different Duties 
1) How much time (e.g. number of months, weeks or days) do you spend in a year on 
each of the following duties? 
a. Participating in the parliamentary sessions in Dodoma 
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b. Participating in the parliamentary committee meetings in Dar es Salaam 
c. Participating in your party’s meetings 
d. Participating in the district council meetings 
e. Preparing written and oral questions for the parliament 
f. Preparing the Bills 
g. Visiting your constituency 
h. Others, if any major duties (e.g. parties, cabinet) 
 
3.  Expectations of Constituents to MPs 
1) What kinds of requests do you receive from your constituents? Choose from the 
options below and rate them by their frequencies between 1 (=Least) and 5 (=Most). 
a. Change in national policies 
b. Legislations 
c. Complaints to the central government 
d. Complaints to the local government 
e. Complains to your party 
f. Donation to local self-help projects (e.g. harambee) 
g. School fees of individuals 
h. Medical expenses of individuals 
i. Wedding/funeral expenses of individuals 
j. Funds for businesses of individuals 
k. Legal advice for individuals 
l. Others (please specify) 
m. Don’t know 
 
2) In the average month, how many requests do you receive from your constituents 
(including requests made through your personal assistants)? Please indicate the 
approximate number of requests for each of the following means of communication. 
a. Public meetings 
b. Individual meetings 
c. Letters 
d. Phone calls and text messages 
e. E-mails 
f. Others (please specify) 
g. Don’t know 
 
3) Do the types and/or frequency of the requests differ between election and 
non-election years? If so, how? 
 
4.  Responses of MPs to Constituents 
1) Apart from the government budget, do you raise funds by yourself to respond to 
some of the requests? If so, what are the main sources of the funds? Choose from the 
options below and rate them by their significance between 1 (=Least) and 5 (=Most). 
a. Your salary from the government 
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b. Income from your business 
c. Organising fundraising events (e.g. dinner) 
d. Assistance from cabinet members 
e. Assistance from senior party members, except cabinet members 
f. Assistance from your family members 
g. Assistance from business partners and friends 
h. Assistance from foreign donors 
i. Funds borrowed from a bank 
j. Others 
k. Not applicable 
 
5.  Elections and Career Development of MPs 
1) In your view, are there any differences between the following factors? 
a. factors that contributed you to win the last general elections 
b. factors that contributed you to win the last primaries (kura za maoni) 
c. factors that contributed you to win the last primaries (kura za maoni) 
(e.g. legislative activities, raising funds for constituencies, gaining support from 
members of your party, speaking to the press).  
 
2) Please tell me three major factors for each category. If there are any differences 
between these factors, how do MPs balance between them? 
 
6.  Constituencies Development Catalyst Fund (CDCF) 
1) Do you think the CDCF will reduce your fundraising responsibility to help your 
constituents? If so how? 
 
2) In your constituency, what is roughly a) the ratio of the amount of CDCF funds 
allocated to your constituency, b) your personal contribution to community projects, 
and c) your personal contribution to individual voters? (e.g. CDCF: community 
projects: individuals = 1: 2: 3) 
 
3) What are the criteria for the CDCF Committee of your constituency in selecting the 
projects? (e.g. sectors which need assistance more urgently than other sectors, equal 
distribution across the constituency) 
 
4) Have there been any disagreements between yourself and other Committee members 
on the allocations? What was the final outcome? 
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Appendix C  Supplementary Notes for the Regression Analysis in 
Chapter 6 
 
1. Variables 
 
Tables C.1, C.2 and C.3 below provide the explanations on the variables created from 
the Afrobarometer surveys for the regression analysis in Chapter 6. 
 
Table C.1  Variables from Afrobarometer (2005) 
 
Variable
Variable Name and Question in
Afrobarometer Survey
Removed Value
Sponsor 'Sponsor' (dummy) from Q100 *
Male 'Gender' (dummy) from Q101
Age Q1 (interval) 999 (Don't know)
Urban 'Urbrur' (dummy) from URBRUR
Gone without cash income 'Cash' (dummy) from Q8E 9 (Don't know)
Gone without enough food to eat 'Food' (dummy) from Q8A 9 (Don't know)
Education
'Education' (ordinal/interval) from Q90
**
99 (Don't know)
CCM supporters 'CCMsupport' (dummy) from Q86
997 (Would not vote), 998 (Refused to
answer), 999 (Don't know)
Contacted the MP 'Contact' (dummy) from Q32B -1 (Missing), 9 (Don't know)
Voted in the elections 'Voted' (dummy) from Q30 9 (Don't know/Can't remember)
Election incentives 'Incentives' (dummy) from Q57F 9 (Don't know)
Favouritism of leaders 'Favouritism' (dummy) from Q21 6 (Agree with neither), 9 (Don't know)
Approve MP's performance 'Perform' (dummy) from Q68B
-1 (Missing), 9 (Don't know/Haven't
heard enough)  
Note: * The following values in Q100 were treated as the government in the dummy variable 
'Sponsor': Government (General), National/Union Government, Provincial/Regional 
government, Local Government, President’s/Prime Minister’s office, Parliament, Government 
census/National Bureau of Statistics, National Intelligence/Secret Service, Ministry of 
Education and Vocational Training, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, 
Other Government Department/ Ministry, Constitutional Commission, National Electoral 
Commission, National Planning Commission and Political Party/Politicians, Government of 
Zanzibar (SMZ) and Human Rights Commission. The rest of the values including 'Refused to 
answer' and 'Don't know' were treated as non-government. 
** Taking into account that there were not many respondents with post-secondary school 
education, three values were created from Q89: 1) primary school uncompleted (including those 
who have some primary schooling), 2) primary school completed (including those who have 
some secondary schooling) and 3) secondary school completed (including those who have 
post-secondary qualifications from colleges or university). Although it is an ordinal variable, it 
was treated as an interval variable in the regression analysis. 
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Table C.2  Variables from Afrobarometer (2008) 
 
Variable
Variable Name and Question in
Afrobarometer Survey
Removed Value
Male 'Gender' (dummy) from q101
Age q1 (interval)
Urban 'Urbrur' (dummy) from URBRUR
Gone without cash income 'Cash' (dummy) from q8e 9 (Don't know)
Gone without enough food to eat 'Food' (dummy) from q8a 9 (Don't know)
Education 'Education' (ordinal/interval) from q89 *
CCM supporters 'CCMsupport' (dummy) from q86
997 (Not applicable), 998 (Refused to
answer), 999 (Don't know)
Contacted the MP 'Contact' (dummy) from q25b 9 (Don't know)
Voted in the elections 'Voted' (dummy) from q23D 9 (Don't know/Can't remember)
Service-oriented MPs 'Service' (dummy) from q55 5 (Agree with neither), 9 (Don't know)
Favouritism of leaders 'Favouritism' (dummy) from q17 6 (Agree with neither), 9 (Don't know)
Programmetic MPs
'Programmatic' (dummy) by combining
'Service' and 'Favouritism' variables
Approve MP's performance 'Perform' (dummy) from q70b 9 (Don't know/Haven't heard enough)
 
Note: * The same values as ‘Education’ in Table C.1 were created. 
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Table C.3  Variables from Afrobarometer (2012) 
 
Variable
Variable Name and Question in
Afrobarometer Survey
Removed Value
Sponsor 'Sponsor' (dummy) from Q100 *
Male 'Gender' (dummy) from Q101
Age Q1 (interval) 999 (Don't know)
Urban 'Urbrur' (dummy) from URBRUR
Gone without cash income 'Cash' (dummy) from Q8E 9 (Don't know)
Gone without enough food to eat 'Food' (dummy) from Q8A 9 (Don't know)
Education
'Education' (ordinal/interval) from Q97
**
CCM supporters 'CCMsupport' (dummy) from Q89B
9997 (Not applicable), 9998 (Refused
to answer), 9999 (Don't know)
CUF supporters 'CUFsupport' (dummy) from Q89B
9997 (Not applicable), 9998 (Refused
to answer), 9999 (Don't know)
CHADEMA supporters
'CHADEMAsupport' (dummy) from
Q89B
9997 (Not applicable), 9998 (Refused
to answer), 9999 (Don't know)
Voted in the elections 'Voted' (dummy) from Q27 9 (Don't know/Can't remember)
Attended a campaign rally Q29A (dummy) 9 (Don't know)
Persuade others Q29B (dummy) 9 (Don't know)
Worked for a candidate or party Q29C (dummy) 9 (Don't know)
Contacted the MP 'Contact' (dummy) from Q30B 9 (Don't know)
Election incentives 'Incentives' (dummy) from Q61F 9 (Don't know)
Vote margin
'Margin' (interval) added to the
Afrobaromer datasets
100 (Uncontested), 999 (Not available)
MPs' interventions in Parliament
'Intervention' (interval) added to the
Afrobarometer dataset
888 (New constituency), 999 (Not
available)
Cabinet members
'Cabinet (dummy) added to the
Afrobatometer dataset ***
8 (New constituency), 9 (Not available)
Constituency-oriented MPs
'Constituency' (dummy) from
Q79A_TAN
5 (Agree with neither), 9 (Don't know)
Favouritism of leaders 'Favouritism' (dummy) from Q18 6 (Agree with neither), 9 (Don't know)
Programmetic MPs
'Programmatic' (dummy) by combining
'Constituency' and 'Favouritism'
variables
Approve MP's performance 'Perform' (dummy) from Q71B 9 (Don't know/Haven't heard enough)  
Note: * The following values in Q100 were treated as the government in the dummy variable 
'Sponsor': Government (General), National/Union Government, Provincial/Regional 
government, Local Government, President’s/Prime Minister’s office, Parliament, Government 
census/National Bureau of Statistics, National Intelligence/Secret Service, Ministry of 
Education and Vocational Training, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, 
Other Government Department/ Ministry, Constitutional Commission, National Electoral 
Commission, National Planning Commission and Political Party/Politicians. The remaining 
values including 'Refused to answer' and 'Don't know' were treated as non-government. 
** The same values as ‘Education’ in Tables C.1 were created. 
*** The cabinet was reshuffled in February 2008, and both the cabinet members before and 
after the reshuffle were counted as cabinet members. 
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2. Vote Margins 
 
Vote margins were calculated based on the difference between the percentages of votes 
won by the winner and by the runner-up. While there is no information on the 
constituencies of the respondents in the Afrobarometer surveys, the constituencies of 
1,870 samples were identified with the information on wards in the Afrobarometer 
dataset and the postcode list published by the Tanzania Communications Regulatory 
Authority (United Republic of Tanzania 2012b).  
There is no significant relationship between vote margins and election incentives 
(r = 0.02, P = 0.36). However, as Figure C.1 below shows, there are some samples that 
have large vote margins and are remotely located in the scatterplot, which can be 
considered as outliers. 
 
Figure C.1  Scatterplot of Election Incentives and Vote Margins 
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Difference in the proportion of votes won by the winner and the runner-up
 
Note: Election incentives offered: 0 = never, 1 = once or twice, 2 = a few times,      
2 = often 
Source: the author, based on Afrobarometer 
 
Thus, the samples whose vote margins are above 80 percentage points were removed. 
When the vote margins are 80 percentage points or below, the relationship becomes 
statistically significant, but there is no correlation (r = 0.04, P = 0.09) (Figure C.2). 
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Figure C.2  Scatterplot of Election Incentives and Vote Margins (with the 
Exclusion of Margins over 80) 
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Note: Election incentives offered: 0 = never, 1 = once or twice, 2 = a few times,      
2 = often 
Source: the author, based on Afrobarometer 
 
This result shows that there is no influence of the level of electoral competitiveness on 
the likelihood of voters to be offered election incentives in the elections in 2012. 
 
3. MPs’ Interventions in Parliament and the Public Views of Their 
Performance 
 
Despite the high public expectation of MPs to contribute to the whole country in the 
Afrobarometer survey in 2012, there seems to be no significant relationship between the 
levels of engagement of MPs with parliamentary discussions and public views of the 
performance of MPs (r = 0.03, P = 0.25) (Figure C.3).  
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Figure C.3  Scatterplot of the Ranking of MPs’ Interventions in Parliament and 
the Performance of MPs (except Cabinet Members) 
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Note: Performance of MPs: 1 = Strongly Disapprove, 2 = Disapprove, 3 = Approve, 4 = 
Strongly Approve 
Source: the author, based on Afrobarometer and Twaweza (2010b) 
 
